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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON TAX EFFICIENCY 
 
BY 
 
SOHANI FATEHIN 
 
AUGUST 2017 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Andrew Feltenstein 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation addresses questions on tax and efficiency. In particular, the main 
research question in essay one is: what is the impact of state and local taxes as well as 
expenditure policies on the level, growth, and ratio of high wage workers in U.S. In particular, 
this essay tries to identify whether interstate differences in state-local level fiscal policies are the 
main driving force to attract high wage workers or not. Based on Roback (1982) and Epple-Plat’s 
(1998) model, a theoretical model in presented in which the relationship appears as ambiguous. 
Empirically, current population survey (CPS) data is used to find out the impact of tax policies. 
In CPS data, I define high wage workers as one who has earnings greater than 75 percentile of 
U.S wage distribution. Additionally, Occupational Employment Statistics (published by Bureau 
of Labor Statistics) is used in which I characterize high wage workers as one who has wages 
greater than 75 percentiles of all workers in each occupation in the U.S. I include total number of 
high wage workers, growth of high wage workers, and ratio of high wage to total number of 
workers in the analysis and examine how fiscal policies affect different forms of high wage 
workers. The results show that state –local taxes are not the major factors to attract high wage 
workers although expenditure policies have a positive impact in some cases. I also check the 
validity of the results by incorporating different time periods, sets of high wage growing states, 
  
and various other ways in order to define high wage workers. All the results are consistent with 
the main findings. 
Essay two analyzes the impact of enforcement on tax evasion in U.S. Due to declining 
budget for enforcement in U.S, the tendency to evade taxes has gone up over the years. Recent 
data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reveals that tax evasion costs the Federal Government 
$458 billion between 2008 through 2010. This suggests that strong enforcement policies, as well 
as a rise, in the budget for enforcement are needed in U.S.  I use original Allingham-Sandmo 
(1972) model in which they found a positive relationship between audit or enforcement and tax 
compliance. Using Individual Tax Model Data File for 2008 and annual state level data from 
1980 to 2014, this paper finds that enforcement has a significant impact on tax compliance. 
There is a possibility that individuals may respond differently at various levels of income. Here I 
provide evidence that individual’s responses vary at different stages of income. Furthermore, 
state level annual data indicates that higher level of enforcement expenditure does decrease the 
likelihood to avoid taxes.  
Essay three uses the same theoretical model to examine the impact of sales tax evasion on 
macroeconomic indicators for a developing country Pakistan. The performance of Pakistan in 
terms of tax collection is very poor and the government is trying to minimize the loss from tax 
evasion by incorporating a VAT type general sales tax. Using a computable general equilibrium 
model, this essay explores the link between sales tax rate, tax gap in sales tax and enforcement 
level, evasion, and observe the consequences of the evasion on macroeconomic factors. In 
particular, we run two simulations in which the base case incorporates sales tax evasion of 25 
percent and the modified case includes full compliance of the general sales tax. The outcome 
  
indicates an increase in Real GNP growth rate, Tax-GDP ratio, and a reduction in the budget 
deficit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have devoted limited attention to understanding the effect of state level fiscal 
policies on the growth of high wage jobs. Over the last two decades, high wage jobs in the U.S., 
particularly high tech jobs, grew faster than lower wage jobs. There is a substantial literature that 
addresses the effect of state and local government taxes on state employment and other state 
economic conditions. But the existing research has not explored whether the effect of taxes 
differs by skill or wage level. Understanding what drives high wage job growth is an important 
issue for economic development and for designing state development policies aimed at 
influencing the growth of high wage jobs. We hypothesize that low taxes and the associated low 
public expenditure levels are attractive to lower-wage workers and firms that hire lower-wage 
workers but not to high-wage workers and firms that hire high-wage workers. This possibility is 
consistent with the positive income elasticity’s found in studies of the demand for public 
services. 
During the last few decades, both developed and developing countries have been 
struggling with the issue of low tax compliance. The presence of shadow economy, tendency to 
evade taxes deteriorates the compliance behavior. According to Tax Justice Network (2011), in 
2010 US lost $337349 million as a result of the informal or the shadow economy. For developing 
countries, the picture is even worse. For example, Brazil lost $280111 million as a result of the 
shadow economy. The significant reasons for evasion or shadow economy are lower 
enforcement level, poor governance, complicated tax structure as well as tax filing method.  
Tax evasion is an important topic to consider for economic development.  The presence 
of evasion not only reduces public sector budget but also causes various distortions like lower 
economic growth, lower investment etc. Reduction of evasion will require the information about 
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causes of evasion. Therefore finding the determinants of tax evasion will be helpful for policy 
analysis. Furthermore, in the US, the recent recession has led to a reduction in government 
expenditure in tax administrative as well as in enforcement level. As a result, there will be lower 
compliance rate in the future. Thus, including enforcement parameter as one of the determinants 
of tax evasion will help to rethink about the recent budget cut. On the other hand, for any 
developing country, the problem of tax evasion leads to the huge budget deficit which can further 
reduce development expenditure. Therefore, finding out the impact of tax evasion on 
macroeconomic welfare may also help policy makers to justify the importance of enforcement.  
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the link between sub 
national level taxes and growth rate of high wage employment. Using state -level panel data from 
1977 to 2012, our research investigates the relation between interstate differences in sub-national 
tax and expenditure policies and employment sorted by wage level, in particular workers with 
earnings above the 75th percentile. We use the Current Population Survey to measure the number 
high-wage jobs in each state in each year. We use three alternative dependent variables: the 
number of high-wage workers in each state in each year, the year-to-year change in the number 
of high wage worker, and the ratio of high wage worker to the total number of workers. The 
principal independent variables reflect state and local taxes and expenditures per capita. We 
estimate several different models. We first estimate a set of fixed effect panel data models where 
employment is a function of tax and public expenditure variables and a set of control variables. 
However, because of the possible endogeneity between the level of taxes and expenditures and 
economic growth, we also use an instrumental variables model. We present several robustness 
tests and the results are consistent with our expectations.  
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In the second essay, we try to find the link between the responses of individuals in their 
reporting of income on tax returns and lower enforcement level. Since 2010, in the U.S. a 
significant budget cut for enforcement activities (almost 8 percent) has been observed.  Using the 
Individual Tax Returns Model file for the year 2008 and annual state-level data from 1980 to 
2014, this paper utilizes a traditional Allingham-Sandmo (1972) approach in order to identify the 
enforcement effect. We measure tax evasion in two ways. For individual-level data, tax evasion 
is measured by the position of the tax payer’s within $100 tax bracket. We followed Slemrod’s 
methodology to calculate tax evasion for each individual. Furthermore, for aggregate level data, 
evasion is measured by additional taxes and penalties recommended by Internal Revenue Service 
for each state and for each year. For enforcement variables, audit rate, enforcement budget, and 
the civil penalty assessed are used. In particular, this paper uses two stage least square methods 
as well as quantile regression methods in order to deal with the endogeneity issue as well as to 
take care of the various behavioral responses of the individuals at different points of income. The 
results indicate that lower enforcement level affects the compliance decision of the individual. 
However, there are significant differences in the responses at the individual level of analysis, and 
also there are notable differences in the responses at different stages of income.  
The third essay is trying to investigate sales tax evasion scenario for a developing country 
Pakistan. Among the developing countries, Pakistan has the lowest tax-GDP ratio. On average, 
the tax-GDP ratio for Pakistan is close to 11 percent which is one of the lowest among other 
South Asian Countries.  One of the reasons for this low tax-GDP is related to the high degree of 
tax evasion. In order to reduce this, the Government of Pakistan has adopted VAT (instead of 
sales tax). However, still in Pakistan VAT types sales tax evasion (in particular General Sales 
Tax gap) is observed. In this paper, we are trying to find out the impact of sales tax evasion on 
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macroeconomic output. We use a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model in which we 
incorporate an endogenous tax evasion. We run two simulations-one with the sales tax evasion of 
25 percent and another with full compliance. The model is calibrated for 8 years. The results 
show an increase in the tax-GDP ratio as well as an increase in the compound annual growth rate 
of real GNP over the 8 periods.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE NUMBER AND GROWTH OF 
HIGH WAGE JOBS: EVIDENCE FROM TWO STATE LEVEL PANEL DATA SETS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a long standing interest in measuring the effects of state fiscal policy on state 
economic growth, measured alternatively by employment, income, investment, and business 
locations. Since employment growth plays an important role in overall economic growth, much 
of the research on this topic has focused on the effect of fiscal variables on job growth. 
Researchers have found mixed results regarding the relationship between state fiscal policy and 
state job growth. Some researchers argue that traditional state tax policies are ineffective in 
promoting state job growth because state and local taxes are too small a percentage of business 
cost to affect the firms’ decisions on location and employment.  On the other hand, others argue 
that due to the development of technology and transportation infrastructure, businesses and 
workers have become more mobile, which has increased the effect of state and local taxes on 
business location decisions (Bartik, 1992). Recent studies, for example, Romer and Romer 
(2010), Barro and Redlick (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2013), find that taxes and economic 
growth are negatively related. In recent times, this debate has gained importance among 
policymakers due to the large income tax cut observed in five states since 2010. 1 The stated 
objective of such tax policy is to increase economic growth2.  At the same time, prosperous states 
like New York and California, have maintained high tax rate over the years.3  
                                                 
1 Kansas, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin  
2 Governor Sam Brownback, “Tax cuts needed to grow economy,” The Wichita Eagle, July 29, 2012, 
http://www.kansas.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/article1096336.html.  
3 In terms of GDP growth, New York was fifth highest and California was ninth highest among the states in 2014.  
On the other hand, GDP growth rate was 0.2% for Maine, 0.8% for Kansas. 2.1% for Ohio in 2014-2015 which was 
lower than the national average.   
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The existing research on job growth has focused on the effect of taxes on the state 
employment growth without regards to how that effect might differ by skill or wage level.  
While states generally welcome any new job, states are especially interested in attracting new 
high wage jobs since such jobs are thought to produce more revenue than the cost of the services 
provided.  Therefore, high-wage job growth is an important issue for economic development and 
state development policies that may influence their growth.   
The principal objective of this paper is to address the question: what is the impact of 
state-local taxes on the level and growth of high-wage jobs? In particular, we focus on how high 
skilled workers sort themselves across states in response to state tax differences.  Although the 
literature on the effect of taxation on economic growth is quite large, no research has been 
conducted that examines the impact of taxes on the level and growth of high-wage jobs at the 
state level. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by considering difference in job growth 
across states as a result of migration of high wage workers. Figure 1.1 shows the presence of 
migration among high wage workers. Although the migration rate for high skilled workers is 
higher for within counties movement4, overall there is a declining trend of migration.   
The general approach to the question of the effect of taxes on employment and economic 
growth starts with the basic premise that higher taxes are a disincentive to employment. 
However, it could be that low taxes and the associated low public expenditure levels are 
attractive to low-wage workers but not to high-wage workers and firms that hire high-wage 
workers. We present a theoretic model in which the relationship between state fiscal policies and 
the location preference of high skilled labor is ambiguous.  
                                                 
4 In Current Population Survey Data, three types of migration are included. 1. Moved within county, 2. Moved 
within states, different county, and 3. Moved between states.  
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To address this question empirically, we construct two employment panel data sets. The 
first data set is constructed from the Annual March Demographic Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), 1977 through 2012. We define high wage for each year as the annual 
wage in excess of the 75 percentile of individual wages for the entire U.S5. The second 
employment data set is derived from the occupation files of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Because the occupation codes changed, our panel is limited to the period 1999 through 2012. We 
define high wage for each occupation in each year as the wage at the 75 percentile of all workers 
in that occupation in the U.S. We measure the annual number of high wage workers in each state 
in each year, the year-to-year annual change in the number of high-wage workers, and ratio of 
high wage workers to the total number of workers. Along with state-local total tax revenues, we 
also address the separate impact of four different taxes (property tax, general sales tax, total 
income tax, and corporate net income tax) on the level, growth and ratio of high skilled workers.  
We measure taxes in per capita terms as well as per dollar of personal income.  
We estimate several different models. We first estimate a set of fixed effect panel data 
models where high-wage employment is a function of taxes and public expenditure variables and 
a set of control variables. However, there is a possibility of endogeneity since economic growth 
affects the level of taxes and expenditures and at the same time, taxes and expenditures affect 
economic growth (Srithongung & Kriz, 2014). Therefore, we use a model with instrumental 
variables in an attempt to obtain interpretable causal inference.   
We find that the level as well as the growth of high wage employment are negatively, but 
statistically insignificantly related to the measurement of the state and local taxes for most of the 
                                                 
5 Hawaii and Alaska are excluded from the analysis.  
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estimations.  We also conduct several robustness tests and find that our results hold up. These 
results imply that state tax policies are not the main driving force in determining the distribution 
of high skilled labor across states, even though it may be that low skilled workers are affected by 
the state fiscal policies. And state expenditure policies may have some positive impact on high 
skilled workers. This finding is consistent with the interstate migration analysis. For example, 
between 2008 and 2012, interstate migration from New York (a high income tax rate state) to 
Florida (a no income tax state) was three times larger for workers below $50,000 earnings than 
for workers above $100,000 earnings.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  The next section contains a review of 
literature that address the relationship between state fiscal policy and state economic growth. 
Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 4 discusses the data and the empirical 
methods used. Section 5 presents the empirical results using the CPS and BLS employment data 
set. Last section 6 concludes.   
1.2. Literature Review  
           The research on the effect of taxes on economic growth is extensive. There are several 
surveys of the literature, Bartick (1992), Phillips and Goss (1995), Wasylenko (1997), and Buss 
(2001). We focus on the more recent literature, key articles, and papers that are particularly 
relevant to the issue we address. Research differs in terms of how the economic growth is 
measured, for example, income, employment, manufacturing employment, etc. The research also 
differs in term of which taxes are considered, how the level of taxes is measured, and how public 
expenditures are incorporated into the empirical analysis. And, of course, research differs in 
terms of what geography, time period, what control variables, and econometric techniques that 
are used. 
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1.2.1 Tax and Income Growth  
Research on the effect of taxes on income growth is inconclusive, with some papers 
finding positive effects and others finding negative effects. Many of the studies conclude that 
taxes have small, negative effects on economic activity, particularly if the tax revenue is used to 
fund transfer payments. Seminal work by Helms (1985) measures the effect of state and local 
taxes on state personal income. He accounts for budget balancing and uses property taxes, other 
state-local taxes, user fees, federal source revenues as tax variables and health, highways, local 
schools, higher education, and other expenditures as spending variables6. Using data for 48 states 
from 1965-1979 and applying fixed effect, instrumental variable, as well as generalized least 
square method, he finds negative significant impact of state taxes on state personal income and 
positive significant impact of spending on health, highways, and education on state personal 
income. The spending impact is larger than the impact from tax resulting in a positive net impact 
of tax financed increase in government services.   
Subsequent studies also indicate negative association between state tax7 and state income 
growth. Mullen and Williams (1994) find that higher state marginal tax rate limits state output 
growth. Reed (2008) finds a negative effect of the tax burden on state income growth. He 
estimates the model for different time periods, different geographical regions and uses various 
estimation techniques8.  Results from all the analysis show that raising total taxes to fund non-
welfare expenditure exerts a negative effect on growth, both in long run and short run.   
                                                 
6 He excludes sales tax from revenue side and welfare spending from expenditure side to maintain budget constraint 
identity.   
7 Several studies employ different measures of tax.  Theoretically, marginal tax rates (MTR) distort relative prices, 
resulting in a welfare loss. However, it is difficult to observe MTR in most cases. Therefore, studies also use average 
tax rates (Engen and Skinner, 1992).  
8 E.g. pooled OLS with time and state fixed effect, fixed effects, random effects, generalized methods of moment, 
and dynamic panel data estimation.  
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In particular, he finds that a one percentage point increase in taxes for the current five year 
period results in 1.37 percent lower growth in that period’s per capita personal income.   
Using different types of taxes may also have different impacts on the economy, and 
hence on growth. In theory, investment and capital formation should be affected more by 
corporate taxes whereas income taxes should have larger effects on individual labor supply and 
savings behavior. Both of these taxes impose taxes on future consumption. Some studies have 
found that corporate and personal income taxes have larger negative effects on economic growth 
than other taxes (Holcombe and Lacombe 2004, Lee and Gordon, 2005). On the other hand, 
Miller and Russek (1997) find negative impact on real per capita economic growth if sales taxes 
or other taxes are used to finance transfer payments and positive impact when corporate income 
taxes are used to finance transfer payments. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) show that a consumption 
tax does not affect the return on capital, and thus, should not affect investment, output and 
productivity. In addition, they also show that property taxation lowers the return on reproducible 
physical capital and on non-reproducible land. Therefore, increases in property tax rates that 
lower the return on capital will reduce growth. In another study, Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell 
(1999) distinguish between taxes that distort labor and investment decisions (defined as taxes on 
income and property) and non-distortionary taxes, which include consumption taxes. They 
conclude that while the former reduces economic growth, the latter does not. Additionally, they 
find that productive government spending benefits economic growth. Similar results were 
observed by Widmalm (2001), and Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2006).    
Using state level data from 1972 to 1998, and incorporating fixed effect model, 
Tomljanovich (2004) finds that higher tax rates reduces state per capita output levels and growth 
11 
 
in the short run. However, long run growth is unaffected by changes in state tax rates, changes in 
state public spending, and by changes in federal aid. In a recent study, Gale, Krupkin and Rueben  
(2015) use Reed’s (2008) model and estimate the impact of tax revenues and income tax rates on 
economic growth for the period 1977-2011. For the tax variables, they use total tax, property tax, 
personal income tax, corporate, sales and other taxes. The economic activities they consider are 
per capita real personal income growth, firm’s per capita formation growth, and the employment 
population ratio. Using ordinary least square method, they find that results are sensitive to 
different time periods e.g. the effect of tax is negative for the period 1977-1991, and is positive 
for 1992-2006. For the whole period (1977-2011), the effect of tax revenues as well as top tax 
rates is not significant.   
A few studies consider the possibility of a nonlinear effect of taxes on economic growth.  
Using five-year interval data from 1962 to 1997, Bania et al. (2007) estimate nonlinear effects of 
taxes. They observe a non-monotonic impact of tax financed expenditures on growth. They 
conclude that taxes increase growth at the beginning, but once government fiscal policies crowds 
out private investment, growth falls.   
Most of the studies examining the effect of tax on economics growth are biased due to 
endogeneity issue. The reverse causality arises because economic conditions affect the level of 
state government taxes and expenditure, while taxes and expenditures also affect economic 
conditions. To deal with this, several papers use lagged variables techniques, first different 
method, or federal tax changes as instrumental variables (Yamarick 2000, Brown, Hayes and 
Taylor, 2003, Barro and Redlick 2009). In a more recent study, Srithongung and Kriz (2014) use 
Panel vector Autoregressive method to solve the endogeneity issue. They use 48 continental state 
level data from 1970 to 2010 and find negative impact of taxes on state income growth in the 
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short run. They also find that public capital spending has a positive effect on income growth, 
both in the short run and in the long run.   
1.2.2 Tax and Employment  
Several papers examine the effects of taxes on employment growth. Mofidi and Stone 
(1990) studies the effects of tax burden and expenditures on the growth of manufacturing 
employment from 1962 to 1982. Like Helms (1985), they omit transfer payments and find that 
taxes that fund transfer payments have a negative effect, while expenditures on health, education, 
and infrastructure have positive effects on employment. 9  However, they do find little to no 
impact on employment when an increase in taxes are associated with an increase in spending on 
health, education, and highways. In a more micro level study, Dalenbergh and Partridge (1995) 
use data for 28 metropolitan areas for 15 periods to analyses micro economic interactions. They 
measure the effect of taxes on total employment and on some disaggregate level of employment 
(e.g., manufacturing employment).  Using ordinary least squares, they find that taxes are 
negatively related to employment growth after controlling for the government budget constraint. 
On the other hand, Wheat (1986) finds insignificant impacts of taxes on manufacturing 
employment growth. He further notes that the most important explanatory factors are markets, 
state amenities, and unionization. Furthermore, in another study Reed and Rogers (2004) 
consider the effect of a 30 percent reduction in personal income taxes over period 1994 and 1996 
in New Jersey, and find no significant difference in employment between New Jersey and the 
control states. More specifically, using difference-in-differences method, they find that the 
increase in employment in New Jersey as compared to other states is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.  
                                                 
9 Holding taxes constant  
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Similarly, Goff, Lebedinsky, and Lile (2012) examine the effect of tax revenues on per 
capita gross state product (GSP) growth from 1997 to 2005. Using matched pairs analysis of 
cross sectional data, they find that a reduction in corporate taxes does not increase employment 
or wages. However, an increase in corporate taxes does result in lower employment and wages. 
Migration of workers can also affect overall state employment. Various papers discuss 
the effect of taxation on the migration of workers, in particular the migration of elderly. Conway 
and Houtenville (2001) study the relationship between elderly migration and state fiscal policies. 
They argue that along with the cost of living and climate factors, states with no sales tax on food 
and lower spending on welfare influence the decision of migration. Bakija and Slemrod (2004) 
focus on the rich (mainly elderly people) and the impact of state sales taxes and estate taxes on 
the number of federal estate tax return filed. They find that high estate taxes and sales taxes have 
negative impact on the federal estate tax returns files in a state. Yang and Warner (2011) use an 
evidence of natural experiment in New Jersey10 and estimate the elasticity of migration using a 
difference-in-differences method. The results show lower elasticity and indicate that migration is 
higher for people at the retirement age, and people living on investment income.  
On the other hand, Kleven et al. (2013) measure the effect of income tax (preferential 
foreign tax scheme) on the migration of top earners using Danish Administrative data. They 
estimate large elasticity of migration among foreigners and argue that the scheme has doubled 
the number of highly paid foreigners.   
In summary, the existing empirical evidence regarding the relationship between taxes and 
economic growth is very large and yields mixed results. Moreover, in the case of employment 
growth, studies focusing on total employment or on manufacturing employment find negative 
                                                 
10 An increase in income tax rate on top income earners by 2.6% points to 8.97%.  
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weak association between state tax and state employment. Despite a large and important 
literature on economic growth and taxes, the effect of taxes on overall high-wage jobs has gone 
unnoticed. In fact, there exists no evidence that addresses the issue of how taxes effect the 
sorting of high wage workers across states. Moreover, estimating causal effects remains an 
important question due to reverse causality between employment growth and state fiscal policies.  
Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by implementing an instrumental variable 
method that aims to estimate causal evidence on the effect of state fiscal policies on state wise 
sorting of high skilled workers.  
1.3 Theoretical Framework  
            The empirical literature discussed above is based on the implicit assumption that 
employment is driven by the demand for workers by firms. But in equilibrium, the supply of and 
demand for workers are equal. Thus, we model employment as being determined by the supply 
of workers. Therefore, our question of interest is whether inter jurisdictional differences in taxes 
have a differential effect on the choice of residential jurisdiction for high-wage workers. This 
question can be framed in the context of the sorting of workers across jurisdictions. There are 
two streams of literature that present sorting models that are relevant to the basic question with 
which we are concerned. One stream is generally associated with Roback (1982) model of 
amenity evaluation, while the second stream is the sorting and capitalization literature that flows 
from Tiebout (1956).   
Roback (1982) presents a model of sorting of workers across jurisdictions that differ in 
terms of their amenities. Her theoretical model has no role for government. She assumes that 
amenities cannot be changed and that there is only one type (defined by skill and tastes) of 
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worker.11 Since in equilibrium, utility has to be the same across all jurisdictions, wage rates and 
land rental rates adjust to bring that about, while still ensuring that labor demand equals labor 
supply in all jurisdictions. Since wage rates differ across jurisdictions, income also differs.     
Tiebout outlines a sorting model in which households have different preferences for tax-
public good packages, jurisdiction offer alternative tax-public good packages, and household 
locate in that jurisdiction that offer the household’s preferred tax-public good package.  
Extensions and applications of the Tiebout model are substantial; see Ross and Yinger 1999 for a 
review of the literature. Epple and Platt’s (1998) paper comes closest to modeling our 
environment. Epple and Platt develop a sorting model in which households differ by income and 
preferences. Unlike in Roback model’s, in Epple and Platt’s model a household’s income is 
given and does not depend on the jurisdiction in which the household is located. The public good 
in the Epple and Platt model can be considered as equivalent to the amenity in Roback’s model. 
However, unlike Roback, Epple and Platt allow the level of the public good, as well as the tax 
rate required to finance the public good, to vary with the makeup of the jurisdiction, with the 
amount of the public good being determined by a social choice mechanism.  
Neither Roback (1982) nor Epple and Platt (1998) model an environment in which wage 
rates differ across workers and jurisdictions, and tax rates and the levels of public good differ 
across jurisdictions.  We modify Roback’s model by requiring that governments finance the 
quantity of amenities (public goods) and by assuming that workers are heterogeneous, differing 
in their skill levels. We modify Epple and Platt’s model by allowing the wage rates to differ 
across jurisdictions.   
                                                 
11 In an extension of her model, Roback (1988) allows for two types of worker who differ in their skill level.  
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Consider a world of multiple jurisdictions and workers. Each jurisdiction provides a fixed 
amount of a public good, which is financed by an income tax. Workers make choices over 
jurisdiction of residence and their consumption bundle.  
First, consider workers. We assume that there is a fixed number of workers and that each 
worker provides a fixed amount of labor, i.e., there is no labor-leisure choice. We assume there is 
an integer number K of worker types that differ in their skill level, and thus in their productivity. 
Let sk denote the skill level of worker k, which we take to be the effective amount of labor 
provided by that worker. Let s1 = 1, and si > sj if i > j.   
We assume that workers of different skill levels are perfectly substitutable at a fixed 
constant rate equal to their relative skill level; for example, firms can substitute two workers with 
skill level equal to 1 for one worker with skill level equal to 2. Thus, labor supply in any 
jurisdiction equals the sum of workers weighted by their skill level. The labor supply is as 
follows, as shown in equation 1.  
                                      𝐿𝑗 = ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑘𝑗           [1] 
  
where 𝐿𝑗 is the total effective labor supply in jurisdiction j, and 𝐿𝑘𝑗 is the number of workers of 
type k in jurisdiction j.  
In any jurisdiction, the wage per unit of skill is equal for all workers in that jurisdiction. 
The relationship between skill level and the wage rate is thus given by  
                               𝑤𝑘𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘 ∙ 𝑤1𝑗                 [2] 
where wkj is the wage in jurisdiction j for worker of type k, and 𝑤1𝑗 is the wage in jurisdiction j 
for workers with skill level sk = 1.    
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Workers make two decisions. They choose the jurisdiction in which to live and which 
consumption bundle to purchase. We assume there are three goods that enter a worker’s utility 
function, a private numeraire good X, rented land, denoted , and the jurisdiction provided public 
good, denoted G.12 Utility for worker of type k in jurisdiction j is given by   
                                                         𝑈𝑘𝑗 = (𝑋𝑘𝑗, 𝑙𝑘𝑗; 𝐺𝑗)           [3] 
where X is the private good, l is land, and G is the public good. A workers in jurisdiction j 
maximizes utility subject to the following budget constraint,  
                                           (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝑤𝑘𝑗 = 𝑋𝑘𝑗 + 𝑟𝑗𝑙𝑘𝑗            [4]    
 where  is the tax rate on earnings in jurisdiction j, r is the land rental rate, and  is the land 
rented by the worker. The price of X is one in all jurisdictions since we take X to be a uniform 
good sold in all jurisdiction and is the numeraire good. Land is owned by absentee landlords who 
use their rents to purchase X. A worker locates in the jurisdiction that yields the worker her 
maximum utility.   
As with Roback, we assume that X is produced by firms using land and labor according 
to a constant returns to scale production function.13 As noted above, good X is identical 
regardless of where it is produced. Roback allows production to depend on amenities, but for 
simplicity we assume that production does not depend on G. Given the constant returns to scale 
production function, the unit cost function, denoted C, can be expressed a function of skill 
adjusted wage rate and the rental rate of land, and will equal one in all jurisdictions14 as follows 
(𝑤1𝑗, 𝑟𝑗) = 1 [5] 
                                                 
12 We do not consider housing consumption. We could assume that housing is a fixed bundle of land and capital.   
13 We ignore capital inputs by assuming that each unit of “labor” is a composite of a worker and a fixed amount of 
capital, and thus capital does not directly enter the analysis. We make this assumption for convenience, since 
allowing capital and labor to vary substantially increases the complexity of the model.  
14 since X is the numeraire 
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Thus, given the skill adjusted wage rate in a jurisdiction, the land rental rate in that jurisdiction 
can be determined from the common unit cost function.  
We assume there are a given set of J jurisdictions. As do Roback and Epple and Platt, we 
assume that an individual works in the jurisdiction of residence and derives utility from the 
public good provided in the jurisdiction of residence only.  Each jurisdiction is assumed to have 
the same amount of identical land, which is geographically immobile. Labor is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile across jurisdictions.   
We assume that the level of public good in each jurisdiction has been set by the 
jurisdiction’s government. We assume the level of the public good does not change and that the 
amount varies across jurisdictions. The public good is assumed to be fully congested (i.e., a 
publicly provided private good) and produced at a fixed per unit cost of one. Let Gj be the per 
capita amount of the public good. (This assumption differs from Epple and Platt, who allow the 
tax-public good package to be determined by a majority vote of residents in the jurisdiction.)  In 
order to finance the public good, we assume that the jurisdiction imposes a tax on labor income 
at a flat rate. Given a requirement to balance its budget, the relationship between public service 
level and the tax rate in jurisdiction j is given by  
                                            (∑𝑘 𝐿𝑘𝑗) 𝐺𝑗 = 𝜏𝑗𝐵𝑗             [6] 
where  is the tax rate, and B is the tax base, which equals aggregate labor income, i.e., 𝐵𝑗 =𝑤𝑗 ∑ 
𝑠𝑘𝐿𝑘𝑗. We can express the indirect utility function for a worker of type k in jurisdiction j as  
 𝑉𝑘𝑗 = (1, 𝑟𝑗, (1 − 𝜏𝑘); 𝐺𝑗)          [7] 
where 1 is the price of X. After tax income is given by 𝑦𝑘𝑗 = (1 − 𝜏𝑘).  
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We can rewrite [7] as 
𝑉𝑘𝑗 = ((1, 𝑟𝑗, 𝑦𝑘𝑗; 𝐺𝑗), 𝑦𝑘𝑗 − (1, 𝑟𝑗, 𝑦𝑘𝑗; 𝐺𝑗); 𝐺𝑗)     [8]  
Where (1, 𝑟𝑘, ;) is the demand for land. We assume positive income elasticities of the demand for 
X, land, and G.  We next generate properties of a worker’s indifference curve in the (r, y) plane.   
        [9]  
Equation 9 says that for a given G, the slope of V is positive. The second derivative of equation 9 
with respect to G is given by 
            [10] 
The sign of  depends on the effect of G on the demand for . There is no a priori 
reason to expect that G and  are complements or substitutes. If we assume that an increase in G 
results in an increase in , then . Let us consider this case. Assuming that 𝑙𝐺 is positive 
for all values of G, then it follows that as G increases the slope of the indifference curve 
decreases.  It further implies that the indifference curves exhibit single crossing.   
In equilibrium, all workers reside in the jurisdiction that maximizes her utility, land 
markets clear, the governments balance their budgets. We do not prove the existence of an 
equilibrium but assume that an equilibrium does exist. We assume that in equilibrium there are 
workers of some skill level who reside in multiple jurisdictions. This requires that workers of 
that skill level be indifferent regarding the jurisdiction in which to reside. If the number of 
jurisdictions is smaller than the number of worker types, then there will be some, but not 
necessarily all, worker types who reside in multiple jurisdictions.    
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 We are interested in under what conditions higher skilled workers will reside in 
jurisdictions that provide a larger amount of the public good. To address this, assume that 
initially there is only workers of one skill level (assumed to be sk = 1) and multiple jurisdictions 
that offer different amounts of the public good. We assume that there is an equilibrium, which 
implies that the utilities of all workers are equal regardless of their residential jurisdiction. Under 
these assumptions it follows that 𝜏𝑗 = 𝐺𝑗/𝑠1𝑊1𝑗.   
Now suppose that a worker of a higher skill level enters and has to decide in which 
jurisdiction to live. We can answer this by considering which jurisdiction generates the higher 
utility for the new worker. If the marginal utility of G is greater the higher the skill level of the 
worker, the worker will choose to reside in a jurisdiction in which G is larger. This implies that 
we need to determine the sign of 𝜕2𝑉/𝜕𝑠𝜕𝐺.  
Since we are considering a small change in the number of workers in a jurisdiction, we 
can assume that prices and tax rates do not change. Differentiating equation 8 with respect to s 
and G, we obtain  
     
where subscripts represent partial derivatives. It seems reasonable to assume that the first partial 
derivatives are positive and that the second partial derivatives and V12 are negative. It follows 
that the sign of  thus depends on the signs of 𝑉13, 𝑙23, and 𝑉23.  𝑉13 and 𝑉23 represent the 
change in the marginal utility of land and X as G changes, and 𝑙23 is the change in the effect of a 
change in r on the demand for land as G changes. If these terms are positive, then it can be 
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shown that 𝜕2𝑉/𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑠 > 0. This means that the higher skilled worker will choose a jurisdiction 
with the larger G (and higher ). In other words, higher skilled workers prefer jurisdictions with  
greater G. Of course if 𝑉13, 𝑙23, and 𝑉23 are negative, then  cannot be signed.     
Thus, whether higher skilled workers locate in jurisdictions in which G (and ) is larger is 
an empirical question. However, we do not observe high skilled worker’s net benefit of choosing 
a jurisdiction. We only observe number of high skilled workers15 for each state over the years. 
Here we are interested in how high wage workers sort themselves across different states. For the 
empirical analysis, we assume that jurisdictions with higher skilled workers are also jurisdictions 
with higher wages. But given that (𝑤𝑗, 𝑟𝑗) implies that wj and rj are negatively related, it is 
feasible for jurisdictions with higher skilled workers to have lower wage workers. Thus, we 
might expect to find that higher skilled workers (perhaps reflected in a higher level of education) 
to local in jurisdictions with higher level of public good.   
1.4 Data and Methodology  
The analysis uses a panel data set consisting of the 48 continental U.S. states for years 
1977 to 2012.16 The primary variable of interest is employment in high wage jobs, which we 
define as one with wages equal to or greater than the wages at the 75 percentile of the U.S. wage 
distribution. Using employment data from the March demographic supplement of Current 
Population Survey (CPS) we determine the earnings at the 75 percentile level for all individuals 
in the U.S. 16 years of age and over who have positive annual earnings greater than $100.17     
                                                 
15 Total number of high wage workers for each year is a function of total number of sample population for each year 
as higher sample population for a year should have higher wage workers compared to the year which has lower 
sample population. This issue is discussed in the robustness check section.   
16 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the analysis.  
17 The wage calculated from the CPS is slightly higher than the wage reported by the Census Bureau.  
18 State level data are available from 1998 to 2015.   
19 http://slfdqs.taxpolicycenter.org/pages.cfm  
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The 75 percentile wage is calculated for each year using person weights (Table 1.1). We create a 
high-wage dummy variable for all individuals that is equal to one if the individual’s earnings are 
greater than or equal to the 75 percentile wage. We sum of this dummy variable for each state 
and each year 1977-2012.  Furthermore, in order to verify the results with occupational 
characteristics, we also use Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data published by Bureau 
of Labor Statistics from 1998 to 201218. Because the occupation codes changed, our panel is only 
for the period 1999 through 2012.  We define high wage for each occupation as the wage at the 
75 percentile of all workers in U.S. in that occupation. We measure our dependent variable in 
three ways: annual number of high wage workers in each state in each year, the annual change in 
the number of high-wage workers, and ratio of high wage employment to total employment.    
The focus of the research is on the effect of fiscal policy on high wage employment. For 
fiscal policy variables, we include various measures of state plus local taxes and expenditures, 
collected from the Urban Brookings Tax Policy Center’s State and Local finance Data Query 
System (SLF-DQS).19 Total taxes, property tax, general sales tax, income tax, and corporate net 
income tax, all measured real (2012 dollars) per capita as well as per dollar of state personal 
income are used as the tax variables. In the basic regression, we alternatively use total tax per 
capita and total tax per dollar of state personal income for the tax variable.  However, since the 
effect of taxes may differ across specific taxes, we also estimate regressions that include property 
tax, income tax, corporate net income tax, and general sales tax, per capita as well as per dollar 
of state personal income.   
To incorporate expenditures, we use total spending on education, health, highways, 
securities, air transportation, and transit utility. We define these spending categories as 
productive spending. To maintain a balanced budget restriction, we include all of the items in the 
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budget reported by US Census Bureau. Table 1.A1 in the Appendix shows the detailed 
descriptions of the fiscal policy variables.  
There are missing values for the fiscal policy variables for years 2001 and 2003 for all 
states since the Bureau of the Census did not report state level data for those two years. In order 
to have a continuous data set, the average of the previous and following years’ values is used for 
the missing values. All the expenditure variables are measured in real (2012 dollars) per capita 
terms.   
We expect that high-wage employment will be affected by firm demand for high wage 
workers and factors that would attract high-wage workers to the state. To the extent that high 
wage jobs are compliments to other jobs, factors that affect the number of jobs in general will 
also affect high-wage jobs. Our control variables include several state level characteristics that 
reflect these three factors. Since we also include state and year fixed effects, we do not include 
variables that do not change over time, for example amenities such as being on the coast.   
The variables that reflect factors that are thought to affect overall employment include 
measures of labor skill, cost of labor, and cost of energy. We hypothesize that the more skilled 
labor will promote more growth of employment, both overall jobs and high wage job. On the 
other hand, we expect that higher cost of production, e.g. energy cost, will reduce growth 
(Dalenbergh and Partridge 1995). Labor skill is measured by the percentage of persons 25 years 
of age and over with a bachelor degree or more. The data are from Census Bureau. Energy cost is 
measured as the average real price of electricity to industrial users, as reported by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration. Since Gale et al. (2015) include the unemployment rate, we 
also include the unemployment rate, as measured by the January seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
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Several state characteristics are expected to affect the attractiveness for high wage 
workers. We include the following variables: heating degree days18 (collected from U.S. Energy 
Information Administration), per capita crime rate (collected from the U.S. Department of 
Justice19).   
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.2.1. The mean value for property tax per 
capita is higher than all the other types of taxes. In case of productive spending, spending on 
education is higher (on average, it is $1566 for the whole period of 1977-2012. On average, 22 
percent of labor has a bachelor degree or more. We also conduct the analysis for two sub periods 
(1977-2007, and 1977-2001) in order to check the validity of the relationship. For the two sub 
periods, property tax still dominates and no huge variation is observed from the total sample 
period.   
We assume that employment in high wage jobs in each state is in equilibrium and 
equilibrium employment depends on both fiscal policy and non-fiscal policy variables. The basic 
regression equation is as follows       
𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + β2𝐺𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑉𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                 (12)  
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is defined as employment in high wage jobs in state i in year t, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the taxes per 
capita, 𝐺𝑖𝑡 is the state–local government expenditure per capita, X is a set of non-policy variables, 
 is a set of year dummies, V is a set of fixed state dummies, and  is the error term. Year 
dummies are used to control for factors such as business cycle, change in federal policies, etc. 
that vary over time but not across states. State dummies are used to control for state specific 
factors like climate, natural resources, natural amenities, etc.   
                                                 
18 Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) use average daily high temperature and average daily low temperature.   
19 http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm  
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We also estimate different variations of equation (12) as robustness checks. First we run 
the regression by only including fiscal variables (total state-local level taxes and expenditures) 
and total high wage employment while excluding other controls. The objective is to see whether 
inclusion of more controls fade out the effect of the policies or not. Second, we use the change in 
high wage employment as the dependent variable and change in both high wage employment and 
change in fiscal variables in separate regression20.  
Reed (2008) has shown that annual data may be sensitive to measurement error and that 
five year periods is suitable to reduce the bias of the results. Therefore, five year interval (non- 
connecting interval) changes are also used in separate regression and observations are spread out 
over these years. This will make serial correlation and measurement error less severe. 
Furthermore, Gale, et al. (2015) find that the relationship between economic growth and taxes 
are sensitive to time period used to estimate the regression. Different time periods may also 
influence the relationship between high-wage employment growth and fiscal policies. Therefore 
as mentioned before, we use two different time periods (1977-2007 and 1977-2001) in order to 
check the validity of the results.   
Our procedure for measuring high wage employment means that in each year total U.S.  
high wage employment is 25 percent of total employment. That is not a problem since we are 
interested in where the high wage workers live. However, to allow the percentage of high wage 
workers to vary, as an alternative we measure high wage in each year as the wage at the 75th 
percentile in 1977 adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.   
                                                 
20 There are four specifications-1. Total high wage employment and total tax per capita 2. Change in high wage 
employment and total tax per capita 3. Change in high wage employment and change in tax per capita, and 4.  
Change in high wage employment and five years change in tax per capita  
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We estimate equation (12) by OLS as well as by a fixed effect model. Fixed effect model 
is preferable because it can control unobserved heterogeneity across different states. Even after 
ruling out within state time invariant difference through individual fixed effect, theoretically 
there is a possibility of reverse causality and hence endogeneity. Economic growth will affect 
fiscal policy decisions, which also in turn will influence growth. To control for this we use a two 
stage least square (2SLS) method and employ two types of instrumental variables that have been 
used in previous literature. The first reflects state government political characteristics and the 
second uses state demographic characteristics.  
a) State Government Political Characteristics: It is empirically observed that political 
characteristics like state legislature controlled by Democratic Party and a Democratic 
State Governor are strongly associated to state government per capita general expenditure 
(Merrifield, 2000). Liberal government spends more than conservative government (Reed 
2006; Krause, Lewis and Douglas 2013). It has been found that when Democrats control 
the state legislation, tax burden is higher (Reed 2006). Democratic controlled states are 
more likely to increase taxes when dealing with shortage of revenue (Alt and Lowry 
1994). Therefore, the political characteristics of state government have a strong influence 
on both the tax and expenditure policies and these can be used as instruments for fiscal 
policies. Here we include a categorical variable for whether the state’s governor is from 
the Democratic Party or not. Furthermore, we also use party control of state legislatures. 
Data on political variables from 1977-2008 are collected from Dubin (2008) and for the 
other years, the data is collected from the National Conference of State Legislators 
reports.    
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b) State Demographic Characteristics: The second type of instrumental variable comes from 
state demographic characteristics, and in particular, the age and poverty rate for the 
population. States with higher proportion of child’s less than 16 years have higher 
demand for public school services and therefore have higher education expenditure 
(Bunch, 1993).  Moreover, the largest portion of spending for state-local government is 
associated with elementary –secondary education. Therefore, proportion of children less 
than 16 has important influence on state –local finances. On the other hand, higher 
proportion of the elderly in the state may affect the demand for public goods by 
increasing the demand for welfare programs, health care or reducing the demand for 
public schools. (Bunch 1993; Painter and Bae 2001; Bae and Moone 1997). Furthermore, 
if the poverty rate is higher in the state, then state-local government are expected to have 
less revenue and therefore less expenditure. The data on demographic characteristics are 
taken from U.S. Census Bureau.   
The IV model takes the following form  
         (13)  
       (14)  
Equation (13) is the first stage regression, where 𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the fiscal policy variables 
21 while 
equation (14) is the second stage regression. Z𝑖𝑡 indicates instrumental variables. Using the 
instruments requires that the instruments do not affect high wage employment through any 
pathways other than fiscal policies. We estimate the model both with state and year fixed effect.  
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by states.  
                                                 
21 Both the tax and expenditure variables are endogenous here and we are using two types of instrumental variables.    
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1.5 Empirical Analysis  
 We test the hypothesis that fiscal policies effect high wage employment. As a first step 
we report the simple correlations between the fiscal policy variables and high wage employment. 
Table 1.3 reports the correlation coefficients, while Figure 1.2 contains plots of high wage 
employment against the fiscal variables. From 1977 to 2012, total taxes, property taxes, and 
income taxes exhibit positive correlation, with values lying between 0.16 and 0.40. Other taxes 
and all types of spending have lower values of correlation with high wage employment level. 
The positive correlation coefficients on the tax variables suggest that high wage workers may 
move to states with higher taxes. But, there are many econometric issues that have to be 
addressed before we can draw such a conclusion.   
1.5.1.  Results (CPS Data)  
Table 1.4 shows the effect of fiscal policies (e.g. total tax revenues, productive spending 
and social spending) on total high wage employment for the whole period (1977-2012). Here the 
dependent variable is total employment in high wage jobs and the fiscal variables are measured 
on per capita basis. All the specification includes year dummies although we do not report their 
coefficients. Here we present results without and with other state controls variables in order to 
find out whether different controls have affected the results or not. The first column of table 1.4 
are the results from an OLS regression with no other control variables. The coefficient on the 
total tax revenues per capita is positive and statistically significant. Incorporating different 
control variables (column 2 of Table 1.4) also produce a similar relationship. The coefficient on 
the productive spending is negative and statistically significant which is contrary to our 
expectation. In terms of other control variables, crime rate per capita, average price of electricity, 
and unemployment rate have positive impact on high wage employment. We do not have any 
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priori belief about the sign of all of these coefficients, although it is expected that the crime rate 
and average price of electricity (cost of the firm) will have a negative impact of on employment. 
There is a possibility of unobserved heterogeneity across states. Therefore in column 3 
and column 4 we use fixed effect model with year dummies in order to account for this time 
invariant heterogeneity issues which could be related with the explanatory variables. The 
coefficient of tax variable is positive but statistically insignificant in column 3 and column 4. 
Productive spending also has an insignificant impact. One possible reason is that high skilled 
labor are not particularly sensitive to state–local government expenditures on education, health 
and highways, for example, they may getter better services from private sectors. Among the 
other variables, the crime rate has a positive and significant impact. Our theoretical framework 
implied that employment in high wage jobs may be positively affected by state tax revenues. The 
result from both OLS and fixed effect model are consistent with this. The signs on the tax and 
productive spending variables are positive, but statistically significant only in the first two 
columns.   
We also estimate the model by using fiscal variables measured in per dollar of state 
personal income (Table 1.A4 in appendix). The OLS results are consistent with those reported in 
Table 1.4, but in the fixed effects model, the coefficient on the tax variable in negative. 
However, the impacts are still statistically insignificant.   
Moreover, as mentioned in the methodology section, we cannot rule out the possibility of 
reverse causality. While state-local total tax revenues will affect the level of high wage 
employment, high wage industries could also influence state-local total tax. There is a possibility 
that high wage industries may lobby state government for lower tax burden. We tested the 
presence of endogeneity by using the Szroeter test (1978). Here all fiscal variables are correlated 
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with residuals (Table 1.A2 in Appendix). Furthermore, we also checked the endogeneity by 
using Woolridge Score Test (1995) and in most of the specifications we reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity. Therefore, OLS as well as fixed effect model cannot solve this 
problem. In order to deal with this endogeneity issue, we use 2SLS with state and year dummy, 
which not only eliminates time invariant unobserved heterogeneity but also addresses issues with 
time variant omitted variable bias, reverse causality and measurement error. Here we use two 
types of instrumental variables-state political characteristics and state demographic 
characteristics22. Political characteristics of Nebraska for our period of analysis is not available. 
Therefore, all the analysis using 2SLS method excludes Nebraska from the estimation23.   
Table 1.5 shows first stage results of the 2SLS method. The coefficient on the political 
characteristics have the expected positive sign, in particular the dummy for state democratic 
legislator has positive and significant impact on state total taxes. On the other hand, among the 
demographic characteristics percentage of people less than 16 years is significant and positive. 
The other two variables (poverty rate and percentage of people over 65 years) also have expected 
signs.  F test for the joint significance of the instruments is also included in Table 1.5 in which F 
statistic is much larger than the standard of 1024. Therefore, the instruments are not weak (Stock, 
Wright, and Yogo, 2002). Furthermore, we use Woolridge Score Test, Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
test and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics test. All of the results indicate that the instruments 
are not weak and are acceptable (Table 1.A3 in Appendix). The second stage results are shown in 
Table 1.6, where the first column shows the results without any other state controls and the 
                                                 
22 Detailed of these variables are included in the methodology section.  
23 However, assuming that Nebraska has Republican State Political Characteristics, we estimate the equation with 
IV’s and find no significant difference in coefficients.  
24 We further derive Angrist-Pischke First Stage F statistics and for both the endogenous fiscal variables, the value is 
greater than 10.  
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second column shows the results with several state control variables and the dependent variable 
is total number of high wage employment. Column one of Table 1.6 shows a negative 
relationship between total tax revenues per capita and total number of high wage jobs, although 
the relationship is not statistically significant. When we control for other state characteristics, the 
relationship does not change.  Productive spending has a positive and statistically significant 
impact. Among other control variables, percentage with a bachelor degree or more (labor skill) 
has a positive impact, although insignificant. State amenities like heating degree days has a 
positive impact which is contrary to our hypothesis. Also the significant impact of heating degree 
days varies. In general total tax revenues per capita does not have any statistically significant 
impact on high wage employment.25   
It is likely that tax variables measured in different forms should have similar impact on 
high wage employment. To test this, we also use total tax per dollar of state personal income 
(PDSPY), and productive spending per dollar of state personal income (PDSPY).  Column 3 of 
table 1.6 shows the results with all the state control variables. The impact of the tax variable is 
consistent with column 2, where tax variable is measured by per capita basis.  
Total employment in high wage industries is an important measure of the size of this high 
wage sector. However, this is only one measure and one specification. In addition to this, we use 
several other specifications. First, we use the change in high wage employment in a given state in 
a given year as the dependent variable, which can be interpreted as growth across states, and total 
taxes per capita as the main independent variable (specification 1). Second, we use the change in 
both high wage employment and the fiscal policy variables (specification 2)  And finally, we use 
the change in high wage employment and five-year interval changes in the fiscal policy variables 
                                                 
25 Due to small sample size, we also run IV-GMM and the results are not significantly different from IV-2SLS.  
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because annual data may be sensitive to measurement error and using five year interval may 
reduce the bias (specification 3). Table 1.7 only reports the coefficient of the fiscal variables 
from 2SLS estimation including state and year dummies. The coefficients of the three 
specifications using tax revenues per capita (columns 1, 2, and 3 of table 1.7) as well as three 
specifications using tax revenues per dollar of state personal income (column 4, 5, and 6 of table 
1.7) are negative but insignificant in all of the regressions, while the sign of the productive 
spending changes. We further use the ratio of high wage workers to total number of employment 
as the dependent variables. The results (Table 1.A5 in Appendix) are not different than for the 
previous analysis. All the results indicate that the distribution of high wage workers across states 
is not influenced by state-local government tax policy.   
Different taxes may have different impact on high wage employment. Therefore, here we 
use four different types of tax revenues, property tax, general sales tax, income tax, and 
corporate net income tax. Table 1.8 shows that the results vary with different taxes. The 1st and 
2nd column of table 8 report the results for total high wage employment using different tax 
variables per capita, without and with other controls. Property taxes have an insignificant 
negative impact where as general sales tax has a positive impact on high wage employment. 
When taxes are measured by per dollar of state personal income (column 3 and 4 of table 1.8), 
then none of the taxes have a statically significant impact. Similar results are found when we use 
the ratio of high wage workers to total employment. Furthermore, we also run separate 
regressions for each of these four taxes and found similar kind of results (these are not reported).   
1.5.1.1  Sub Period Analysis  
In order to examine the robustness of the results, we test the model by using two different 
time period, 1977 to 2007 and 1977 to 2001. We choose the first period to find out whether any 
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changes in the economy in that time period (before the recent great recession) influences the 
stability of the results. Table 1.9 shows the results for different specification including the basic 
one and utilizes period from 1977 to 2007; we only report the coefficients for fiscal variables 
(measured in per capita terms). In all the specifications, total tax has no significant impact. On 
the other hand, productive spending has positive impact but is only significant in the first 
specification. We also checked the validity of the result by using fiscal variables measured as per 
dollar of state personal income and found consistent results.   
Table 1.A6 in appendix shows the results of different specification for period 1977-2007 
using four different types of taxes. Consistent with our previous findings, none of the fiscal 
variables has any impact on high wage employment. We also checked this by using tax variable 
measured by per dollar of state personal income and found similar relationship. For the other 
period (1977-2001), the results are consistent with the previous findings, which also confirms 
that the impact does not vary across the time period (Table 1.A7 in Appendix).   
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, US economy faced its largest expansion 
after the recession in the early 1990’s. New and cheaper computer technology improved 
productivity in all the sectors of the economy. Therefore, we run separate regression for year 
1991 to 2012 and determine whether any changes in fiscal policy on that time may have a 
significant impact on job growth in the high wage sector (Table 1.A8 in Appendix). Only the 
income tax has a negative and statistically significant impact on high wage job growth in the 
basic specification. On the other hand, no taxes have an impact when both taxes and employment 
are measured by annual change as well as by five-year change.    
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1.5.1.2 Subgroup Analysis  
In this section, we explore the effects of taxes on high wage job growth for particular 
states. Table 1.A10 in appendix shows the results only for 16 states26. In those 16 states the ratio 
of high wage employment as percent of total employment is more than 21 percent (Table 9a in 
Appendix). The results show that total taxes per capita have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on total high wage employment using the original specification. However, in 
the other three specifications, there is no significant impact. In addition, we also run separate 
regression for the four different taxes; the results are consistent to the previous findings. We also 
explore this by using tax per dollar of state personal income; the impacts are very similar.  
Furthermore, we also test the validity of the results by estimating the model only for nine states,  
i.e. Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, Vermont, 
and Washington, where the ratio of high wage employment to total employment is more than 30 
percent. Only total tax per dollar of state personal income has negative and significant impact on 
change in total high wage employment, whereas in the other specification, the effect is 
insignificant (table 1.A11 in appendix). Moreover, taxes do not have any significant impact 
when measured on per capita basis.   
Moreover, we also take care for differences by geographic area. We divided the U.S. into 
two regions; east and west27 and run separate regression on these two regions. The east region 
has much more high wage industries than the west region. However, applying different 
specifications to both of these region does not change the impact.    
                                                 
26 Delaware, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, California, Virginia, New York, Colorado, Minnesota, 
Maryland, Texas, Georgia, Kansas, Illinois, Utah, and Washington  
27 East state is equal to one if state is in the following census region: New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, 
or East South Central. West state is Mountain, Pacific. The results are not reported here.  
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1.5.2 Results (BLS Data)  
The concentration of high wage jobs is higher in the professional, scientific, and technical 
service sector. Offices of physicians, corporate, offices of lawyers, and regional managing 
offices industries have the greatest number of high wage jobs. On the other hand, in terms of 
occupation, general and operation managers, accountants and auditors are also considered as 
high wage occupations (Rex, 2006). We use Occupational Employment Statistics data published 
by Bureau of Labor Statistics to take control for different occupational characteristics. The data 
using 75th percentile wage shows that high wage workers are mainly concentrated in the major 
occupational categories of management, business and financial occupations, health care 
practitioners and technical occupations, health care support, life, physical, and social science 
occupations, legal occupations, computer and mathematical related occupations, and sales and 
related occupations. Table 1.10 shows 2SLS results using different specifications and various 
taxes measured on per capita basis. In most of the cases, we find results which are consistent to 
our previous findings using CPS data. Total tax as well as four different taxes do not have any 
statistically significant impact on high wage employment when endogeneity issue is taken care 
of. Furthermore, we also ran regression similar to those reported in Table 1.11 with fiscal 
variables measured in per dollar of state personal income. The results of this regression (not 
reported) is consistent with Table 1.10.   
We tested the validity of our results by also using 90th percentile wage of all workers in 
each occupation. In most of the cases, high wage workers fall in broad categories of 
management, computer and mathematics occupation, health care practitioner and health services, 
legal, office and administrative support. The results (not reported) show that when we control for 
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endogeneity issue, the results are insignificant. In general, all the previous results indicate that 
high wage workers are less sensitive to change in tax policies28.   
1.5.3 Further Robustness Check  
There is a possibility that total number of high skilled workers will increase if there is an 
increase in total sample population in some years. However, in our study, we are focusing on the 
sorting of high wage workers across states. To justify our findings, we did two kind of robustness 
check.  Firstly, we take top 75th percentile wage for 1977 (starting year) and use that wage 
adjusted for inflation for all other years. We calculate the number of high wage workers and 
estimate the same 2SLS model with total taxes and other four types of taxes.  The results indicate 
no significant differences from previous analysis. Secondly we take some high income earned 
occupational categories29 and estimate the model with 2SLS method. The previous results still 
hold up.  
1.6 Conclusion  
Public economists as well as policy makers are interested in the effect of fiscal policies 
on state economic growth. After the recent recession, they are now more concerned about the 
growth of employment and in particular with the growth of high skilled labor since high skilled 
labor can bring more revenue than low skilled workers. In this paper, we estimate the impact of 
state fiscal policies on the distribution of high wage workers.  
We developed a simple general equilibrium model in which high skilled workers may 
prefer to go to a state that gives them higher level of public goods. However, their preference 
                                                 
28 In most of the cases, the coefficient of productive spending is higher than the coefficient of tax which also indicate 
a positive net effect of fiscal policies on high wage employment, although the impact is insignificant.  
29 We chose major occupation categories from BLS data and used those occupation categories as a criteria for 
defining high wage workers.  
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depends on factors for which there is no priori belief. Therefore, theoretically, it is difficult to 
identify the direction of the impact of state fiscal policies on the migration of high skilled 
workers. Empirically, using Helms (1985) balanced budget model, we estimate the impact on the 
sorting of high skilled workers of both fiscal policy and non-policy variables. The results show 
that in most of the cases, the tax impact is negative while the spending impact is positive, 
resulting in a positive net impact of fiscal policies on high wage employment. However, the tax 
impact is insignificant in all the cases. Therefore, the findings indicate that high skilled workers 
are not sensitive to state-local tax and expenditure policies.  
We further check this finding by using the change in the number of high skilled workers 
across states and also by using ratio of high skilled workers to total number of workers. We also 
show that including different types of taxes does not affect the results. Moreover, using different 
time periods and group of high income states do not influence the findings.  
In general, the sorting of high skilled workers are not strongly tied to state-local 
government fiscal policies.  Strategies like investing in skill level education and increasing the 
number of well-educated workers may help state-local government to achieve more economic 
growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 1.1: 75th percentile income for each year 
 
Year  75 percentile income  
 
1977 $12,550   
1978 $13,500   
1979 $14,922   
1980 $16,000   
1981 $17,000   
1982 $19,000   
1983 $20,000   
1984 $20,500   
1985 $22,050   
1986 $24,000   
1987 $25,000   
1988 $25,000   
1989 $26,000   
1990 $28,000   
1991 $29,000   
1992 $30,000   
1993 $30,000   
1994 $31,200   
1995 $32,994   
1996 $34,000   
1997 $35,000   
1998 $36,000   
1999 $38,000   
2000 $39,500   
2001 $40,000   
2002 $42,500   
2003 $43,385   
2004 $45,000   
2005 $45,000   
2006 $48,000   
2007 $50,000   
2008 $50,000   
2009 $52,000   
2010 $52,000   
2011 $53,632   
2012 $55,000   
 
                                  Note: 75th Percentile is calculated by using US Wage Distribution for each year  
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Table 1.2.1: Summary Statistics (Year 1977-2012)  
Variables   Mean   
Std.  
Dev.   
Min   Max   
High Wage Jobs (% of total employment)   24.04   0.05   10.97   39.16 
Low Wage Jobs (% of total employment)   48.04   0.06 20.01 80.34 
Total Tax per capita   2678.92   1500.06   479   7892   
Property tax per capita   832.54   568.7   60   3002   
General sales tax per capita   101.8   86.83   0   2416   
Corporate net income tax per capita   614.14   430.81   0   729   
Total income tax per capita   652.06   549.04   0   3254   
Productive Spending per capita   2206.9   1319.43   404   7543   
Labor skill (% with bachelor degree)   22.68   5.54   4.2   40.4   
Average price of electricity   6.33   2.23   1.95   17.11   
Heating degree days   4933.8   1638.95   1650   7558   
Crimes Per Capita   0.45   0.34   0.01   6.54   
Urban population (%)   68.87   14.75   31.05   96.74   
Poverty rate (%)   12.99   3.78   2.9   27.2   
Less than 16 years old (%)   27.52   3.87   20   41.6   
Greater than 65 years old (%)   12.65   2.69   7.49   32.94   
Unemployment rate (%)   6   2.13   2.1   17.9   
State personal income (log)   18.56   1.66   16.25   21.31   
Party affiliation of state governor ‘*   0.527   0.499   0   1   
Party affiliation of state legislator   0.524   0.489   0   1   
Note:* party affiliation of state governor =1 if state governor is democratic and vice versa  
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Table 1.2.2: Summary Statistics (Sub period i: Year 1977-2007)  
 
Variable   Mean   
Std.  
Dev.   
Min   Max   
High Wage Jobs (% of total employment)   23.94  5.46 10.97 39.16 
Low Wage Jobs (% of total employment)   47.50 6.46 20.00 80.39 
Total Tax per capita   2411.18   1383.17   479   7871   
Property tax per capita   739.49   508.08   60   2781   
General sales tax per capita   558.22   404.26   0   2275   
Total income tax per capita   590.59   512.09   0   3234   
Corporate net income tax per capita   94.95   81.13   0   729   
Productive Spending per capita   1935.23   1188.02   404   6700   
Labor skill (% with bachelor degree)   21.97   5.32   4.2   40.4   
Average price of electricity   5.99   1.9   1.95   14.11   
Average earnings in manufacturing 
sector   
29.51   11.49   9.22   67.04   
Heating degree days   4956.58   1649.94   1802   7558   
Crimes per capita   0.47   0.35   0.01   6.54   
Urban population (%)   68.08   14.63   31.05   96.19   
Poverty rate (%)   12.86   3.84   2.9   27.2   
 Less than 18 years old (%)   28.13   3.76   20.29   41.6   
Greater than 65 years old (%)   12.56   2.83   7.49   32.94   
Unemployment rate (%)   5.8   2.03   2.1   17.9   
State personal income (log)   18.5   1.05   16.25   21.25   
Party affiliation of state governor ‘*   0.53   0.49   0   1   
Party affiliation of state legislator   0.53   0.49   0   1   
               Note:* party affiliation of state governor =1 if state governor is democratic and vice versa  
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Table 1.2.3: Summary Statistics (Sub period ii: Year 1977-2001)  
 
Variable   Mean   
Std.  
Dev.   
Min   Max   
High Wage Jobs (% of total employment)   23.87   5.46 10.97 38.83 
Low Wage Jobs (% of total employment)   47.44 6.66 20.00 80.39 
Total Tax per capita   1992.06   1131.69   479   6206   
Property tax per capita   612.89   415.27   60   2441   
General sales tax per capita   460.12   334.51   0   2041   
Total income tax per capita   484.14   429.45   0   2470   
Corporate net income tax per capita   82.49   68.33   0   475   
Productive Spending per capita   1539.18   935.5   404   5183   
Labor skill (% with bachelor degree)   20.85   4.78   4.2   38.7   
Average price of electricity   5.69   1.8   1.95   11.72   
Average earnings in manufacturing 
sector   
25.92   9.13   9.22   59.5   
Heating degree days   5000.32   1664.32   1802   7558   
Crimes per capita   0.48   0.38   0.01   6.54   
Urban population (%)   67   14.39   31.05   94.63   
Poverty rate (%)   13.09   3.99   2.9   27.2   
 Less than 18 years old (%)   28.95   3.66   20.29   41.6   
Greater than 65 years old (%)   12.53   3.07   7.49   32.94   
Unemployment rate (%)   6.01   2.15   2.1   17.9   
State personal income (log)   18.42   1.05   16.25   21.12   
Party affiliation of state governor ‘*   0.54   0.49   0   1   
Party affiliation of state legislator   0.57   0.49   0   1   
                 Note:* party affiliation of state governor =1 if state governor is democratic and vice versa  
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Table 1.3:  Pairwise Correlation Coefficient  
   
High 
wage 
jobs   
Total 
tax   
Property 
tax   
General 
sales tax   
Total income tax   
Corporate net 
income tax   
Productive 
spending   
High wage jobs   1               
Total tax   
0.2902*  
(0.000)   
1             
Property tax   
0.3078*  
(0.000)   
0.8739*   
  
1           
General sales tax   
0.1553*  
(0.000)   
0.6900*  
(0.000)   
0.4717*  
(0.000)   
1         
Total income tax   
0.3086*   
(0.000)   
0.7552*   
(0.000)   
0.5859*   
(0.000)   
0.2579*   
(0.000)   
1       
Corporate net income 
tax   
0.3681*   
(0.000)   
0.6207*   
(0.000)   
0.5451*   
(0.000)   
0.1601*   
(0.000)   
0.7362*   
(0.000)   
1     
Productive spending   
0.1350*   0.9259*   0.7625*   0.7137*   0.6287*   0.4779*   
1   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    
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Table 1.4: High wage employment –OLS and Fixed Effect estimation (1977-201) Dependent 
Variable: Total employment in High wage industries  
  
VARIABLES   OLS   OLS   FE   FE   
  
Total Tax Per Capita   
  
0.239***   
  
0.151***   
  
0.0357   
  
0.0322   
       (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.0271)   (0.0245)   
Productive Spending Per Capita   -0.233***   -0.129***   0.00872   0.00144   
  (0.043)   (0.032)   (0.0196)   (0.0219)   
Heating Degree Days     -0.008     0.0190   
    (0.005)     (0.0131)   
Unemployment Rate     30.87***     0.204   
    (4.551)     (3.355)   
Labor skill     4.956***     4.255   
    (1.654)     (3.542)   
Urban Population     8.631***     1.560   
    (0.596)     (3.741)   
Average price of electricity     7.120*     11.69   
    (3.837)     (13.00)   
Crime rate per capita     133.9***     19.47*   
    (31.54)     (11.70)   
Year Fixed Effect  
State Fixed Effect   
×   ×   ×   
×   
×   
×   
Observations   1,728   1,728   1,728   1,728   
Number of States   48   48   48   48   
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * significance at 
the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.5: First Stage Regression Results  
Variables   Total Tax Per 
Capita   
Total Tax Per 
Capita   
Productive  
Spending  
Per capita   
Productive  
Spending  
Per Capita   
Democratic Governor   19.63   
(17.40)   
5.30   
(17.10)   
15.90**  
(8.34)   
12.88   
(8.26)   
Democratic Legislator       193.62***  
(24.09)   
  194.96***  
(22.73)   
23.30**  
(10.90)   
22.81**  
(10.79)   
Poverty rate       -12.70***  
(2.49)   
-8.91***  
(2.87)   
Above 65 years old   
  
Less than 18 years old   
  
  
Controls   
    
  
  
  
  
×   
21.25***   
(5.53)   
8.02***   
(2.24)   
  
  
21.35***   
(5.237)   
6.45**   
(2.341)   
  
×   
    
F Statistics                                                    423.86            446.20             25.64       100.04   
      
  
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * significance at 10 
level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.6: 2SLS Estimation with State and Year Dummy  
Dependent Variable: Total employment in High wage sectors (tax, productive spending are endogenous)  
  
VARIABLES   2sls   2sls   2sls   
Total Tax Per Capita   -0.012   -0.017     
  (0.032)   (0.030)     
Productive Spending Per Capita   0.218***   0.134*     
  (0.065)   (0.078)     
Heating Degree Days     0.022***   0.000   
    (0.007)   (0.000)   
Unemployment Rate     1.376   -0.002   
    (3.001)   (0.006)   
Labor Skill     3.641   0.028***   
    (2.722)   (0.004)   
Urban Population (%)     0.276   0.001   
    (1.336)   (0.003)   
Average Price of Electricity     14.10**   0.0131   
    (5.730)   (0.012)   
Crime per capita     8.565   0.096***   
    (7.085)   (0.027)   
Total Tax (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.051   
(0.057)   
Productive Capital Spending (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.095   
(0.087)   
Year Fixed Effect   ×   ×   ×   
State Fixed Effect   ×   
  
×   
×   
Observations   
  
1,692   
  
1,692   
  
1,692   
Number of States   47   47   47   
Note: PDSPY is per dollar of state personal income.  Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by 
state level. * Significance at the .10   level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
  
  
  
  
46 
 
Table 1.7: 2SLS Results (Three Specifications with fiscal variables measured in both per 
∆capita and per dollar of state personal income) (1977-2012) 
Dependent variable: Change in employment in high wage sectors  
Variables  
Change 
in employment  
Change 
in employment  
Change 
in employment  
Change 
in employment  
Change 
in employment  
Total Tax 
per capita  
-0.01         
  (-0.015)         
Productive 
Spending 
per capita  
0.065         
  (0.051)         
∆ Total 
Taxes per 
capita  
  -0.128       
    (-0.133)       
∆Productive 
Spending 
per capita  
  -0.1       
    (-0.194)       
∆ t-4 total 
tax per 
capita   
    -0.053     
      (-0.06)     
∆ t-4 
productive 
spending per  
capita  
    0.001     
      (0.057)     
Total tax 
(PDSPY)  
      -0.024   
        (-0.034)   
Productive 
Spending 
(PDSPY)  
      0.073   
        (0.056)   
∆ Total Tax 
(PDSPY)  
        0.048 
          (0.192) 
∆ Productive 
Spending 
(PDSPY)  
        0.636 
          (0.545) 
∆ t-4 total 
tax (PDSPY)  
        -0.009 
          (-0.032) 
∆ t-4 
productive 
spending 
(PDSPY)  
        0.039 
          (0.108) 
Control  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  
Year and 
state Fixed 
Effect 
×  ×  ×  ×  ×  
      
Observations  1,645 1,645 1,504 1,645 1,645 
Note: PDSPY is per dollar of state personal income. Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at 
the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.8: 2SLS estimation with different taxes (1977-2012) 
Dependent variable: Total Number of High Wage Employment 
           
VARIABLES   total employment in 
high wage 
sectors   
total employment 
in high wage 
sectors   
total 
employment 
in high 
wage 
sectors   
total employment 
in high 
wage 
sectors   
  
Property Tax per capita   
  
-0.0412   
  
-0.334   
  
  
  
  
  (0.231)   (0.752)       
General Sales Tax per 
capita   
      0.424***   0.624*       
  (0.124)   (0.320)       
Total Income Tax per 
capita   
0.029   0.076       
  (0.295)   (0.609)       
Corporate Net Income Tax 
per capita   
-0.481   0.810       
  (0.562)   (2.122)       
Productive Spending per 
capita   
0.282*   0.151       
  (0.153)   (0.204)       
Property Tax (PDSPY)       -0.997*   -11.76   
      (0.542)   (54.69)   
General Sales Tax 
(PDSPY)   
    0.416   3.307   
      (0.263)   (14.53)   
Income Tax (PDSPY)       0.292   1.117   
      (0.315)   (5.391)   
Corporate Net Income 
Tax(PDSPY)   
    -1.216   16.40   
      (1.367)   (82.66)   
Productive Spending 
(PDSPY)   
    0.366   5.774   
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.232)   
  
(27.97)   
  
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State Fixed Effect   
  
    ×  
    ×                      
  
×   
×   
×   
  
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
Observations   
  
1,692   1,692   
  
1,692   
  
1,692   
Number of states   47   47   47    
Note: PDSPY is per dollar of state personal income.  Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by 
state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.9: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications and Year 1977-2007 
            Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the 
.10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLES   Total  
Employment   
Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
Total Tax per capita   -0.027   -0.007       
  (0.036)   (0.018)       
Productive Spending per capita   0.220**   0.076       
  (0.095)   (0.082)       
∆Total tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.183   
(0.182)   
  
  
∆ Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
0.026   
(0.207)   
  
  
∆t-4.total tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.077   
(0.072)   
∆t-4productive spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.042   
(0.072)   
  
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State Fixed Effect   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
Observations   
  
1,457   
  
1,410   
  
1,410   
  
1,269   
Number of states   47   47   47   47   
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Table 1.10:  Regression Estimation Using BLS data and different Specifications (Full Year 
1977-2012)  
VARIABLES   Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
Change in 
employment   
  
Total Tax Per Capita   
  
  
-147.3   
(119.6)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Productive Spending Per capita   
  
226.0   
(361.2)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
∆ Total Taxes per capita   
  
  
  
-529.4*  
(278.1)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
∆Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
-4.918   
(628.3)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
∆ t-4 total tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-172.6   
(198.4)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
∆ t-4 productive spending per       204.5         
  
  
  
  
  
  
(165.4)   
  
  
0.262   
  
  
  
  
Total Tax  (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.167)   
0.572   
  
  
  
  
Productive Spending (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.381)   
  
  
0.647   
  
  
∆ Total Tax (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.492)  
-0.160   
  
  
∆ Productive Spending (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.492)   
  
  
0.435*   
∆ t-4 total tax (PDSPY)   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.251)   
-0.469   
(0.309)   
  
   
Control   
  
×   
  
×   
  
×   
  
×   
  
×   
  
×   
 
Year 
and 
state 
fixed 
effect 
  
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
  
Note: PDSPY is per dollar of state personal income.  Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at 
the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .0 
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Table 1.11:  Regression Estimation Using BLS data and fiscal variables are measured by 
Per Dollar of State Personal income (Full Year 1977-2012)  
Note: PDSPY is per dollar of state personal income.  Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by 
state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
VARIABLES  Total 
employment  
Change in 
employment  
Change in 
employment  
Change in 
employment  
Total Tax  (PDSPY)  -0.351*  -0.262      
  (0.200)  (0.167)      
Productive Spending (PDSPY)  1.035**  0.572      
  (0.462)  (0.381)      
∆ Total Tax (PDSPY)      -0.647    
      (0.492)    
∆ Productive Spending (PDSPY)      -0.160    
      (0.492)    
        -0.435*  
∆ t-4 Total tax  (PDSPY)        (0.251)  
        -0.469  
∆ t-4 Productive spending (PDSPY)        (0.309)  
          
          
  
Control  
  
×  
  
  
×  
  
  
×  
  
  
×  
  
Year Fixed Effect 
State Fixed Effect  
×  
×  
  
×  
×  
  
×  
×  
  
×  
×  
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Figure 1.1: Average Migration Rate of High Skilled Workers  
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Figure 1.2: Scatter Plot of High Wage employment and Fiscal Variables 
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ESSAY TWO: TAX EVASION IN US: THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the most common economic crimes in the USA is income tax evasion (Feinstein, 
1991). Between 2008 through 2015, the US government lost around $458 billion due to tax 
evasion30. The criminal investigation department in the IRS is responsible for the investigation of 
any violations of tax laws.  The goal of the IRS is to reduce criminal violations and to promote 
confidence in the tax system. However, over the years, the budget for these activities has 
declined. Since 2010, the IRS budget has been cut by nearly 8 percent. Moreover, the IRS 
workforce has been reduced by 9 percent’s and the training budget has been reduced by over 80 
percent’s.  Lower resources limit IRS ability to perform basic services as well as provide audit 
services for the tax payers, which can further reduce the trust in the tax system. For example, in 
2010, IRS audited 1.1 percent’s of the individual returns, where as in 2015 the rate was 0.8 
percents. The ultimate result was lower revenue generation31. On the other hand, every dollar 
invested in IRS actually generates more than a dollar of revenue in return32 . This evasion not 
only causes problems with the public sector budget, but also leads to economic distortions, such 
as reductions in public investment, increase in the budget deficit, lower economic development 
(Alm and Buckley 1998; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Therefore, the policy makers should 
rethink about the linkage between lower enforcement activities and tax evasion scenario in US. 
                                                 
30 IRS Report 
31 IRS Commissioner John Koskinen says the budget cuts are costing the government between $4 billion and $8 
billion a year in uncollected taxes. 
32 For every dollar invested in enforcement, it will generate almost $6 (the Budget of the United States Government, 
Fiscal Year 2017,” Department of the Treasury) 
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The principal objective of this paper is to address the question: what is the impact of 
enforcement on the tax evasion tendency of the individual? In particular, we focus on how recent 
budget cut influences the level of income tax compliance.  Although the literature on the effect 
of audit or enforcement on evasion is quite large, no research has been conducted that examines 
the recent budget cut issue as well as the responses of the individual at different income level to 
enforcement level in their reporting of income. There is a possibility that the tendency to evade 
taxes may differ across various ranges on income, since higher income individuals have more 
flexibility in their reporting decision due to having larger financial stability.   
The common approach to the question of the effect of enforcement on tax evasion starts 
with the basic idea that higher level of enforcement may reduce tax evasion. However, the 
responses may vary with different income levels. We use the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
model of tax evasion in which the effectiveness of enforcement policies depend on several 
individual characteristics as well as how people react to this policies. Empirically we use 
Individual Tax Return Model File33 (ITMF) for a single year (2008), and examine whether 
several enforcement activities affect the tendency to evade or not. Furthermore, other variables, 
e.g. marginal tax rate (MTR), tax payer’s characteristics are taken into account in this analysis. 
ITMF’s data helps us to explore the issue in individual income (wage and salary income, 
aggregate total income, etc.) perspectives. Along with OLS (Two stage least square), here 
quantile regression analysis is also used. Quantile regression helps to examine behavioral 
responses at different quintiles.  Furthermore, we also use detailed panel data at state level from 
year 1980 to 2014 in order to examine whether enforcement has any impact on tax compliance in 
aggregate level or not and whether a lack of monetary support for IRS has any influence on that. 
                                                 
33 A discussion of the data is provided in the data section. 
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We find that at annual level, cut in enforcement resources increases the likelihood to 
evade taxes. At the same time, an increase in MTR enhances noncompliance among the 
taxpayers. However, at the individual level, there is no significant impact of enforcement 
activities on tax evasion behavior. One reason may be related to the definition of tax evasion34 
which is sensitive to the assumption of reported income. Also, Slemrod (1985) argued that it may 
reflect the lower bound of tax evasion. This finding is consistent with the revenue generation. 
After the budget cut, 30 percent’s less revenue is generated compared to previous five years. We 
further check the validity of the results with different time periods and find that after 2008, the 
impact is larger than the overall impact.   
Therefore, this paper is important to the literature in several ways. First, this paper 
incorporates the recent budget cut for IRS and examines how that can change the behavior of the 
tax payer’s.35Furthermore, instrumental variables approach is used to find out the causal impact of 
enforcement activities on evasion.  Second, this paper also includes Quantile regression analysis 
along with Fixed effect and Instrumental Variable approach in order to find out whether the 
responses towards enforcement parameter changes with different income levels. 
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows.  The next section contains a literature 
review on tax evasion. Section 3 discusses several programs by IRS and recent IRS budget cuts 
in enforcement. Section 4, 5, and 6 discuss the theoretical framework, data and empirical 
method.  Section 7 contains summary statistics and empirical results. And finally, section 8 
concludes.  
                                                 
34 In both the cases (e.g. Individual as well as aggregate level data), tax evasion is measured by a proxy variable. 
More discussion is included in the data and methodology section.  
35 Here several enforcement parameters along with the budget is used which has not been included in the original 
paper of Slemrod (1985). 
56  
  
2.2 Literature Review 
The literature on the effect of enforcement on tax evasion is extensive.  Research differs 
in terms of both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Theoretically, research differs by various 
forms of utility function (e.g. risk averse, risk neutral) of the individuals. Empirically, studies 
vary in terms of how the evasion is measured, for example, tax gap analysis, the position of the 
taxpayers, additional taxes and penalties recommended by IRS, etc. The research also differs in 
term of how the audit rate or enforcement level is measured, and how the marginal tax rate is 
incorporated into the empirical analysis. And, of course, research differs in terms of partial 
equilibrium and general equilibrium analysis.  
The theoretical literature on tax evasion is based on Allingham and Sandmo (1972)’s 
portfolio approach36. They analyzed the effect of tax rates, income of tax payers and various 
enforcement parameters on tax evasion and they found a negative association between 
unreported income37 and penalty rate.  
Later, a number of studies (Pencavel 1979, Cowell 1981, and Sandmo 1981) investigated 
the relationship between tax evasion and labor supply. In particular, Sandmo (1981) builds up a 
model in which the larger the penalty rate, the lower will be the supply of labor in the 
underground market which further causes a reduction in underreporting income.  Other studies 
also consider the interaction of the taxpayers and tax authorities by making the probability of 
audit endogenous.  For example, Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998); classified two models; 
one is a principal agent model in which the government declares the level of audit it makes, and 
another is a game theory model where the government or tax authority does not make any 
                                                 
36 The portfolio approach is based on Becker’s (1968) economic approach of crime.   
37 Although the relationship between unreported income and true income is ambiguous, they showed that relative 
risk aversion of the tax payer’s utility function influences the effect of before tax income on unreported income. 
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commitment, and there occurs a strategic interaction between tax payers and tax authority. In 
these areas, the pioneering works have been done by Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986), and 
Reinganum and Wilde (1985).  However, a clear cut connection between tax evasion and the 
probability of being caught is still unknown.  
On the other hand, the empirical literature has not progressed due to lack of data on tax 
evasion. The IRS measures the tax gap through Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
which is based on audited returns. Several studies used tax gap information as a proxy for 
evasion. Using the 1969 Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)38, Clotfelter (1983) 
estimates a Tobit model to test the impact of taxpayers’ after-tax income, the tax rate, and several 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics on the level of tax evasion. He finds a positive 
and significant effect of after tax income and tax rates on tax evasion.  Several other studies 
focus on the impact of audit and enforcement on evasion behavior. For example, Witte and 
Woodbury (1985) aggregate the 1969 TCMP data at the three-digit zip code level and find a 
negative relationship between lagged audit rates and evasion.  Moreover, Beron, Tauchen, and 
Witte (1988) use 1969 TCMP data aggregated at the three-digit zip code level and find that the 
deterrence effect of the audit is small   However, they use two stage least square method without 
incorporating MTR. 
Furthermore, Tauchen, Beron, and Witte (1989) apply two stage least square method to 
the 1979 TCMP individual data and find the similar outcome. In another study, Dubin and Wilde 
(1988) divide the 1969 TCMP data set into seven audit classes. Their primary objective is to find 
out whether audit rate is endogenous and, if so, how it affects evasion among different audit 
classes. They find that the audit rate is an endogenous variable in four of the seven audit classes. 
                                                 
38 Detailed description on TCMP is discussed in the next section. 
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Moreover, the effect of the IRS auditing strategies outweighs the deterrent effect in three of the 
four cases in which audit rates are endogenous. In addition, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) 
use 1985 TCMP data and examine the theoretical and empirical implications of accounting for 
different modes like targeted mode, untargeted mode. They find that the higher the level of 
enforcement effort, the higher will be the level of compliance in the targeted mode, and the 
higher the level of enforcement, the lower will be the level of compliance for the untargeted 
mode. However, overall they find a positive impact on tax compliance. 
Others also use TCMP data to find out the determinants of tax evasion. For example, 
Feinstein (1991) uses 1982 and 1985 TCMP data and discusses the relationship between income, 
MTR, various socio economic characteristics of the tax payers and their evasion behavior. He 
finds a positive effect of marginal tax rates on tax gap. In another study, Joulfaian and Rider 
(1996) examine the relationship between marginal tax rates and evasion for low income 
households (in the presence of earned income tax credit) in which they define evasion as a 
possibility that taxpayers may over-report. However, they find that there is no relationship 
between misreported income (evasion) and marginal tax rates except for the case of proprietor’s 
income.  
On the other hand, using one fourth of the data from a random sample of the U.S. 
Treasury File for 1977, Slemrod (1985) assumes that taxpayers are randomly distributed across 
each quintile of the $50 tax brackets and then he looks at deviations of actual distributions from 
the 20 percent levels. He finds deviations which are consistent with the fact that people over 
claim deductions to move from the bottom of $50 bracket to the top of the lower $50 bracket.  
Therefore, the computation of evasion is based on the position of the taxpayer’s taxable income 
within $50 tax bracket. He finds that the tendency to evade is related to higher marginal tax rates, 
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the presence of fungible items, being less than 65 years of age and being married.  However, in 
his study, he did not include any enforcement parameters. In another study, Poterba (1987) finds 
a positive relation between marginal income tax rates and tax evasion which is consistent with 
Slemrod’s findings.  
However, the TCMP data is not publicly available to find out the possible reasons for tax 
evasion and relevant solutions. Therefore, some studies use state level data published by the IRS 
in order to find out the determinants of tax evasion. In one study, Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 
(1987) use 1977-1985 data and find that the percentage of the adult population with high school 
degrees, per capita income, and the lagged audit rate positively affect taxpayers’ noncompliance. 
Furthermore, there is a positive impact of audit rate on tax evasion. In their later study, they also 
find spillover effects of audit rates. Using the data for 1982-1991, Plumley (1996) found that 
criminal investigation activities of IRS are positively related to compliance. On the other hand, 
Ali, Cecil, and Knobelt (2001) mentioned about the endogeneity problem in their study and used 
pooled estimation method. However, they could not find any precise effect of audit rate. Later, 
Dubin (2004) used state level data from 1977-2001 and used budget per return, resources 
devoted to tax returns examination, and several state political characteristics as instrumental 
variable and found a positive impact of criminal investigation enforcement on compliance. 
Later, some studies use general equilibrium approach in tax evasion. In one study, Dabla-
Norris and Feltenstein (2005) analyses macroeconomic consequences of tax evasion and find that 
credit rationing from banks is the cost for the firms to evade taxes. As a result of credit rationing, 
aggregate investment will be low. Higher taxes encourage firms to evade whereas lower tax 
leads to unsustainable budget and trade deficits. They conclude that optimal taxes may occur 
some presence of underground economy. Using Russian economic data, Feltenstein et.al. (2012) 
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found that if the value added tax declines then the incentive to evade taxes for non-capital 
intensive sectors have been reduced. At the same time, capital intensive sectors would not enter 
into the underground economy even if the tax rate increases. In a more recent study, Feltenstein 
and Cyan (2013) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model, applicable to Pakistan and 
examine how optimizing agents evade taxes by operating in the underground economy. Their 
results show that increasing tax rates influences firms to enter into the underground economy. 
In summary, empirical evidence from studies attempting to uncover the determinants of 
tax evasion is small but informative. However, past studies have shown some mixed evidence 
between tax evasion and audit rate. For example, for some cases, the relationship between audit 
rates and evasion is clear and significant, but not for all audit classes (Dubin and Wilde 1988), 
Furthermore, the effect of marginal tax on the level of compliance is always an issue for debate 
and empirical analysis (Yitzhaki 1974; Clotfelter 1983; Slemrod 1985; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 
1987, 1990). Moreover, estimating causal effects between evasion and enforcement remains an 
important question due to reverse causality. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by 
implementing an instrumental variable method as well as quantile instrumental approach that 
aims to estimate causal evidence of the effect of audit rate as well as other enforcement 
parameters on tax payer’s noncompliance behavior.  
2.3 A Brief Description of Internal Revenue Service Tax Program and Enforcement: 
2.3.1 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) and National Research Program 
(NRP) 
Based on the examination of individual income tax returns for Tax Year 1963, the IRS 
started Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in 1964. It included thorough 
audits of the samples of individual income tax returns and it is done for every three years.   
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The sample size is approximately 50,000-55,000 individual tax returns for a given tax year. 
However, the IRS discontinued after 1988 TCMP study.  
After that, the National Research Program (NRP) was formed to update measures of 
taxpayer compliance and audit selection. The goal of NRP is to find out a strategy in order to 
collect data for measuring payment, filing and reporting compliance. Based on random audits of 
46,000 individual income tax returns for the Tax Year 2001, the first NRP was reported. The 
audits were completed by the end of 2004, and the IRS released this information in 2006. The 
NRP is different from TCMP in that it uses less invasive analysis while relying more on external 
data.  These data are used to estimate the gross tax gap. The gross tax gap is defined as the 
difference between aggregate tax liabilities imposed by law for a tax year and the amount of tax 
that taxpayers pay voluntarily on time for that year39. In 2012, the IRS released new tax gap 
information for the year 2006. However, these data are not available to the public for research.  
2.3.2 Tax Gap and Tax Enforcement Effort by IRS 
The tax gap from individual income taxes has grown over the years. It was $29 billion in 
1973 and jumped to $95 billion in 1992. For the most recent year 2006, the estimated tax gap was 
$450 billion (which is $345 billion in 2001). The gap consists of three major elements including 
underreporting of tax liability ($376 billion), non-filing of tax returns ($28 billion), and 
underpayment of taxes ($46 billion). In underreporting of tax liability, 63 percent are caused by 
individual income tax. Due to this gap, there is a huge loss of revenue which requires more 
attention from the tax authority as well as from policy makers.  
The IRS plays an important role in ensuring fair tax laws as well as helping tax payers to 
comply with tax code. Therefore, tax enforcement actions are important to collect due taxes.     
                                                 
39 US Department of Treasury, IRS 
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From 2001 to 2011, revenue collection due to enforcement action has increased by 63 percent (it 
was $33.8 billion in 2001 and was $55.2 billion in 2011). However, a fall in the collection of 
revenue is observed in 2008. One reason may be that in 2008, staffing for enforcement occupations 
declined by 1.1 percent per individual tax returns examined. IRS has taken a comprehensive 
strategy to minimize the tax gap and those strategies have four basic principles 
1. Both unintended tax payers errors and intentional taxpayers evasion should be addressed 
2. Sources of evasion should be targeted with specificity 
3. Enforcement activities should be combined with a commitment to taxpayers service 
4. Policy position and compliance proposals should be sensitive to taxpayers right 
2.3.3 Budget Cuts 
Over the years, the enforcement funding has been declining. According to the Treasury 
Department, each $1 spent on IRS enforcement results in $6 of additional revenues collected 
from taxes owed. Significant budget cuts have been observed since 2010. However, the 
enforcement budget has declined by 14 percent over the years. Enforcing tax laws and providing 
tax payer’s services are the two most important services on which the IRS spends its budget. Due 
to the budget cut, the IRS has reduced its workforce in this area. The following figure (fig 2.1) 
shows the budget cut from 1980 to 2014.  The number of employees for overall service in IRS 
has declined from 1995 whereas tax return file has increased day by day. In particular, from 2010 
to 2014, the IRS has reduced its staff by 11 percent. However, the number of returns filed has 
increased in that time e.g. from 2004 to 2013, the number increased by almost 100%. 
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Figure 2.1: Tax Returns Filed and Number of Employees (1980-2014) 
                                                           Source: IRS Data Book, IRS 
And from 2010 to 2014, the number of employees has reduced by 15%. A significant 
reduction has been observed in terms of training IRS officials (by almost 87%). As a result, fewer 
audits are conducted which may also influence tax compliance behavior. Therefore, it is important 
to empirically find out the impact of this lower enforcement activities on tax compliance.  
2.4 Theoretical Model 
Given that the true tax base is only known to the tax payers, it is difficult to measure the 
actual amount of tax evasion. To provide a theoretical background for the empirical investigation, 
this paper uses original income tax evasion model by Allingham-Sandmo (1972). Suppose 
individual i knows his true income (Y) but the tax authority does not know it. Tax rate 𝑡𝑖 is imposed 
on declared or reported income (R) and the difference between true income and reported income 
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(E = Y- R) is denoted as evasion (E).  There is a detection rate P and if found guilty then he/she 
will be penalized at rate Ω.  Both the understated income and evaded tax liability influence penalty 
rate. On the other hand, probability of detection (P) is related to 1) different actions (Æ) taken by 
the tax authority e.g. examinations, auditing, enforcement activities as well as the tax rate, 2) a 
number of exogenous characteristics of the tax payers (X), and 3) a set of evader’s activities (B) 
which may reduce the chance of being penalized (Slemrod, 2012).  Based on the above conditions, 
individual i’s after tax income is as follows 
𝑊1 = 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖(𝑌𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖) If he or she is not caught while cheating   (state 1) 
𝑊2 = 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖(𝑌𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖) − Ω𝑖𝐸𝑖 if he or she is caught while cheating  (state 2) 
And individual i will maximize40  
1 − 𝑝(𝐸𝑖)𝑈(𝑊1) + 𝑝(𝐸𝑖)𝑈(𝑊2)         (1) 
First order condition implies that 
𝑈′(𝑊2)
𝑈′(𝑊1)
⁄ =
(1 − 𝑝)𝑡𝑖
𝑝(Ω𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖)
⁄         (2) 
Equation (2) shows the relative price of income in the two states (Sandmo, 2004). The 
higher the level of detection or penalty rate, the lower will be the degree of evasion. Based on the 
solution of the taxpayer’s utility maximization problem, the indicators of tax evasion results in 
the following functional form 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓(∈𝑖) 
where ∈𝑖 is a set of characteristics including Æ , X , and B which influences the evasion decision 
of an individual. Certain characteristics (X) of an individual may make evasion more attractive. 
                                                 
40 It is assumed that utility is increasing and concave indicating a risk averse tax payers. 
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For example, richer people tend to be more risk lover and therefore more likely to evade. On the 
other hand, it is believed that elderly people are more risk averse and are less likely to evade. 
However, other factors such as opinion about the fairness of the tax system, how tax revenues are 
going to be used, culture, tradition etc. also affect compliance behavior (Torgler, 2007).  
Moreover, the government as well as tax authorities choose tax and several enforcement 
activities41 in order to provide public goods G. Following Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987), we 
assume that the objective of the government is to maximize the social welfare function and social 
welfare function is a sum of the expected utilities of the representative households. The 
government as well as tax authorizes try to maximize the following function 
Max 𝑊 =  {1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝑖)}𝑈(𝑊1) + 𝑃(𝐸𝑖)𝑈𝑊2        (3) 
sub to 𝑡𝑌 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑅 = 𝐺 + 𝑎(𝑝)  Where a(p) denotes resources which are used for detecting 
evasion. From the first order condition, it is observed that by increasing p, the government or tax 
collection agency can increase more revenue than the cost of doing it (Sandmo 1981, Slemrod 
and Yitzhaki 1987). The utilization of enforcement activities as well as penalty rate depends on 
X and how people will react to the choice of policies. Almost all the previous studies including 
Dubin, Graets, and Wilde (1990) used audit rates as the preventive mechanism. However, over 
the years, individuals audit rates has declined along with the expansion of several new 
enforcement programs e.g.  Civil penalty assessed, examination and investigation program, 
which has been ignored by most of the studies. Moreover, enforcement activities are influenced 
by overall economic situation. Over the years recessions have cut budgets for enforcement 
activities and this may also influence tax evasion behavior and may reduce total revenue 
collection. Incorporating the enforcement activities along with audit rates for improving 
                                                 
41 In our model, this is referred to as policy actions.  
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compliance in the tax evasion model and finding its impact with all other determinants may help 
policymakers to consider the importance of enforcement.  Therefore, this creates a justification 
for empirical examinations. 
2.5 Data 
For micro level analysis, I am using 2008 Individual Tax Model Files (ITMFS) from the 
Statistics of the Income published by IRS. This data contains detailed information on several tax 
forms42 and that information are collected from a stratified random sample of US taxpayers. The 
sample consists of 139651 records which are drawn from a population of a total of 
approximately 142 million tax returns record. Taxpayers identity information (e.g. name, SSN) 
are excluded from the file. Using ITMFs data is helpful because it provides vast information on 
items reported on tax returns. However, there are several problems in this data set. One is that 
this data set lacks information on any demographic characteristics. Moreover, information on 
individual characteristics is almost absent on the tax returns. However, an inclusion of state and 
marital status is helpful for the analysis. Besides the above mentioned shortcomings, the data set 
is important for the micro level measurement of tax compliance. 
In this study, we measure tax evasion by the index defined in Slemrod’s (1985) paper. In 
particular, the index is defined by the position of the taxpayer’s taxable income within hundred 
dollar tax bracket43. Marginal tax rates (MTR) and some socio economics and demographic 
variables like marital status, age dummy, any adjustment taken place in calculating taxable 
income, adjusted gross income are also taken into account to find out the determinants (Slemrod, 
1985). In order to calculate MTR, we include returns filed by a single person, and married 
                                                 
42 form 1040, form 1040A, and form 1040EZ federal individual tax returns filed 
43 A detailed description of the Slemrod’s methodology to compute evasion is included in the appendix. 
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couples filing jointly and separately44. Furthermore, Feinstein (1991) argued that two groups –
Schedule C filer and Schedule F filers were viewed as higher than average evaders. However, 
there is no significant difference between fungible items (Slemrod, 1985) and Schedule C and F 
filers45. On the other hand, Clotfelter (1983) suggested using different forms of income e.g. wage 
and salary income and income from interest and dividend because these variables are subject to 
information reporting. Therefore, there is a possibility of underreporting.  From ITMF data, total 
income is calculated as the sum of AGI, Social Security income not included in AGI, Dividend 
not reported in AGI, pension income not included in AGI, and statutory adjustment.  
In order to increase voluntary compliance, along with audit rates, several enforcement 
programs are run by IRS.  Audit rate as well as enforcement data are not available in ITMF data 
set. Therefore, tax return examined by different income level is used as audit rate and the data is 
collected from IRS data book 2008. In terms of enforcement parameter, two types e.g. 
enforcement costs (including investigation, examination and collection costs) and civil penalty 
assessed46 are used. The data is collected from Annual Report published by IRS47. 
Estimating the importance of enforcement programs on compliance requires an analysis 
of time series observation over the years. Therefore, in the second part, I am using annual state 
data collected from Internal Revenue Service Data Book (published by Department of the 
Treasury, IRS) for years 1980 to 2014.  The data book contains individual tax returns filed, tax 
returns examined, additional recommendations and penalties suggested by IRS based on the 
returns at the state level.  
                                                 
44 We exclude returns filed by head of the households. 
45 Fungible items includes itemized deductions, self-employment, partnership income, small business income, estate 
or trust fund, farm income. All of the items except itemized deductions are included in Schedule C and F filers. 
46 It is a sum of Delinquency, estimated tax, failure to pay, bad check, fraud and negligence. 
47 The report has only annual data. Therefore, we created state level data by multiplying percent’s of state level tax 
returns filed to total returns and annual civil penalty assessed. It is measured in 000 dollars.  
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Here tax evasion is measured by a proxy variable which is defined as additional taxes and 
penalties recommended divided by a number of individual income tax returns filed. In our 
analysis, audit rate, as well as enforcement parameter, is important. Here it is measured by the 
number of income tax return examined divided by returns filed times 100. However, state level 
information48 on tax returns examined and additional taxes and penalties reported is available 
from 1980 to 1999. For the rest of the period (2000-2014), I use a weighted average of the 
previous period and extrapolate the data by multiplying the weighted average at each state with 
annual tax return examined and recommended taxes. IRS has introduced several other 
enforcement factors for which the data is not publicly available.   
Marginal tax rate is also important for analysis. The data for average MTR is collected 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis. For other socio economic and demographic variables at the 
state level, e.g. unemployment rate, a number of manufactured employed are also included in the 
estimation as these variables reflect an opportunity to evade (Dubin, 2004).  Social norms can 
also play an important role in compliance behavior. If a society has high income inequality then 
there are poor social norms which may also enhance the tendency to evade taxes. Here we are 
using Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality. Moreover, retail trade employment, 
proprietor’s employment, service employment are used. The data is collected from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Besides these, the percent of nonwhite population, and people aged 65 or 
more are also taken into account. Data are collected from US Census.  
Table 2.1.1 shows descriptive statistics of some important variables using ITMF’s data. 
Here information is reported by different income class e.g. 1st decile reports poorest 10 percent’s 
whereas 10th decile reports richest 10 percent’s of the sample population. Aggregate gross income 
                                                 
48 IRS does not have information for all states. The list of the states and districts is included in Appendix.  
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has larger standard deviation indicating greater disparity among the tax payers. MTR, as well as 
the audit rate, are higher for higher income class. However, there is less variation of audit rate 
among the lowest income class (first five deciles). The pairwise correlation between tax evasion 
and several enforcement parameters indicate positive correlation which suggest that individuals 
tend to evade more with higher enforcement. But, there are many econometric issues that have to 
be addressed before we can draw such a conclusion. 
Table 2.1.2 presents summary statistics using state level annual data. The average per 
return evasion is $4123.36 over the sample period. The average audit rate is 1.13 percent. The 
average marginal tax rate is 27 percent although it varies between 14 and 40 percent across states 
and years. The average budget per return examined is $1656.72 and the budget per return has 
reduced by almost 12 percent after 2008. 
2.6 Empirical Method 
The effect of enforcement on evasion is estimated by the following model 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖′𝛽 +   𝑍𝑖  +∈𝑖,    (5) 
Where evasion (position of the tax payer’s in $100 tax bracket) is the outcome of interest, 𝑥𝑖 is 
audit rate (measured as %) or any enforcement variable49 (measured in 000 dollars), 𝑍𝑖 is a vector 
indicating individual characteristics including 𝑀𝑇𝑅, a dummy variable for elderly which is equal 
to 1 if elderly deduction is claimed and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable for marital status (married 
1, and 0 otherwise), a dummy variable for fungible items. Dummy for fungible items is created if 
taxpayers have at least one of the following characteristics-any adjustment to income, itemized 
deduction, self-employment income, partnership income, small business income, and estate or trust 
                                                 
49 We used civil penalty assessed and total enforcement cost as other forms of audit or enforcement variables. 
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income.  Furthermore, we also include income from work (e.g. wage and salary income), and 
income from the dividend.  
Our hypothesis is that the higher the audit rate or enforcement forces the lower will be the 
rate of evasion. Aside from audit rate, we think that MTR is likely to have a positive impact on 
evasion although it might vary with different income class. Besides these two important variables, 
the impact of individual’s socio economic and demographic variables is as follows- elderly people 
are less willing to evade taxes than younger people50. Moreover, the presence of fungible items in 
the taxable income calculation makes evasion more likely to happen. On the other hand, for some 
variables e.g. marital status, earnings, interest, and dividend income, it is difficult to find any 
straight forward relations. The basic model (1) is estimated by using OLS.  
Moreover, using only one year data may not give us the true picture of enforcement and 
evasion. Also, the definition of tax evasion may generate a lower bound of the true tax evasion 
behavior. Therefore, the following panel data model is used at state level. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽 +   𝑍𝑖𝑡  + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑉𝑠  ∈𝑖𝑡,    (6) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is defined as additional taxes and penalties recommended divided by the number of 
individual income tax returns filed in state i in year t, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is audit rate which is measured by the 
number of income tax return examined51 divided by returns filed times 100 . In separate 
regression, we also use IRS administrative budget (includes processing, investigation, and 
enforcement) as 𝑥𝑖𝑡.  Zit is other state specific characteristics including state average marginal 
tax rate, 𝜇 is a set of year dummies, V is a set of fixed state dummies and 𝜖 is the error term. 
                                                 
50 Most of the previous studies found that elderly people are risk averse and therefore they have higher tendency to 
report their true income. 
51 However, there is a possibility that the probability of audit is not random by nature and this may affect the 
outcome.  
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Year dummies are used to control for factors such as business cycle, population, and change in 
federal policies, etc. that vary over time but not across states. State dummies are used to control 
for state specific factors.  
However, it may generate inconsistent results due to endogeneity problem of audit rates 
and enforcement parameters. The definition of audit rate is endogenous by nature (Dubin, 2004). 
Audit rate not only affects tax payers position to the tax bracket and therefore evasion but also 
IRS allocates resources based on its perceptions of tax payers noncompliance. For enforcement 
parameters, a similar relationship has been observed. A possible solution of this type of problem 
is to use IV estimation.  Previous studies used the budget as instrumental variables e.g. Dubin, 
Graetz, and Wilde (1990) used IRS budget per return filed and a number of information returns 
per tax returns filed as instruments. However, those instruments are weak since both district 
budget and information returns vary with the perception of tax payer’s compliance. In another 
study, Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992) used a number of returns filed per IRS employee in a 
given district. However, the variable also seems to affect compliance directly. Therefore, in this 
study, I use political affiliation of the President of United States, the party affiliation of state 
Governor, and a composition of the chamber of commerce of US senate and congress as 
instrumental variables. Alm and Yunus (2009), Schulz and Wood (1998) argued that audit rate, 
as well as enforcement parameters, are largely governed by representatives of IRS to elected 
officials. If there is democratic majority then audit as well as enforcement will be lower. The 
reason is that Democrats are more likely to be stated to favor general public as opposed to Pro 
Corporation or rich people. The data on political variables from 1977-2008 are collected from 
Dubin (2008) and for the other years, the data is collected from the National Conference of State 
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Legislators reports, and Congressional Research Service Report. The validity of the IV’s is 
checked by Sargan (1958) test and found that instruments are valid. 
The IV model takes the following forms 
𝑥𝑖 =  𝛼𝐹𝑆 + 𝜕𝐹𝑆 𝑃𝐴 +   𝐹𝑆𝑍𝑖  +∈𝑖  (7) 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼𝑆𝑆 + 𝑥?̂?𝛽 +   𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑖  +∈𝑖  (8) 
The first stage regression is shown by equation 2 where PA refers to the instrumental variables. 
Equation (3) gives the second stage regression with coefficients denoted by the SS.  
Distribution of income may have different impacts on individual responses. And least square 
method will not be able to capture the true impacts. Therefore, in this paper, we further use quantile 
regression analysis (Koenker & Bassett 1978, Koenker & Hallock, 2001).52 Although the most 
familiar form of quantile regression is median regression, here we use 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th 
quantile in order to find out the responses of individuals at different points in the distribution of 
income. Furthermore, we use instrumental quantile regression model in order to deal with the 
endogeneity issue related to the enforcement parameter. 
2.7 Results and Discussion 
2.7.1 Using ITMF’s DATA  
Table 2.3 shows the impact of enforcement on taxpayer’s position of taxable income. 
Taxpayer’s position within $100 tax bracket is represented by an index variable which takes the 
values from 0 to 100. The indicator of tax evasion is sensitive to the assumption of reported 
income (rather than reported tax) and thus it may measure a lower bound of the actual extent of 
evasion (Slemrod, 1985). 
                                                 
52 A brief description of the Quantile Regression is discussed in the appendix. 
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Column (1) uses OLS techniques and shows that while MTR has positive impact 
indicating the higher the tax rate, the higher will be the tendency to evade, audit rate has a 
positive impact on evasion. However, the nature of the audit rate which a simple OLS is unable 
to control for may generate a biased result. Thus, we use other enforcement variables e.g. 
enforcement cost, and the civil penalty assessed in column (2) and column (3). It is noted that 
using these two variables reduces number of observations due to incorporating state level 
information. In ITMF’s data set, state level information is given only for individuals who has 
AGI less than equal to $20000053. With these two variables, enforcement has a negative impact 
on the tendency to evade although the effect is not statistically significant. All the columns 
control for the presence of fungible items, wage and salary income, interest and dividend 
income, marital status, and elderly people. Reported income variables such as wage and salary 
income, interest and dividend income have a positive influence on the tendency to evade. 
Moreover, married couples are more likely to evade than unmarried ones. In all those columns, 
robust standard errors are used in order to take care of the heteroskedasticity issue. Furthermore, 
state dummies are taken in to account in table 2.4 in order to deal with state specific 
characteristics. However, all the enforcement variables show positive impact on tax evasion 
which is contrary to our hypothesis.  
While simple OLS estimates the impact of enforcement on the tendency to evade, there 
may be a possibility of endogeneity (discussed in the methodology section) which will not be 
captured by using other enforcement variables. Since we have only one endogenous variable e.g. 
enforcement (it is measured by either return examined or by enforcement cost or by the civil 
penalty assessed) and we use two instrumental variables, the model is over identified.  
                                                 
53 Therefore using state level information limits the estimation only to certain level of income (mostly excludes 
higher level of income).  
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For that, Sargan’s (1958) and Basmann’s (1960) test is used. The test statistic is reported in 
appendix table 2.A3. It shows that instruments are valid.  
In order to reduce the bias due to endogeneity problem, two stage least square method is 
used. Table 2.5 and 2.6 reports the results from 2SLS. The ITMF data is only for one year, and 
therefore, here state governor party affiliation and state legislator democratic affiliation are used 
as instruments. First stage results (Table 2.5) show that state level political characteristics have 
some relation with enforcement activities. In particular if the state governor is democrat and if 
the state legislator is democratic, it is less likely to have strong enforcement activities.  The 
second stage results show that the coefficients for all the enforcement variables are negative 
although insignificant. On the other hand, the higher the MTR, the possibility to report income in 
the higher bracket of lower taxable income is also higher. Similarly, married couples are likely to 
evade more than others. Furthermore, all the reported income variables show higher tendency to 
evade. Therefore, two major outcomes are: MTR has a positive impact on the tendency to evade, 
and enforcement, as well as audits, do not have any significant impact on the evasion behavior. 
One of the major shortcoming of using political characteristics of the state legislators as 
instrumental variables is that it excludes information about individual who has higher AGI of 
$200000 in ITMF’s data set. All the previous studies argued that higher income people are more 
likely to evade than lower income. Excluding a larger portion of the higher income people may 
bias the outcome.   
Different income levels may influence the tendency of taxpayers to evade taxes and thus 
may have reacted differently with the enforcement programs. To account this issue, we use 
quantile regression for 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 quantiles54. Calculation of each quantile is based on 
                                                 
54 I also tested for 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 quantile and the results do not show much variation. 
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total comprehensive income55. The effect of enforcement parameters on different income classes 
in shown in table 2.7. For 0.2 quantile income level, audit rate (measured by returns examined) 
has a negative insignificant impact on evasion. For other income classes, it has positive impact 
although insignificant. For example, a one percentage point increase in the audit rate decreases 
the tendency to evade taxes by 0.235 points for an individual in the 0.2 quantile. For higher 
quantile groups, the relationship is positive although their tendency to evade taxes has declined. 
Moreover, enforcement cost and civil penalty assessed has an insignificant impact on evasion. 
When enforcement is measured by a civil penalty assessed and enforcement cost, the tendency of 
individuals to evade taxes varies at different points of income distribution. For example, with 
quintile regression at 0.2 and 0.4 quantile of total income, the coefficient estimates of the 
enforcement cost as well as civil penalty assessed show negative relationship although 
insignificant. However, for upper quantile, it shows positive and very negligible impact.  
There still exists a possibility of endogeneity due to the definition of the audit rate. 
Therefore, IV-Quantile regression method56 is used here. The results are shown in Table 2.8, 2.9, 
and 2.10. For an individual in the 0.2 quantiles, a one percentage point increase in returns 
examined reduces individual’s tendency to evade taxes by 1.90 points. However, with 0.60 
quantile level, the tendency increases. All the effects are insignificant.  On the other hand, 
marginal tax rate tends to have a larger impact for higher income class. However, due to lower 
observation in the upper quantile 57, no precise results has been observed. On the other hand, for 
marital status, the coefficients are generally positive for all income types indicating that married 
couples tend to evade more than unmarried ones and the coefficient do not vary much with 
                                                 
55 Total comprehensive income =Aggregate Income, SSI not included in AGI, Dividends not included in AGI, 
Pension Income, Capital Gains and Statutory Adjustment.  
56 Kaplan and Sun (2012); “Smoothed Estimating Equations for Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression” 
57 State specific variables are only included for AGI<=200000. 
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different income class. In addition, elderly people tend to evade more when they are in the lower 
quantile of income which is contrary to our belief. However, for the upper level of income, the 
results are consistent with the expected sign that elderly people tend to evade less. We observe 
similar type of results when enforcement is measured by the civil penalty assessed and also by 
enforcement cost.  
Furthermore, we also calculate quantile based on AGI and wage and salary income. In all 
the cases, we found a negative insignificant impact of enforcement on tax evasion, especially for 
20th and 40th quantile class (Table 2.A4 in Appendix). In a separate regression, we also use 
interest income, dividend income, and capital gains income to calculate different quantiles. The 
results do not vary significantly. 
The graphs in the appendix show the comparison between OLS and quantile coefficients. 
The dotted line is OLS confidence interval. It appears that linear regression slope is not sufficient 
to describe the relationship between evasion and its determinants. In particular, when audit rate is 
measured by return examined the upper quintiles are below the least square estimates. In most of 
the cases, OLS is insufficient to measure the true relationship between different points in income. 
In general, the impacts of enforcement on tax evasion varies with different income level. 
The responsiveness of the individual in their reporting of income is declining at higher income 
level due to different enforcement activities. Moreover, responsiveness is higher for lower 
quantile income level (quantile level 0.2 and 0.4). However, in all the cases, the responsiveness 
is insignificant. Possible reasons may be related to data constraint at the state level and the 
definition of tax evasion.  The results may indicate the impact at the lower extent. 
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2.7.2 Using IRS Aggregate Data  
Therefore, we also estimate the model with aggregate data at the state level. In the 
aggregate data set, we are using two types of enforcement variables-audit rate (measured by tax 
return examined per tax return filed) and enforcement budget at the administrative level. 
Enforcement budget is only available at the annual level and here annual data is used to calculate 
the budget for each state based on tax return examined at each state. Other control variables are 
unemployment rate, MTR, employment in the manufacturing sector, employment in retail past, 
employment in proprietors, services, GINI coefficient, elderly people, and percentage of 
nonwhite people.  
Table 2.11 shows the results for both fixed effect and random effect model without 
incorporating endogeneity issue. Both the enforcement variables have an insignificant impact on 
tax evasion. However, we choose fixed effect model based on Hausman Test (1978).  
In order to control for endogeneity issue, we use two stage least square method. And we have 
three instruments- political affiliation of the President of United States, party affiliation of state 
Governor, and a composition of chamber of commerce of US senate and congress, and one 
endogenous variable. Therefore, there may be a possibility of over identifying estimation and in 
order to test this, we use Sargan (1958) and Basmann (1960) test. The test statistics show that 
instruments are valid. Table 2.12 shows first stage results of the 2SLS method. The coefficient 
on the political characteristics have the expected sign, in particular the coefficient on the party 
affiliation of the U.S. President, and the ratio of Democratic to the Republican in both the 
chambers of the U.S. Congress show that the presence of Democrat government increases the 
tendency to evade more by reducing the audit or enforcement activities. F test for the joint 
significance of the instruments is also included in Table 12 in which F statistic is much larger 
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than the standard of 1058. Therefore, the instruments are not weak (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 
2002). Furthermore, we use Woolridge Score Test, Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test and the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics test. All of the results indicate that the instruments are not 
weak and are acceptable.  
Table 2.13 shows two stage least square results with two enforcement variables. Both the 
audit rate and enforcement budget have a negative impact on tax evasion indicating that the 
higher the level of enforcement, the lower will be the tendency to evade. However, the 
significance of the coefficient varies between 5 and 10 percent level. These results are similar to 
previous studies (Tauchen, Witte, and Beron 1989; Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990; Alm and 
Yunus 2008). Our results confirms that the lower budget for enforcement for IRS is the reason to 
have low tax compliance over the years and policy makers should advocate for increasing 
resource support for IRS.  
For other variables, average marginal tax rate shows a positive impact59.  Some sources 
of income may enhance more tax evasion tendency than other. In order to incorporate this, we 
are using income from proprietorship, services, retail trade, and manufacturing employment. We 
find that retail past, proprietorship income as well as being employed in the service increases the 
tendency to evade. On the other hand, the percentage of nonwhite population is positively related 
to tax evasion which is consistent with the findings of Tauchen, Witte, and Beron (1989). The 
positive relationship between the rate of unemployment, the Gini coefficient and the level of 
evasion suggests that evasion becomes higher during the economic recession, and evasion is 
                                                 
58 We further derive Angrist-Pischke First Stage F statistics and for both the endogenous fiscal variables, the value is 
greater than 10.  
59 Here we are using average marginal tax rate for federal and state government.  
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higher in a society with high inequality. These findings are similar to most of the previous 
studies (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990).  
We further check our results by using MTR square, and also different time period. Using 
MTR square along with MTR does not change the previous outcomes.  In the US, there is a 
significant reduction in enforcement budget from 2009. Therefore, in a separate regression, we 
estimate the causal relationship between tax evasion and enforcement from period 2009 and 
onwards. The results (Table 2.14) indicate a significant increase of tax evasion due to this budget 
cut. In particular, the responsiveness towards noncompliance actually increases. Furthermore we 
also use enforcement budget as well as audit rate of the previous year. Our goal is to find out 
whether enforcement activities in the previous year has any different impact on evasion. The 
results are consistent with our previous findings. 
Generally, the effect of enforcement on evasion is negative. The higher the level of 
enforcement, the lower will be the degree of evasion. However, in case of ITMF’s data, the 
impact is insignificant. One reason may be related to the fact that the instrumental variables lack 
information on individual’s who has income greater than $200000. Another reason may be 
related to the definition of tax evasion in which evasion is calculated based on reported income 
rather than reported tax. Slemrod (1985) argued that if evasion is based on reported income then 
it will generate a lower bound estimate of evasion, rather than the true picture of evasion. On the 
other hand, at the aggregate level, our hypothesis holds up. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The responsiveness of taxpayers in filing their income taxes depends on many factors. 
One of the important factors is related to the overall enforcement activities taken by the tax 
authority. Therefore, the government policy makers, as well as tax authorities, are always 
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interested in estimating the causal impact of enforcement on tax compliance. Over the years, tax 
noncompliance has gone up. After the recent recession, policy makers are now more concerned 
about the growth of noncompliance and in particular how the federal budget cut can deteriorate 
the noncompliance even more since lower resources for IRS can also decrease enforcement 
activities and services to tax payers. In this paper, we estimate the impact of several enforcement 
parameters on the tendency to evade taxes.  
We used Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tax evasion model in which there is a negative 
relation between tax evasion and enforcement. And we find that tax evasion depends on 
individual characteristics, government policies as well on social norms.  Furthermore, the 
government can increase the revenue by increasing enforcement activities. Empirically, we use 
individual level data for year 2008 and aggregate state level data from 1980 to 2014. The results 
show that in most of the cases, the enforcement impact is negative.  However, due to endogenity 
we use instrumental variables and those variables are weakly defined in case of individual level 
data. As a result, at the individual level we find imprecise impact although negative. On the other 
hand, the responses can vary at different income level. Therefore, we further use quantile 
regression analysis and our results confirm divergence in tax payer’s responses across different 
income level towards enforcement activities. On the other hand, at the aggregate level, we find a 
negative significant impact of enforcement activities on tax evasion.  Therefore, the findings 
indicate that enforcement as well resources devoted to enforcement play an important role to 
reduce tax evasion. We check the robustness of the results by using different time periods, 
previous enforcement budget etc. We find that the results vary with different time period.  
In U.S. IRS is responsible for collecting revenue. For IRS, a dollar spent generates more 
than one dollar in revenue. However, recent cuts in IRS budget have deteriorated the tax 
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compliance situation.  Our results confirm that more resources in enforcement activities can 
reduce tax evasion. Therefore, policy makers, as well as the government, should take proper 
policies to increase budget for IRS in order to maximize voluntary compliance as well as 
maintaining tax payer’s rights, facilitating tax services, and minimizing tax payer’s burden.  
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Table 2.1.1: Summary statistics by Income class 
Total 
Income 
Class 
  AGI Wage and Salary 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Dividend 
Income 
Audit Rate Marginal 
Tax rate 
1 Mean 17702.47 15251.52 296.702 259.8136 9.23 11.6741 
SD 6710.18 19704.78 1524.963 1739.446 0.7 2.359744 
2 Mean 35246.29 28762.88 727.1921 584.9439 9.4 14.17121 
  SD 8052.097 32293.77 3091.263 3253.704 1.21 3.772145 
3 Mean 55936.66 41327.78 1482.587 1317.889 9.62 17.01232 
  SD 11578.25 34440.8 7001.279 9763.991 1.75 4.964046 
4 Mean 88190.41 58203.22 3337.652 3188.62 9.83 19.66354 
  SD 17877.65 46314.8 17306.22 12362.87 2.02 5.381731 
5 Mean 154025.5 96087.41 6303.155 7566.249 10.06 25.10133 
  SD 32226.43 77979.64 24179.9 22668.02 2.46 4.106941 
6 Mean 256572 144403.5 11502.63 15129.74 10.25 29.64547 
  SD 59619.71 125836.4 37033.3 44150.84 2.67 4.419631 
7 Mean 467853.2 226792.9 24373.23 30279.75 10.53 33.21873 
  SD 134650.8 222074.3 71181.49 84661.53 3.17 3.700074 
8 Mean 887518.4 371745.9 45340.74 56761.1 10.95 34.37375 
  SD 243675.9 384359.7 118481.1 142825.9 3.89 2.749887 
9 Mean 1589631 630709 68649.19 90682.38 11.32 34.71886 
  SD 372986.1 675583.4 178590.6 235149.6 4.2 1.807665 
10 Mean 6683046 1832701 298316.1 478259 11.34 34.90214 
  SD 1.43E+07 4859808 1408196 2596293 4.34 1.079265 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83  
  
Table 2.1.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Evasion (Per return $) 4123.36 1695.72 
Audit Rate 1.13 1.86 
IRS Budget 20200000 33600000 
MTR 27.03 3.43 
% of Proprietors in Total Employment 2.07 2.25 
% of Retail Trade in Total Employment 2.06 2.09 
% of Service Sector in Total Employment 2.06 2.43 
% of Elderly 15.02 2.06 
% of Non-white people 13.16 8.79 
Unemployment Rate 6.14 2.15 
Gini Coefficient 0.56 0.04 
Party Affiliation of State Governor 0.48 0.5 
House Democratic Ratio 0.53 0.05 
Senate Democratic Ratio 0.5 0.46 
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Table 2.2: Pairwise Correlation Coefficient 
  
Tax 
Evasion 
Returns 
Examined 
Civil 
Penalty 
Assessed 
Cost of 
Enforcement 
Tax Evasion 1    
Returns 
Examined 
0.0547* 
1   
(0.000) 
Civil Penalty 
Assessed 
0.0143 0.0249* 
1  
(0.1316) (0.0085) 
     Cost of 
Enforcement 
0.0136* 0.0239* 0.9996* 
1 
(0.0053) (0.0115) (0.000) 
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Table 2.3: Tax Evasion: OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 Tax Bracket) 
Primary Independent Variables: Returns Examined, Cost of Enforcement and Civil Penalty Assessed 
 OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES    
    
Returns examined  0.101*   
 (0.059)   
MTR 1.520*** 1.530*** 1.530*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Presence of Fungible Items -0.930* -0.794 -0.794 
 (0.530) (0.528) (0.528) 
Wage and Salary Income 0.725*** 0.743*** 0.742*** 
 (0.219) (0.220) (0.220) 
Interest Income 0.251** 0.245** 0.245** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Dividend Income 0.421*** 0.430*** 0.430*** 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) 
Marital Status 6.244*** 6.270*** 6.271*** 
 (0.672) (0.675) (0.675) 
Elderly people -0.235 -0.254 -0.254 
 (0.559) (0.560) (0.560) 
Cost of Enforcement  -0.227  
  (0.287)  
Civil Penalty Assessed   -0.222 
   (0.287) 
    
Observations 11,221 11,158 11,158 
    
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 
level;   ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.4: Tax Evasion: OLS Estimation with State Fixed Effect 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 Tax Bracket) 
Primary Independent Variables: Returns Examined, Cost of Enforcement and Civil Penalty Assessed 
 
 OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES    
    
Returns examined  0.107*   
 (0.059)   
MTR 1.520*** 1.528*** 1.528*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Presence of Fungible Items 0.824 0.714 0.714 
 (0.533) (0.531) (0.531) 
Wage and Salary Income 0.667*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 
 (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
Interest Income 0.227* 0.221* 0.221* 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Dividend Income 0.425*** 0.439*** 0.439*** 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) 
Marital Status 6.384*** 6.415*** 6.415*** 
 (0.676) (0.679) (0.679) 
Elderly people -0.300 -0.335 -0.335 
 (0.562) (0.563) (0.563) 
Cost of Enforcement  1.481  
  (2.470)  
Civil Penalty Assessed   1.481 
   (2.470) 
State Dummy  × × × 
Observations 
Sargan & Basmann Chi Square (1) 
11,221 
0.37 
(P=0.54) 
11,158 
1.42 
(P=0.23) 
11,158 
1.39 
(P=0.23) 
    
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 
level;   ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.5: First Stage Regression Results 
 
 Returns 
Examined 
Cost of 
Enforcement  
Civil Penalty 
Assessed 
VARIABLES    
    
Democratic Governor  -0.190** 
(0.082) 
-0.352** 
(0.018) 
-0.359** 
(0.018) 
    
Democratic Legislator 0.162 -0.081** -0.071** 
 (0.985) (0.016) (0.016) 
MTR 0.056** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
Marital Status 0.332*** -0.105*** -0.099*** 
 (0.098) (0.025) (0.020) 
Presence of Fungible Items 0.925 -0.048 -0.048 
 (0.0.08) (0.017) (0.016) 
Wage and Salary Income 0.667*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 
 (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) 
Interest Income 0.227* 0.221* 0.221* 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Dividend Income 0.425*** 0.439*** 0.439*** 
 (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) 
Marital Status 6.384*** 6.415*** 6.415*** 
 (0.676) (0.679) (0.679) 
Elderly people -0.300 -0.335 -0.335 
 (0.562) (0.563) (0.563) 
State Dummy  × × × 
    
F statistics 32.85 64.20 65.97 
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 
level;   ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.6: Tax Evasion: Two Stage Least Square Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 Tax Bracket) 
Primary Independent Variables: Returns Examined, Cost of Enforcement and Civil Penalty Assessed 
 
 2sls 2sls 2sls 
VARIABLES    
    
Return Examined -2.472   
 (2.150)   
Marital status 5.472*** 6.354*** 6.358*** 
 (0.995) (0.689) (0.688) 
Elderly People 0.0497 -0.248 -0.248 
 (0.653) (0.560) (0.560) 
Marginal tax rate 1.398*** 1.527*** 1.526*** 
 (0.124) (0.046) (0.046) 
Wage and Salary Income 0.546* 0.708*** 0.707*** 
 (0.283) (0.226) (0.226) 
Interest Income 0.0567 0.228* 0.228* 
 (0.207) (0.126) (0.126) 
Dividend Income 0.280 0.423*** 0.423*** 
 (0.183) (0.122) (0.122) 
Presence of fungible items 3.051 0.754 0.752 
 (2.052) (0.533) (0.532) 
Cost of Enforcement  -0.663  
  (1.448)  
Civil Penalty Assessed   -0.702 
   (1.421) 
Score Chi Square (1)                              0.115 
(0.733) 
1.432 
(0.231) 
1.397 
(0.237) 
Observations 11,158 11,158 11,158 
Note: Standard Error are heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 level;   
** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.7: Tax Evasion: Quantile Regression (OLS) 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 
Tax Bracket) 
 
Note: Standard Error are heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 level;   
** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Quantile Results 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Returns 
Examined 
-0.235 
(0.174) 
0.131** 
(0.047) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
Civil Penalty 
Assessed 
-0.780 
(0.509) 
-0.107 
(0.141) 
0.0011 
(0.0002) 
0.0020 
(0.0003) 
Enforcement Cost -0.781* 
(0.499) 
-0.108 
(0.213) 
-0.0050 
(0.0065) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
Controls × × × × 
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Table 2.8: Tax Evasion: Quantile Regression (2sls) 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 
Tax Bracket) 
Major Independent Variable: Returns Examined 
 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
VARIABLES     
     
Return Examined -1.901 -1.612 1.024 0.000 
 (2.234) (1.563) (0.658) (0.000) 
Marital status 3.413   *** 7.362*** 4.887*** 1.666** 
 (1.070) (1.201) (0.457) (0.887) 
Elderly People 3.136** 2.286** -0.763** ne 
 (1.213) (0.885) (0.325)  
Marginal tax rate 1.234  *** 2.410*** 1.576*** 0.555** 
 (.1563 ) (0.204) (0.054) (0.295) 
Wage and Salary Income .0001 0.000 0.0001 ne 
 (000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Interest Income .0000 0.000 0.000 ne 
 (.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Dividend Income .000 0.000 0.000 ne 
 (.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Presence of fungible items 2.075 1.588 1.029 ne 
 (2.770 ) (1.578) (0.670)  
Note: Standard Error are heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 level;   ** significance 
at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level. Ne stands for very negligible impact. 
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Table 2.9: Tax Evasion: Quantile Regression (2sls) 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 
Tax Bracket) 
Major Independent Variable: Civil Penalty Assessed 
 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
VARIABLES     
     
Civil Penalty Assessed -1.723 -0.871 0.315 0.0001 
 (1.508) (0.855) (0.285) (0.000) 
Marital status 3.967  *** 6.030*** 5.251*** 1.558** 
 (0.960) (1.071) (0.324) (0.8870) 
Elderly People 3.321** 1.876** -0.681** ne 
 (1.468) (0.632) (0.255)  
Marginal tax rate 1.340  *** 2.522*** 1.633*** 0.5415** 
 (.078 ) (0.134) (0.025) (0.2302) 
Wage and Salary Income .0001 0.0001 0.0001 ne 
 (000) (0.000) (0.0001)  
Interest Income .00002 0.0002 0.0002 ne 
 (.00003) (0.0002) (0.0002)  
Dividend Income .00001 0.0001 0.0001 ne 
 (.00001) (0.0000) (0.0001)  
Presence of fungible items 1.0007 0.8150 1.0290 ne 
 (1.4895 ) (0.7800) (0.6706)  
Note: Standard Error are heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 level;   
** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level. Ne stands for 
very negligible impact.  
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Table 2.10: Tax Evasion: Quantile Regression (2sls) 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by the Position of the Tax Payers with $100 
Tax Bracket) 
Major Independent Variable: Enforcement Cost 
 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
VARIABLES     
     
Return Examined -1.723   -0.871 0.415 0.000 
 (1.455) (0.610) (0.311) (0.000) 
Marital status      3.458   *** 7.030*** 4.887*** 1.667** 
 (0.960) (0.946) (0.457) (0.887) 
Elderly People 3.321**    1.475** -0.763** ne 
 (1.239) (0.524) (0.325)  
Marginal tax rate 1.310  *** 2.532*** 1.625*** 0.522** 
 (.115 ) (0.120) (0.031) (0.295) 
Wage and Salary Income .0001    0.0001 0.0000 ne 
 (0000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Interest Income .00000   0.0002 0.0002 ne 
 (.00000) (0.0002) (0.0002)  
Dividend Income .00001   0.0001 0.0001 ne 
 (.00001) (0.0000) (0.0001)  
Presence of fungible items 1.0003   0.8150 0.8373 ne 
 (1.304 ) (0.7800) (0.2127)  
Note: Standard Error are heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 level;   
** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level. Ne stands for 
very negligible impact.  
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Table 2.11: Tax Evasion: Fixed Effect and Random Effect Model 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Additional Taxes and Penalties Recommended divided 
by number of individual tax returns filed) 
 
   
Variables FE RE 
   
Returns Examined 0.0352 0.0140 
 (0.060) (0.059) 
Unemployment Rate 0.0018** 0.0018*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Elderly People 0.00001** 0.000001 
 (0.000) (0.00000) 
MTR 0.0005 0.00005 
 (0.0004) (0.00036) 
Manufacturing Emp. -0.0103*** -0.0099*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Retail Trade Sector 0.00522 0.0055 
 (0.0032) (0.0033) 
Proprietors Emp. -0.0042 -0.0038 
 (0.0030) (0.0029) 
Service Emp. 0.0066*** 0.0064*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
GINI coefficient 0.0415 0.0553* 
 (0.0480) (0.0315) 
Non White People -0.00017 -0.00017 
 (0.0001) (0.00014) 
Note: Standard Error are heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 level;   ** significance at the .05 level; 
*** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.12: First Stage Regression Results 
 Returns 
Examined 
IRS Budget 
VARIABLES   
   
Party Affiliation of US President  -0.205** 
(0.098) 
-0.187** 
(0.050) 
   
Democratic State Governor  -0.001 -0.011 
 (0.001) (0.230) 
Ratio of Democrats in US Senate -0.085** -0.076** 
 (0.042) (0.028) 
Ratio of Democrats in US Congress -0.055*** -0.019*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) 
Controls 
State Dummy                                                         
× 
×
× 
× 
F statistics                                                             37.19 58.39 
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 
level;   ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.13: Tax Evasion: Two Stage Least Square Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by Additional Taxes and Penalties 
Recommended divided by number of individual tax returns filed 
 
 2sls 2sls 
VARIABLES   
   
Returns Examined -0.176**  
 (0.073)  
Unemployment Rate 0.0010 0.0009* 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Elderly People 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.0001) 
MTR 0.0010* 0.0012*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Manufacturing Emp 0.0057 0.0094 
 (0.0090) (0.0074) 
Retail Trade Sector 0.0023 0.0047 
 (0.0070) (0.0084) 
Proprietors Emp. 0.0025 0.0004 
 (0.0047) (0.0057) 
Service Emp. 0.0006 0.0008 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) 
GINI coefficient 0.0273 0.103 
 (0.0647) (0.0679) 
Non White People 0.0085*** 0.0092*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0019) 
IRS Budget  -0.105* 
(0.020) 
State Dummy  
Year Dummy 
× 
× 
× 
× 
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 
level;   ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 2.14: Tax Evasion: Two Stage Least Square Estimation (year 2009-2014) 
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion (Measured by Additional Taxes and Penalties 
Recommended divided by number of individual tax returns filed) 
 
 2sls 2sls 
VARIABLES   
   
Returns Examined -4.407**  
 (1.996)  
Unemployment Rate 0.153 0.0233 
 (1.402) (0.0376) 
Elderly People 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) 
MTR 0.384 0.0155 
 (2.928) (0.0291) 
Manufacturing Emp 0.808 0.146 
 (0.695) (0.110) 
Retail Trade Sector 0.514 0.361 
 (0.432) (0.263) 
Proprietors Emp. 1.291 0.243 
 (1.11) (0.197) 
Service Emp. 0.163 0.0404 
 (.484) (0.0406) 
GINI coefficient 10.33 0.714 
 (9.63) (1.892) 
Non White People 0.0705 -0.0204*** 
 (0.396) (0.00717) 
IRS Budget  -0.230* 
  (0.180) 
State Dummy  
Year Dummy 
× 
× 
× 
× 
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust. * Significance at the .10 
level;   ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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ESSAY THREE: THE MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATOPNS OF SALES TAX 
EVASION IN PAKISTAN  
3.1 Introduction 
Tax evasion is a severe problem for developing countries where informal sector accounts 
for almost 40 percent of GDP. Higher tax evasion results in lower funds for public sector 
investment and therefore leads to lower economic growth. Lack of information and imperfectly 
observed transactions may cause evasion. Therefore, true reporting, verified documents, and 
strict enforcement rules can be used to reduce this problem (Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006, Kleven 
et.al. 2009, Kleven et.al, 2010).  The value added tax (VAT) is believed to facilitate tax 
enforcement through a built-in incentive structures (Agha, A., and Haughton 1996, Kopczuk and 
Slemrod 2006). As a result, several countries including Pakistan have adopted this form of tax60. 
The goal is to improve the tax compliance scenario. 
Among these developing countries, Pakistan has the lowest tax-GDP ratio (near 11 
percent) in the world. Around 7 million Pakistanis are estimated to be eligible to pay taxes but in 
reality less than 0.5 million pay taxes.  Therefore, tax reform is a very important agenda for 
Pakistan. In Pakistan, most of goods are subject to a VAT rate of 17%61 (also known as General 
Sale’s tax). In terms of VAT or general sales tax, major areas of concerns are i. Registration 
Issues, ii. Fake and Flying Invoices, iii. Fraudulent Refunds, IV. Undervaluation and fictitious 
sales, v. Misuse of concessions and VI. Weakness in Data Processing62.  Most likely, evasion 
occurs in these areas. Besides corporate income tax evasion in Pakistan, sales tax evasion is one 
of the growing concerns for policy makers as well as for the government.  
                                                 
60 The sales tax in VAT mode has been in place since 1996. 
61 For six products-soybean meal; oil cake and other solid residues; direct reduced iron; oilseeds meant for sowing;, 
cotton; and plant and machinery not manufactured locally, the rate is 5 percent’s.  
62 A detailed discussion of these issues are included in Appendix. 
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The objective of the paper is to find out the potential distributional impact of sales tax 
evasion by using the output of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Models and to analyze 
the macroeconomic outcome e.g. Real GNP, Tax-GDP ratio, Budget Deficit, Investment etc. A 
particular characteristic of the CGE model is that it incorporates tax evasion as an endogenous 
outcome of optimizing behavior by the different sectors of the economy.  Given Pakistan’s 
relatively low rate of overall tax collection, as well as high statutory tax rates, it is important to 
compare the outcome from two scenarios-one with sales tax evasion, and another without sales 
tax evasion. The results of the simulations may indicate the importance of strong enforcement 
and tax administrative structure for Pakistan.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  The next section contains a modeling of 
tax evasion based on previous literature in the context of the general equilibrium model.  Section 
3 discusses a brief overview of General Sales Tax or VAT in Pakistan. Section 4 presents the 
general equilibrium specification, section 5 shows numerical results of the simulations of the 
alternative effective sales tax rate in the CGE model. Last section 6 concludes.  
3.2. Modeling Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is a severe problem in Pakistan. According to a recent IMF’s report (IMF 
Country Report No.16/2, 2016)63, the tax capacity of Pakistan is estimated to be 22.3 percent’s of 
GDP implying a tax revenue gap of more than 11 percent’s or Rs 3.3 trillion. Although the 
revenue collection has gone up from 8.7 percent’s  of GDP in 2005-06 to 10.6 percent’s of GDP 
in 2015-16, still it is one of the lowest in South Asia.  In terms of VAT, Ahmad (2011)64found 
that out of 86 countries that have a VAT types sales tax, the efficiency ratio65 of the VAT in 
                                                 
63 Pakistan Selected Issues, International Monetary Fund, 2016 
64 Ahmad (2011), “Why is it so difficult to implement a GST in Pakistan” 
65 Efficiency ratio = total vat revenue as % of GDP/ Vat Standard Rate 
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Pakistan is very low (27%). Recently, the Federal Board of Revenue in Pakistan has discovered a 
fraud of Rs9.8 billion in sales tax, which was done by issuing fake invoices for obtaining input 
adjustments and refunds. Thus Pakistan can be used as a country study in which there is a high 
amount of sales tax evasion, as well as low tax-GDP ratio 
Here we model sales tax evasion, audit and self-enforcing mechanism in the original 
Allingham-Sandmo model (1972).  The approach is similar to Pomeranj (2010) who model VAT 
evasion for a developing country. In the model, an individual chooses evasion E66 given that 
there is a detection rate P and if found guilty then he/she will be penalized at rate Ω. Here Ω is a 
function of evaded tax or underreport income. Therefore, individual i’s expected net of tax 
income is 
𝑊1 = 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖(𝑌𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖) If he or she is not caught while cheating   (state 1) 
𝑊2 = 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖(𝑌𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖) − Ω𝑖𝐸𝑖 if he or she is caught while cheating  (state 2) 
And individual i will maximize67  
1 − 𝑝(𝐸𝑖)𝑈(𝑊1) + 𝑝(𝐸𝑖)𝑈(𝑊2)         (1) 
The first order condition implies a negative relation between detection and evasion 
(Sandmo, 2004). VAT68 has a self-enforcing mechanism in which firms have asked their suppliers 
for true receipts in order to deduct input costs from VAT bill (Pomeranj, 2010). This mechanism 
creates an incentive for paper trails or records of documents. In another paper, Bird and Gendron 
(2007) argued that in the case of inter-business trade in VAT, buyers and sellers have conflicting 
interests in which buyers want to exaggerate buying price in order to inflate deductions although 
                                                 
66 Evasion is defined as the difference between true income and reported income 
67 Risk neutral individual 
68 In terms of VAT, income is calculated as the difference between sales and inputs cost. 
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sellers want to underreport sales in order to reduce the liability of tax.  Therefore, the risk of the 
cross check can reduce the probability of false reporting. Following Kleven et al (2010), here the 
probability of detection is a function of probability of audit (a) in which probability of audit (a) 
depends on set of actions taken by the tax authority (examination, enforcement, tax rate etc.), and 
probability of cross checks (c) for transactions with a paper trail. In their paper, c is close to 1 for 
a developed country; Denmark. However, Pomeranj (2010) argued that for developing countries, 
most of the documents are actually kept in paper and tax payers keep all the information about 
transactions which makes the cross check even more expensive. Therefore, for a developing 
country c is significantly lower than 1. Therefore, in terms of VAT, equation 1 will become 
1 − 𝑝 {𝐸𝑖(𝑎, 𝑐)}𝑈(𝑊1) + 𝑝{𝐸𝑖(𝑎, 𝑐)}𝑈(𝑊2)69          (2) 
Here, the probability of detection is an increasing function of both probability of audit and 
probability of cross check implying that the higher the level of enforcement, the higher will be the 
chance for audit, and the higher will be the detection rate.  
In case of developing countries, firms can evade taxes without any fear for detection 
because, in those countries, enforcement activities by the government are very weak and also 
corruption rate is very high (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Although Pakistan has some penalty rates 
for sales tax evasion, there is no such strong enforcement e.g. jail. On the other hand, Pakistan has 
VAT type’s sales tax and the format of the VAT in Pakistan is a type of General Sales Tax. 
Therefore, the probability of cross check is also low. As a result, the evasion in sales tax in Pakistan 
is increasing day by day (Federal Board of Revenue Reports, 2016). Information on different forms 
of enforcement as well as different levels of cross checks are not available for Pakistan and 
                                                 
69 Pomeranj (2010) further assumes that cross check is a function of the likelihood of creating paper document by 
the trading partners. However, in our paper, we keep it simple.  
101  
  
therefore we will just assume a simple linear function where detection or evasion is a function of 
enforcement. And enforcement expenditure is a part of total government expenditure. The higher 
the level of enforcement, the lower will be the degree of evasion. Furthermore, for sales tax, if a 
firm evades tax then this will increase the profitability of the firm which in turn will be captured 
by the corporate income tax. Because of this complicated structure, there is less information 
available for sales tax evasion. Using an input-output model, Ahmed and Rider (2008) estimated 
the sales tax gap or evasion for Pakistan for 2004-05 and they found that the sales tax gap or 
evasion lies between 25 to 30 percent of actual sales tax revenue. Furthermore, Bird and Gendron 
(2007) estimated GST gap70. It was 63.9 percent in 2002-03 and is increased to 75 percent in 2010-
11.  
3.3. A Brief Overview of VAT in Pakistan 
During 1980’s, the government of Pakistan decided to replace the sales tax by VAT and in 
1990’s, they introduced VAT types General Sales Tax (GST). Originally, it had destination based 
characteristics and was limited to goods. Later, in 2000, certain services were included in GST. In 
2003-04, there were five different rates, i.e. 2%, 15%, 18%, 20% and 23%. However, due to 
multiple rates, and administrative difficulties; cost of compliance have increased. Therefore, a 
uniform standard rate of 15% was taken in 2004. Moreover, in 2009-10, the standard rate increased 
to 16 percent and again it increases to 17 percent in 2010-11. However, some goods have zero 
rates e.g. goods supplied to diplomats, privileged person and organization, some goods are 
exempted e.g. basic foods like wheat, rice, edible oil, fruit, lifesaving drugs, and some goods have 
reduced GST rates, e.g. Importation or supply of black tea, agricultural tractor etc.  
                                                 
70 The GST gap is defined as the difference between GST actually collected and that which is potentially collectible 
if all final household consumption were taxed at the standard GST rate (Hassan, B., & Sarker, T. (2012)) 
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The GST-to-GDP ratio has decreased from 4.0% in 2002/03 to 3.5% in 2010/11. Besides, 
GST-GDP ratio, the revenue performance can also be seen by Gross Collection Ratio (GCR) which 
is calculated as the ratio of actual GST collection to the potential GST collection71. The GCR value 
for Pakistan declined from 36.1% in 2002-03 to 25.0% in 2010-11. Significant number of 
exemptions, lack of compliance, and weak enforcement are the probable causes of this low 
performance of GST in Pakistan.   
3.4. A General Equilibrium Specification 
A dynamic general equilibrium model is developed in which a shadow economy is 
generated endogenously. Here we follow the model developed by Feltenstein, A., Lopes, L. T., 
Porras Mendoza, J., & Wallace, S. (2013). Suppose there are n discrete time periods and in each 
period, an agent optimizes over a two time period horizon. For example, in period t, an agent 
optimizes given prices for period t and t+1 and at period t+2, an agent re-optimizes for period 
t+2 and t+3. The structure of our model is such that we can use Pakistan as a numerical example. 
Production 
There are 8 factors of production and 3 types of financial assets: 
1-5 Capital types  9.  Domestic currency 
6. Urban labor 10.  Bank deposits 
7. Rural labor 11.  Foreign currency 
8. Land 
 
The five types of capital correspond to five aggregate nonagricultural productive sectors 
which are stated below:   
SECTOR 1=LIGHT 
MANUFACTURING  
SECTOR 2=HEAVY INDUSTRY  
SECTOR 3=ELECTRICITY,WATER, 
SEWAGE  
                                                 
71 Potential collection is defined as the GST collection without any evasion.  All final consumption including private 
as well as general government are used to calculate GCR. The formula to calculate GCR is [Revenue from 
VAT/(Total Consumption*Vat rate)]*100 
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SECTOR 4=TRANSPORT  
SECTOR 5=HOTELS, HOUSING, HEALTH 
SERVICES 
In order to determine intermediate and final production at time t, an input output matrix  
At
72 (50 x 50) is used. The matrix is taken from Samwalk 2010, the most recent social accounting 
matrix for Pakistan developed in Debowicz et al (2013), where the tab PSAM2C is used to 
derive the matrix representing 2010 technology. The IO matrix is 50x50, but in order to simplify 
computations we have aggregated the matrix to 27x27, where row and column 27 represent a 
single aggregate import.  For each sector, a sector special value added is created using land and 
rural labor for agricultural sector and capital and urban labor for nonagricultural sector. The 
weights in the valued added function are derived from PSAM2C.   
We can specify firm’s problem as follows.  Let𝑌𝑘𝑖
𝑗
, 𝑌𝐿𝑖
𝑗
be the inputs of capital and urban 
labor which are used to j th nonagricultural sector in period I and we assume that in period i , 
there is an outstanding stock of government infrastructure denoted by 𝑌𝐺. We further assume that 
public infrastructure may be used to increase the productivity of the private sector. Therefore, 
value added in sector j in period i is given by: 
𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑖 = 𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑖(𝑦𝑘𝑖
𝑗 𝑦𝐿𝑖
𝑗 𝑌𝐺𝑖)         (3)    
In period i, sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital denoted by 𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑗  and on labor, 
given by 𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑗. Here we interpret capital tax as a tax on firm profits, and labor tax as a tax on 
personal income that is withheld at source.  Because, production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale, there is no pure profits, and corporate income tax is treated as a tax on returns to 
capital. 
                                                 
72 Here we use a most recent Social Accounting Matrix (SAMWALK 2010) for Pakistan.  
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We further assume that sectoral investment functions are uniform across the 5 types of 
sectoral capital and is given by the value added function for the construction industry, taken from 
the SAM.  However, due to different rates of return to capital in different sectors, rates of 
investment will differ (Feltenstein et al, 2017)  
Consumption 
Consumers are categorized by 18 different ways and each of which has two types, either urban or 
rural labor. They have initial allocations of 5 capital types, land, financial assets; money, bonds, 
and foreign exchange.  In SAMWALK2010, the 18 categories are 
  1.  Urban quintile 1 
  2.  Urban quintile 2 
  3.  Urban other 
4.  Medium farm Sindh 
5.  Medium farm Punjab 
6.  Medium farm Other Pakistan 
7.  Small farm Sindh 
8.  Small farm Punjab 
9.  Small farm Other Pakistan 
10. Landless Farmer Sindh 
11. Landless Farmer Punjab 
12. Landless Farmer Other Pakistan 
13.Waged rural landless farmers  Sindh 
14.Waged rural landless farmers Punjab 
15.Waged rural landless farmers Other Pakistan 
16.Rural non-farm quintile 1 
17.Rural non-farm quintile 2 
18.Rural non-farm other 
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Two types of consumers have different utility maximizing functions, and different endowments. 
The consumers maximize their consumption and leisure choice in each of the period. Feltenstein 
and Cyan (2013) solved the Cobb Douglas maximization problem and the problem is as follows 
max 𝑈(𝑥), 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥𝐿𝑢1, 𝑥𝐿𝑟1, 𝑥2, 𝑥𝐿𝑢2, 𝑥𝐿𝑟2)   (4) 
Such that  
 
(1 + 𝑡𝑖)𝑃𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑃𝐿𝑢𝑖𝑥𝐿𝑢𝑖 + 𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑖𝑥𝐿𝑟𝑖 + 𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑀𝑖 + 𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑥𝐵𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑃𝐵𝑓𝑖𝑥𝐵𝑓𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 (4a) 
 
𝑃𝑘1𝐾0 + 𝑃𝐴1𝐴0 + 𝑃𝐿𝑢1𝐿𝑢1 + 𝑃𝐿𝑟1𝐿𝑟1 + 𝑃𝑀1𝑀0 + 𝑟0𝐵0 + 𝑃𝐵1𝐵0 + 𝑒1𝑃𝐵𝐹1𝐵𝐹0+𝑇𝑅1 = 𝑁1  
 
𝑃𝑘2(1 − 𝛿)𝐾0 + 𝑃𝐴2𝐴0 + 𝑃𝐿𝑢2𝐿𝑢2 + 𝑃𝐿𝑟2𝐿𝑟2 + 𝑃𝑀2𝑀1 + 𝑟1𝑥𝐵1 + 𝑒2𝑃𝐵𝐹2𝑥𝐵𝐹1+𝑇𝑅2 = 𝑁2  
 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖  
 
log 𝑃𝐵𝑖𝑥𝐵𝑖 − log 𝑒𝑖𝑃𝐵𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐵𝐹𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 (log 𝑟𝑖 − log
𝑒𝑖+1
𝑒𝑖
𝑟𝐹𝑖)               (4b) 
 
log
𝐿𝑢𝑖
𝐿𝑟𝑖
= 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 log
𝑃𝐿𝑢𝑖−𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑖 
𝑃𝐿𝑢𝑖+𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑖
                   (4c) 
 
log 𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑀𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑡𝑖)𝑃𝑖𝑥𝑖           (4d) 
 
𝑃𝐵2𝑥𝐵2 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1(1 + 𝑡2)𝑃2𝑥2 + 𝑑2 [
𝑟2−𝜋2
1+𝜋2
]   (4e) 
Where: 
 
Pi    = price vector of consumption goods in period i. 
xi = vector of consumption in period i. 
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Ci = value of aggregate consumption in period i (including purchases of financial assets). 
Ni = aggregate income in period i (including potential income from the sale of real and 
financial assets). 
ti = vector of value added tax rates in period i. 
PLui = price of urban labor in period i. 
Lui = allocation of total labor to urban labor in period i. 
xLui = demand for urban leisure in period i. 
PLri = price of rural labor in period i. 
 
Lri = allocation of total labor to rural labor in period i. 
xLri = demand for rural leisure in period i. 
a2 = elasticity of rural/urban migration. 
 
PKi = price of capital in period i. 
K0 = initial holding of capital. PAi  
𝑃𝐴𝑖= price of land in period i. 
A0 = initial holding of land. 
 
δ = rate of depreciation of capital. 
 
PMi = price of money in period i. Money in period 1 is the numeraire and hence has a price of 
 
1. 
 
xMi = holdings of money in period i. 
 
PBi = discount price of a certificate of deposit in period i. 
 
πi = domestic rate of inflation in period i. 
 
ri , rFi = the domestic and foreign interest rates in period i. 
 
xBi = quantity of bank deposits, that is, CD's in period i. 
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ei = the exchange rate in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency 
in period i. 
xBFi = quantity of foreign currency held in period i. 
 
TRi = transfer payments from the government in period i. 
 
a, b,  ,  = estimated constants. 
 
 
di  = constants estimated from model simulations. 
 
The weights are derived from the SAM consumption data.  Endowments are also taken from the 
SAM. Furthermore, there is a uniform money demand function across all consumers which 
depends on interest rates, inflation rates, and real income, and the parameters of the equation are 
taken from Qayyum, A. (2005). 
The Government 
Personal income, corporate profit, value-added taxes, and import duties are collected by the 
government. The government finances the provision of public goods and gives some subsidy 
support too. Furthermore, the government also pays the interest rates on domestic and foreign 
loans.  And the deficit is financed by monetary policy or borrowing from domestic or foreign 
countries.   
The Foreign Sector 
In the foreign sector, it is assumed that both the domestic and foreign price indices as well as 
world income determines aggregate demand for exports.  The foreign sector produces imports 
which is considered as a single aggregate good. Demand for imports are generated from two 
sides-intermediate demand is coming from input output matrix whereas final demand is coming 
from consumers intertemporal choice mechanism.  
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Fiscal Parameters  
 The benchmark or base case tax rates are taken from KPMG (2012). We use Pakistan Statistical 
Yearbook for different levels of public expenditure. Moreover, in the model, we suppose that the 
current expenditure produced by the public sector incorporates a Cobb-Douglas function in 
which the shares of capital and labor are given by the aggregate shares of these factors in private 
production. The shares are taken from the Pakistan National Income Accounts.  The public 
investment function, which determines public capital spending, is taken to have the same 
parameters as the private investment functions.   
3.5. Simulations 
3.5.1 Simulation 
The model incorporates sales tax evasion as well as enforcement expenditure as part of 
government total expenditure. The objective is to simulate the model on the basis of most recent 
policy as well as technological parameters for Pakistan. Here we assume that all the fiscal policy 
variables e.g. tax rates, real public sector spending, deficit financing rules etc. remain constant 
for the 8 years (2013 to 2021) of the simulation. We further assume that there is managed 
exchange rate, and the exchange rate is devalued by 6 percent per year. In addition, the world 
inflation rate is 4 percent annually and world growth is 2 percent per year. In the baseline model, 
we assume the current scenario of Pakistan where there is sales tax evasion. Furthermore, we 
assume that the sales tax evasion is 25 percent. It is based on Ahmed and Rider (2008)’s sales tax 
gap analysis and Hasan and Sarkar (2012)’s Gross Collection Ratio analysis. With a 16 percent73 
general sales tax, the effective tax rate becomes 12 percent.  The counterfactual full compliance 
simulation assumes zero evasion in the sales tax, so that effective general sales tax rate becomes 
                                                 
73 The average sales tax is 16 percent from 2006 to 2016. It was 17 percent in 2014 and 15 percent in 2007.  
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16 percent. In all the simulations, enforcement spending is included as a part of current 
government spending.  The simulation is then run for 8 periods and creates a number of 
macroeconomic variables.  
3.5.2 Results (Base Line Model) 
Here we focus on the macroeconomic effects, government budget as well as real income 
of different sectors of the economy. The results of the simulation are shown is Table 3.1. We find 
that the annual real growth average is 3.31 percent. The average inflation rate is 15 percent over 
the 8 years forward time horizon.  Although the forward-looking growth rate is close to the 
current Pakistan growth rate, the inflation rate is significantly higher than the current rate. 
Furthermore, the budget deficit starts quite high and stabilizes at 7 percent of GDP.  Finally, the 
trade deficit is gradually decreasing. One reason may be related to the assumption of the 
exchange rate devaluation. 
Table 3.2 displays real incomes of the 18 consumers groups in period 8. Consumers 1-3 
are urban, consumers 4-9 are the farm (either medium or small), consumers 10-15 are landless, 
and consumers 16-18 are rural non-farm. Among these different sectors, medium and small 
farms in Punjab are considerably wealthier than any other sectors.  Here most of the sectors show 
growth over the 8 periods. However, landless farmers in Sindh, Punjab, and other Pakistan suffer 
from losses. The urban other sector experiences growth compared to small farms, and medium 
farms sector. On the other hand, the rural sector exhibits only slight growth.  
3.5.3 Full compliance of the Sales Tax (No Evasion) 
In the full compliance simulation, we assume that the effective sales tax is increased to 16 
percent. There is no sales tax evasion which can occur due to strong tax administration and tax 
enforcement expenditure. However, data on tax administration and tax enforcement expenditure 
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is not available for Pakistan. Therefore, for this simulation we assume that enforcement is 
costless, and hence there is no increase in current public expenditure.  
Real GNP is growing over the periods. However, real GNP in period 8 is slightly lower 
than real GNP in the base case. The compound annual growth rate of Real GNP between these 
two simulations show a slight increase (0.04 percent) in the full compliance case compared to the 
base case. Regarding inflation, the value ranges from 9 to 19 percent and the average (13.22 
percent) is lower than the base case. The trade deficit is decreasing at a higher rate compared to 
the base case as consumption rises. 
Figure 3.1 shows that full compliance has a significant effect on tax collection as a 
percent of GDP although, for the first 3 periods, both the base line and full compliance 
simulation indicates approximately similar tax-GDP ratio. As we would expect, no tax evasion in 
the sales tax increases the tax share as a percent of GDP. In the case of budget deficit, the deficit 
is reduced compared to the base case.  
Table 3.4 displays the real income for different types of consumers. The real income 
shows increasing pattern across different types of consumers, in particular for urban, medium, 
small farms and rural non-farm consumers. However, all the landless farmers including waged 
rural landless farmers suffer from the loss. In addition, in all the cases, the growth of real income 
is lower than the base case. This is largely due to the fact that the consumption of different types 
of consumers are lower than the base case as they are now paying an effective tax of 16 percent 
(Table 3.5). 
The interest rate has declined significantly compared to the base case. With no change in 
other tax rates e.g. capital tax and income tax, investment has increased in sector 2 (heavy 
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industry), and in sector 4 (transport). However, no significant change in investment is observed 
in other sectors (Table 3.6).  
In general, we can say that from a macro perspective, full compliance of general sales tax 
is superior to the case with evasion. It results in higher tax-GDP ratio, higher compound growth 
in Real GNP, lower budget deficit, and lower interest rates. For a country like Pakistan where the 
government always suffers from huge budget deficit, full compliance will results in an improved 
budget scenario. However, from consumer perspectives, this may result in lower consumption, 
lower utility and lower income as in our model we are assuming that it is the consumer who is 
involved in sales tax evasion.  
3.6 Conclusion 
As a developing country, Pakistan faces problems e.g. low tax-GDP ratio, high amount of 
budget deficit, a high degree of tax evasion, as well as high degree of corruption. In order to 
increase the share of taxes in GDP, like many other developing countries, Pakistan has adopted 
the VAT type general sales tax. However, still the tax-GDP ratio is one of the lowest compared 
to any developing country and it is also lower than some least developed countries. Therefore, 
evaluating two scenarios- current tax evasion and no tax evasion in case of general sales tax will 
be helpful for policymakers as well as for the government to apply strict enforcement rules and 
to maintain a strong tax administrative structure.  
Using a Social Accounting Matrix for Pakistan, this paper incorporates a dynamic general 
equilibrium model and examines the effects of changes to the tax compliance on growth, budget, 
and welfare. We find that the effects of full tax compliance to the sales tax have long lasting 
impact. There is an increase in tax-GDP ratio, a decline in budget deficit, a decline in interest 
rates, and an increase in investment in some sectors. However, consumers of different sectors 
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especially landless farmers and waged landless farmers are impacted negatively by this. 
Although growth of real income is observed in most of the sectors, the growth rate is lower than 
the tax evasion case. The positive impacts from full compliance can be used to overcome the loss 
in consumer utility and real incomes of different sectors. 
In our model, the consumers are evading taxes by paying effective rates. However, in real 
scenario, sellers or retail sellers evade sales tax by faking invoices, giving receipts without 
including tax, or even by giving no receipt at all. However, within 18 categories of consumers, 
information about the sellers or owner of retail shops is absent. Therefore, extension of this 
research may consider incorporating evasion from the seller’s part and then try to find out the 
proportion of sellers or retail shop owners among those 18 categories of consumers by using 
Pakistan Living Standard Measurement Survey, and Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
Moreover, including the tax enforcement expenditure in the model would help to generate more 
accurate outcome.  
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Table 3.1: Base Case (Based on 2010)  
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
REAL GNP 100 99.13 101.58 104.48 112.22 114.9 119.57 122.88 
NOMINAL GNP 100 118.46 154.75 174.91 229.8 261.67 328.79 375.58 
PRICE LEVEL 100 119 152 167 204 227 274 305 
INFLATION 0 19 27 9.8 22.15 11.27 20.7 11.31 
TAX REVENUES/GDP 20.14 21.5 21.36 20.9 20.68 20 19.8 19 
GOV. 
EXPENDITURES/GDP 
34.55 34.1 30.4 28.9 27.8 27 26.5 26.7 
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT -14.41 -12.6 -9.04 -8 -7.12 -7 -6.7 -7.7 
INTEREST RATE 20 5.4 5.3 4 4.71 4.24 4.54 4.34 
EXPORTS/GDP 15.21 15.88 17.88 18.98 18.65 20.56 20.55 28.56 
IMPORTS/GDP 20.68 20.23 19.57 19.25 18.21 18.13 18.01 16.36 
TRADE DEFICIT/GDP -5.47 -4.35 -1.69 -0.27 0.44 2.43 2.54 12.2 
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Table 3.2: Real Income by Sectors (Base Case) 
REAL INCOME (PERIOD)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Urban quintile 1 3.03 3.68 5.86 6.42 9.65 10.66 14.47 16.12 
Urban quintile 2 5.52 6.39 9.45 10.42 14.71 16.32 21.47 23.98 
Urban other 26.72 32.81 51.19 56.10 84.38 93.22 126.58 141.05 
Med farm Sindh 2.69 3.18 3.10 3.52 3.78 4.32 4.84 5.48 
Med farm Punjab 23.89 28.68 31.26 35.33 40.35 45.94 54.00 60.95 
Med farm OthPak 3.74 3.90 4.30 4.89 5.07 5.80 6.32 7.17 
Small farm Sindh 5.83 6.62 6.98 7.88 9.14 10.39 12.35 13.93 
Small farm Punjab 8.74 11.61 15.84 17.69 23.94 27.03 35.38 39.66 
Small farm OthPak 5.02 5.89 7.56 8.47 11.07 12.51 16.05 18.01 
Landless Farmer Sindh 2.53 2.76 1.76 2.03 1.70 1.97 1.72 1.99 
Landless Farmer Punjab 3.31 3.40 2.05 2.37 1.83 2.13 1.65 1.93 
Landless Farmer OthPak 1.37 1.60 0.95 1.10 0.95 1.11 1.01 1.16 
Waged rural landless farmers Sindh 1.64 1.72 1.50 1.72 1.56 1.81 1.73 1.99 
Waged rural landless farmers 
Punjab 
3.41 3.63 2.63 3.03 
2.46 2.86 2.39 2.78 
Waged rural landless farmers 
OthPak 
0.77 1.32 1.24 1.43 
1.09 1.28 0.98 1.15 
Rural non-farm quintile 1 1.67 2.00 1.46 1.66 1.73 1.98 2.16 2.45 
Rural non-farm quintile 2 2.07 2.44 1.91 2.24 2.35 2.78 3.03 3.55 
Rural non-farm other 6.93 7.59 7.91 9.42 11.02 13.01 15.26 18.01 
TOTAL 108.88 129.22 156.95 175.72 226.78 255.14 321.37 361.37 
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Table 3.3.With No Evasion 
YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
REAL GDP 98.11 97.77 99.71 102.61 110.38 113.02 118.21 121.04 
NOMINAL GDP 91.89 108.2 135.12 152.27 194.48 219.1 269.39 301.75 
PRICE LEVEL 93.65 110.67 135.5 148.4 176.19 193 227 249 
INFLATION 0 18.17 22.43 9.51 18.71 10.03 17.55 9.39 
TAX REVENUES/GDP 20.18 21.97 21.5 21.06 21.41 21.02 22.67 22.97 
GOV. 
EXPENDITURES/GDP 
36.78 34.53 30.93 28.98 25.57 27.12 27.18 27.45 
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT -16.6 -12.56 -9.43 -7.92 -4.16 -6.1 -4.51 -4.48 
INTEREST RATE 19.48 5.28 4.388 3.68 4.23 3.55 3.48 3.2 
EXPORTS/GDP 16.55 17.42 15.69 17.08 14.65 16.05 14.36 15.77 
IMPORTS/GDP 21.17 21.25 19.6 18.8 17.53 16.91 16.31 15.72 
TRADE DEFICIT/GDP -4.62 -3.83 -3.91 -1.72 -2.88 -0.86 -1.95 0.05 
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Table 3.4 Real Income by Sectors (with no Evasion) 
REAL INCOME (PERIOD)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Urban quintile 1 2.79 3.36 5.14 5.60 8.23 9.02 11.98 13.22 
Urban quintile 2 5.19 5.93 8.36 9.18 12.62 13.90 17.85 19.74 
Urban other 24.55 29.91 44.78 48.81 71.90 78.80 104.7 115.5 
Med farm Sindh 2.57 3.01 2.79 3.16 3.28 3.72 4.02 4.52 
Med farm Punjab 22.76 27.06 27.99 31.51 34.77 39.32 44.56 49.86 
Med farm OthPak 3.66 3.77 3.94 4.46 4.46 5.08 5.31 5.99 
Small farm Sindh 5.49 6.16 6.18 6.95 7.81 8.82 10.13 11.32 
Small farm Punjab 8.08 10.63 13.79 15.32 20.14 22.53 28.64 31.72 
Small farm OthPak 4.67 5.41 6.61 7.36 9.33 10.46 13.02 14.45 
Landless Farmer Sindh 2.36 2.54 1.57 1.80 1.48 1.71 1.46 1.68 
Landless Farmer Punjab 3.05 3.13 1.82 2.10 1.59 1.86 1.42 1.66 
Landless Farmer OthPak 1.29 1.49 0.85 0.98 0.83 0.96 0.85 0.98 
Waged rural landless farmers 
Sindh 1.60 1.65 1.39 1.59 1.40 1.61 1.49 1.70 
Waged rural landless farmers 
Punjab 3.28 3.46 2.42 2.79 2.22 2.57 2.10 2.43 
Waged rural landless farmers 
OthPak 0.77 1.31 1.18 1.36 1.02 1.19 0.90 1.05 
Rural non-farm quintile 1 1.57 1.85 1.29 1.46 1.48 1.68 1.78 2.00 
Rural non-farm quintile 2 1.91 2.23 1.66 1.95 2.00 2.34 2.48 2.89 
Rural non-farm other 6.44 7.00 6.95 8.29 9.42 11.10 12.59 14.85 
TOTAL 102.0 119.8 138.7 154.6 193.9 216.7 265.3 295.60 
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Table 3.5: Utility of All Types of Consumers 
 Base Case Full Compliance  
Period 4 6 8 4 6 8 
Urban quintile 1 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Urban quintile 2 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Urban other 0.49 0.80 1.12 0.18 0.44 1.01 
Med farm Sindh 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Med farm Punjab 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.46 
Med farm OthPak 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Small farm Sindh 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Small farm Punjab 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.24 
Small farm OthPak 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Landless Farmer Sindh 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Landless Farmer Punjab 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Landless Farmer OthPak 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Waged rural landless farmers Sindh 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Waged rural landless farmers Punjab 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Waged rural landless farmers OthPak 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rural non-farm quintile 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rural non-farm quintile 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rural non-farm other 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 
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Table 3.6: Investment in Five Sectors 
Year 2 4 6 8 
Base Case 
Investment in Type 1 Capital  8.89 4.72 6 5.53 
Investment in Type 2 Capital  0.16 0.21 0.23 0.24 
Investment in Type 3 Capital  1.25 0.31 0.96 0.65 
Investment in Type 4 Capital  2.74 1.18 2.78 2.57 
Investment in Type 5 Capital  1.52 0.91 1.36 1.38 
Full Compliance 
Investment in Type 1 Capital  8.85 4.72 5.95 5.47 
Investment in Type 2 Capital  0.16 0.21 0.23 0.25 
Investment in Type 3 Capital  1.25 0.27 0.96 0.55 
Investment in Type 4 Capital  2.88 1.21 2.97 2.72 
Investment in Type 5 Capital  1.53 0.88 1.35 1.34 
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Figure 3.1: Tax Revenue to GDP Ratio and Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio (Base Line and 
Full Compliance) 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 1. A1: Detailed Description of the Fiscal Policy Variables  
Fiscal Policy Variables  Operationalization for State Local Government Budget reported By U.S. Census 
Tax Total Tax 
 Property Tax 
 Corporate Net Income Tax 
 General Sales Tax 
 Total Income Tax 
 License Tax (Excluded) 
Other Revenue Sources (Excluded)  Miscellaneous general revenue 
 Death and gifts 
 Severance 
 Documentary and stock transfers 
 Other taxes 
  Liquor store revenue 
 Utility revenue 
 Total intergovernmental revenue 
Expenditure Total Current Capital Spending on 
 Education 
 Health, hospital and human services, 
 Highways 
 Housing (Excluded) 
 Public safety 
 Community development (Excluded) 
 Total current operational spending on 
 Education, Health, highways, Housing and Public Safety (Excluded) 
 Total transfers payment and income securities (Excluded) 
  Public welfare (Excluded) 
 Employment securities administration (Excluded) 
 Insurance trust expenditure (Excluded) 
  Veteran’s services (Excluded) 
Other Expenditures (Excluded)  Current spending on 
  Liquor store expenditure 
  Utility expenditure 
  Government administration 
  Financial administration 
  General control and general public buildings 
  Debt services and interests 
 Total intergovernmental expenditure 
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Table 1.A2: Endogeneity Test (Szroeter Test, 1978)  
Variables Chi Square  df            P 
Total Tax  50.7  1 0.000 
Property Tax  81.12  1 0.000 
General Sales Tax  95.71  1 0.000 
Income Tax  72.14  1 0.000 
Corporate Income Tax  252.41  1 0.000 
Productive Spending  7.51  1 0.000 
                      Note: Null hypothesis is variance of error term is not related to independent variable.  
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Table 1.A3: Validity test of Instrumental Variables  
 
Score Test (score 𝝌𝟐)                        1.566                                            0.668 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic        16.438                                            0.000 
The Score test verifies two points: whether instruments are uncorrelated with error term or not and equation is 
correctly specified or not. Kleibergen test verifies whether instruments are relevant or not. Here we use score test 
instead of Sargan test due to having robust and cluster standard error in the estimation.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Test   Statistic   P value   
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Table 1.A4: High Wage Employment OLS and Fixed effect using fiscal variables 
measured by dollar of state personal income (1977-2012)  
 
VARIABLES   OLS   FE   
Total Tax (PDSPY)   0.055***   -0.001   
  (0.010)   (0.020)   
Productive Spending (PDSPY)   -0.069**   -0.0297   
  (0.028)   (0.0314)   
Heating Degree Days   0.000*   0.000   
  (0.0001)   (0.000)   
Unemployment Rate   0.049***   -0.002   
  (0.007)   (0.008)   
Labor Skill   0.026***   0.024***   
  (0.003)   (0.008)   
Urban Population (%)   0.022***   0.001   
  (0.001)   (0.011)   
Average Price of Electricity   0.005   0.015   
  (0.006)   (0.029)   
Crime per capita   0.313***   0.100***   
  (0.062)   (0.031)   
Observations   1,728   1,728   
Number of states     48   
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** 
significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 
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Table 1.A5: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications and ratio of high skilled labor to  
Total employment as dependent variable  
VARIABLES  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio   Ratio   Ratio   Ratio  Ratio  
                     
Total Tax per capita  0.001  -0.001                 
  (0.001)  (0.000)                 
Productive Spending per capita  0.001  0.001                 
  (0.001)  (0.001)                 
∆ total Taxes per capita        -0.001               
        (0.004)               
∆productive spending per 
capita  
      0.005  
(0.006)  
             
                        
∆ t-4 total tax per capita            0.0002             
           (0.002)             
∆ t-4 productive spending per            -0.001             
           (0.002)             
                         
Total tax per $ of personal 
income   
             1.164** 
(0.527)  
 -0.227  
(0.437)  
     
                         
Productive spending (PDSPY)               -0.268   0.476       
               (0.823)   (0.722)       
∆ total tax (PDSPY)                     0.094    
                     (2.063)    
∆ productive spending  
(PDSPY)  
                   5.458    
                     (5.813)    
∆ t-4 total tax (PDSPY)                       -0.157  
                       (0.489)  
∆ t-4 productive spending  
(PDSPY)  
                     -0.452  
                       (1.572)  
Control   ×   ×   ×   ×   ×   ×   ×   ×  
Year Fixed Effect  
  
×   ×  
×  
 ×  
×  
 ×  
×  
 ×  
×  
 ×  
×  
 ×  
×  
 ×  
×  
State  Fixed Effect                       ×  
Note: PDSPY is per dollar of state personal income.  Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered 
by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 le 
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Table 1.A6: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications and Year 1977-2007 and 
different taxes  
  Specification 
1   
Specification 
2   
Specification 3   Specification 4   
VARIABLES   (level)   (change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
(change in HW)   
  
Property Tax per capita   
  
0.361   
  
0.114   
  
  
  
  
  (0.902)   (0.219)       
General Sales Tax per capita   0.260   -0.052       
  (0.495)   (0.096)       
Total Income Tax per capita   -0.439   -0.112       
  (0.664)   (0.187)       
Corporate Net Income Tax per capita   -2.358   -0.347       
  (4.101)   (0.896)       
Productive Spending per capita   -0.052   
(0.032)   
0.039   
(0.050)   
    
∆  Property Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-2.257   
(4.394)   
  
  
∆  General Sales Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.695   
(1.298)   
  
  
∆  Total Income Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
0.085   
(0.808)   
  
  
∆  Corporate Net Income Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-1.406   
(8.162)   
  
  
∆  Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.037   
(0.583)   
  
  
∆t-4. Property Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2.297   
(15.61)   
∆t-4.  General Sales Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.592   
(5.035)   
∆t-4.  Total Income Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-1.058   
(6.616)   
∆t-4 Corporate Net Income Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
9.569   
(66.36)   
∆t-4. Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1.042   
(7.375)   
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State  Fixed Effect   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
     
Number of states   47   47   47   47   
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** 
significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.A7: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications and Year 1977-2001 and with total 
tax 
 
  
VARIABLES   
  
total  
employment   
  
Change in 
employment   
  
Change in 
employment   
  
Change in 
employment   
  
Total Tax per capita   
  
-0.041   
  
-0.007   
  
  
  
  
  (0.030)   (0.017)       
Productive Spending per capita   0.140**   0.036       
  (0.069)   (0.042)       
∆.Total Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
0.167   
(0.297)   
  
  
∆ Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.019   
(0.131)   
  
  
∆t-4.total tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.002   
(0.041)   
∆t-4productive spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.014   
(0.040)   
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State Fixed Effect   
Number of States   
×   
×   
×   
47   
  
×   
×   
×   
47   
  
×   
×   
×   
47   
  
×   
×   
×   
47   
  
  
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** 
significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.A8: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications and Year 1991 and above and 
total tax and different taxes  
  
1. A8.1: Total Tax per capita   
  Specification1   Specification2   Specification 3   Specification 4   
VARIABLES   (level)   (change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
  
Total Tax per capita   
  
-0.074   
  
0.012   
      
  (0.068)   (0.021)       
Productive Spending per capita   0.136**   0.028       
  (0.068)   (0.044)       
∆ Total Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
0.046   
(0.164)   
  
  
∆ Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.461   
(0.442)   
  
  
∆t-4.total tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.009   
(0.045)   
∆t-4productive spending per capita         -0.124   
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State Fixed Effect   
  
×   
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
×   
  
  
×   
×   
×   
  
  
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** 
significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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1. A8.2: Different Taxes           
 Specification1   Specification2   Specification 3   Specification 4   
VARIABLES   (level)   (change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
Property Tax per capita  0.529  -0.142      
  (0.426)  (0.139)      
General Sales Tax per capita  0.331  0.124      
  (0.304)  (0.099)      
Total Income Tax per capita  -0.711**  0.031      
  (0.298)  (0.097)      
Corporate Net Income Tax per capita  -0.712  0.475      
  (1.304)  (0.430)      
Productive Spending per capita  0.227  -0.100      
  (0.191)  (0.063)      
∆ Property Tax per capita      -0.449    
      (2.444)    
∆ General Sales Tax per capita      -0.278    
      (2.211)    
∆ Total Income Tax per capita      0.366    
      (1.788)    
∆ Corporate Net Income Tax per capita      2.310    
      (4.997)    
∆ Productive Spending per capita      -0.244    
      (1.097)    
∆t-4 Property Tax per capita        0.127  
        (0.140)  
∆t-4 General Sales Tax per capita        0.262  
        (0.238)  
∆t-4 Total Income Tax per capita        -0.103  
        (0.197)  
∆t-4 Corporate Net Income Tax per capita        -0.565  
        (0.761)  
∆t-4 Productive Spending per capita        -0.0665  
        (0.195)  
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect  
State Fixed Effect  
×  
×  
×  
  
×  
×  
×  
  
×  
×  
×  
  
×  
×  
×  
  
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; ** 
significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.A9: High wage employment as percentage of total employment (state wise 
average for all years)  
Census/CPS Code for States State Name Percent’s of total employment  
11 Maine 19.06 
12 New Hampshire 27.42 
13 Vermont 20.16 
14 Massachusetts 31.88 
15 Rhode island 26.55 
16 Connecticut 33.74 
21 New York 29.55 
22 New Jersey 34.45 
23 Pennsylvania 26.93 
31 Ohio 27.43 
32 Indiana 23.90 
33 Illinois 29.73 
34 Michigan 31.08 
35 Wisconsin 25.38 
41 Minnesota 26.43 
42 Iowa 20.01 
43 Missouri 23.29 
44 North Dakota 16.44 
45 South Dakota 14.14 
46 Nebraska 18.94 
47 Kansas 22.27 
51 Delaware 27.99 
52 Maryland 33.88 
54 Vermont 29.57 
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55 West Virginia 22.58 
56 North Carolina 20.48 
57 South  Carolina 19.62 
58 Georgia 23.91 
59 Florida 21.64 
61 Kentucky 21.49 
62 Tennessee 20.02 
63 Alabama 21.47 
64 Mississippi 17.03 
71 Arkansas 15.23 
72 Louisiana 23.07 
73 Oklahoma 20.23 
74 Texas 22.28 
81 Montana 17.24 
82 Idaho 18.50 
83 Wyoming 24.67 
84 Colorado 28.51 
85 New Mexico 20.19 
86 Arizona 23.36 
87 Utah 23.72 
88 Nevada 25.24 
91 Washington 29.70 
92 Oregon 24.76 
93 California 28.07 
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Table 1.A10: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications for 16 states  
 
  Specification 
1   
Specification2   Specification 3   Specification 4   
VARIABLES   (level)   (change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
  
Total Tax per capita   
  
-0.221**   
  
0.001   
  
  
  
  
  (0.058)   (0.025)       
Productive Spending per capita   0.253   -0.010       
  (0.226)   (0.151)       
∆. Total Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.027   
(0.273)   
  
  
∆. Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
0.257   
(0.558)   
  
  
∆t-4 Total Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.028   
(0.098)   
∆t-4 Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.037   
(0.350)   
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State Fixed Effect   
×   
×   
×   
  
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
  
Observations   540   
  
525   
  
525   480   
Number of states   15   15   15   15   
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; 
** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Table 1.A11: 2SLS Estimation using all the specifications for 9 states  
  Specification1   Specification2   Specification 3   Specification 4   
VARIABLES   (level)   (change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
(change in  
HW)   
  
Total Tax per capita   
  
0.0184   
  
0.001   
  
  
  
  
  (0.047)   (0.019)       
Productive Spending per capita   0.213   -0.065       
  (0.230)   (0.095)       
∆ Total Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.217   
(0.471)   
  
  
∆ Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
-0.107   
(0.519)   
  
  
∆t-4 Total Tax per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.092   
(0.141)   
∆t-4 Productive Spending per capita   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.003   
(0.103)   
Controls   
Year Fixed Effect   
State Fixed Effect   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
×   
Observations   
  
324   
  
315   
  
315   
  
288   
Number of states   9   9   9   9   
Note: Standard Error are Heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by state level. * Significance at the .10 level; 
** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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APPENDIX 2 
Note 2. A1: Slemrod’s Methodology to Calculate Tax Evasion 
Tax liability is a step function of taxable income and the step length is 50 dollars of 
income. For calculating tax liability, taxpayers at first look at the table based on marital status 
and then  look at the column based on the number of exemptions and look at the rows based on 
the level of income (income bracket is $50). There are two types of evasion: primary and 
secondary evasion. Primary evasion is the amount of income understatement. If the household 
wants to evade then they will report a figure of taxable income near to the top of the next lowest 
bracket. Primary evasion decision problem for the household is as follows74 
Max (1 − 𝑝(𝐸,)) 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑔)) + (𝑝(𝐸,))𝑈 (𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦) − 𝛺(𝑇(𝑦) − 𝑇(𝑦 − 𝐸))) 75      (1) 
The Utility function is strictly concave by assumption. 
The first order condition associated with (1) is as follows 
(1 − 𝑝(𝐸 ∗, ∅))𝑡𝑈𝑓
′ = 𝑝(𝐸 ∗, ∅)𝛺𝑡𝑈𝑐
′ +
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑔
 (𝐸*,∅)(𝑈𝑓 -𝑈𝑐) if E*>0 
And (1 − 𝑝(0, ∅)) < 𝑝(0, ∅)𝛺 if E*=0 
If the evasion is successful, the utility is  𝑈𝑓  and if the evasion is unsuccessful, the utility is𝑈𝑐 . 
Moreover, if optimal amount of primary evasion (E*) is zero then it indicates less than a fair 
gamble. 
                                                 
74 Individual’s after tax income is dependent on whether the tax payer’s is being caught cheating or not. If he/she is 
not caught cheating then after tax income is  𝑌𝐴 = 𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑔) and if she /he is caught then after tax income is as 
follows 𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦) − 𝛺(𝑇(𝑦) − 𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑔)) 
75 The probability of detection is a function of taxable income understated (E) and also some other characteristics of 
the type of evasion ().Slemrod here mentioned that it is easier to detect understatement of wages and salaries by 
tax payers than overstatement of some other deductions. 
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On the other hand, secondary evasion is the increment to the understatement taken in response to 
the step nature of the tax tables. Suppose d is the number of dollars of understatement which is 
required to go to the next lowest income bracket then secondary evasion will occur if  
[(1 − 𝑝(𝑑,)) 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑑)) + (𝑝(𝑑,))𝑈 (𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦) − 𝛺(𝑇(𝑦) − 𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑑)))]
− 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦)) > 0 
If 𝑇 is the tax saving due to secondary evasion then  
(1 − 𝑝(𝑑,)) [𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦) + 𝑇) − 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦)]
+ (𝑝(𝑑,))[𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦) − 𝛺 𝑇) − 𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑇(𝑦))] > 0 
 The prediction from this model shows that households engaging in primary evasion also 
tend to evade taxes furthermore by secondary evasion. Slemrod (1985) argue that primary evader 
is concerned about the probability of detection, the gain if undetected and the loss if detected. If 
d is low then still there is some expected gain from secondary evasion even if p is positive.  
Therefore, the location of a household’s taxable income within $50 bracket can be used as an 
indicator of tax evasion. For individual level data, tax evasion is measured by an index (index 
values lies from 1 to 50) derived from the location of a household’s taxable income within $50 
bracket. In this study, I am using $100 tax bracket to calculate the indicator of tax evasion. 
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Table 2.A1: IRS Districts and Regions by State 
STATE DISTRICT STATE DISTRICT 
Alabama Gulf Coast Montana Rocky Mountain 
Alaska Pacific North West Nebraska Midwest 
Arizona Southwest Nevada Southwest 
Arkansas Arkansas-Oklahoma New Hampshire New England 
 
 
California 
Central California New Jersey New Jersey 
Los Angeles New Mexico Southwest 
Northern California  
 
New York 
Brooklyn 
Southern California Manhattan 
Colorado Rocky Mountain Upstate New York 
 
Connecticut 
Connecticut- 
Rhode Island 
 
North Carolina 
 
North-South Carolina Delaware Delaware-Maryland North Dakota North Central 
Florida North Florida Ohio Ohio 
South Florida Oklahoma Arkansas-Oklahoma 
Georgia Georgia Oregon Pacific North West 
Hawaii Pacific North West Pennsylvania Pennsylvania 
 
Idaho 
 
Rocky Mountain 
 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut- 
Rhode Island Illinois Illinois South Carolina North-South Carolina 
Indiana Indiana South Dakota North Central 
Iowa Midwest Tennessee Kentucky-Tennessee 
Kansas Kansas-Missouri Texas North Texas 
Kentucky Kentucky-Tennessee South Texas 
Louisiana Gulf Coast Utah Rocky Mountain 
Maine New England Vermont New England 
Maryland Delaware-Maryland Virginia Virginia-West Virginia 
Massachusetts New England Washington Pacific North West 
Michigan Michigan West Virginia Virginia-West Virginia 
Minnesota North Central Wisconsin Midwest 
Mississippi Gulf Coast Wyoming Rocky Mountain 
Source: The Internal Revenue Service 
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Table 2.A2.  Examination Coverage: Individual Income Tax Returns Examined,  
by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Fiscal Year 2008  
 
 
Returns filed in 
Calendar Year 
Examination 
coverage in Fiscal 
Year 2008 (percent) 
[3] 
Size of adjusted gross income 
[1] 
2007 (percent) [2] 
   
All returns [4] 100 1 
No adjusted gross income [5] 2.13 2.15 
$1 under $25,000 40.51 0.9 
$25,000 under $50,000 24.31 0.72 
$50,000 under $75,000 13.44 0.69 
$75,000 under $100,000 7.99 0.69 
$100,000 under $200,000 8.69 0.98 
$200,000 under $500,000 2.25 1.92 
$500,000 under $1,000,000 0.43 2.98 
$1,000,000 under $5,000,000 0.23 4.02 
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000 0.02 6.47 
$10,000,000 or more 0.01 9.77 
 
[1]  Adjusted gross income is total income, as defined by the Tax Code, less statutory adjustments—primarily business, investment, and certain other deductions. 
 
[2]  In general, examination activity is associated with returns filed in the previous calendar year. 
 
[3]  Represents the number of returns examined in Fiscal Year 2008 for each adjusted gross income (AGI) class, as a percentage of the total number of returns 
 filed in Calendar Year 2007 for that AGI class.       
[4]  In addition to examinations of returns filed, IRS examined more than 158,000 cases in which no return was filed.  These nonfiler  
cases were referred for examination by the Collections Program and the Automated Substitute for Return Program (ASFR).  In the ASFR Program,  
IRS uses information returns (such as Forms W-2 and 1099) to identify persons who failed to file a return and constructs tax returns for certain nonfilers  
based on that third-party information.  These nonfiler cases are excluded from the examination data in this table.  
[5]  Includes returns with adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than zero.  AGI may be less than zero when a taxpayer reports losses or statutory adjustments exceed total income.       
SOURCE: Research, Analysis, and Statistics, Office of Research  RAS:R   
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Table 2.A3: Over Identification Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Note: Null hypothesis is excluded instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error terms and 
                                                                   correctly excluded from the estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Sargan chi sqaure Basmann chi sqaure 
Return Examined 0.371 (P =0.542) 0.371 (P =0.542) 
Enforcement Cost 0.392 (P =0.530) 0.392 (P =0.531) 
Civil Penalty 
Assessed 
0.441 (P =0.506) 0.440 (P =0.506) 
138  
  
Note 2. A2: Quantile Regression 
The Quantile Regression model introduced by Koenker and Basset is a kind of location model where 
quantile 𝑞 ∈ (0, 1) and it splits the data into proportions q below and (1-q) above (Baum, 2013). This 
minimizes sum of residuals which is more robust to outliers than least square estimators. Quantile 
regression estimators is asymptotically normally distributed. The most popular form of quantile 
regression is median regression in which 50th quantile is measured. To be more specific, let  𝑦(𝑥)̂ is the 
prediction function where 𝑦(𝑥)̂ = ?̂? 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑦 − 𝑦(𝑥)̂ is the estimated residuals. Then in case of 
quantile regression, the loss associated with prediction errors 𝐿(𝑒) = |𝑒| and optimal prediction 
minimizes ∑|𝑒| where the weight on the residuals depends upon the quantiles to be estimated. 
Therefore, the quantile regression estimator minimizes the following objective functions 
𝑄(𝛽𝑞) = ∑ 𝑞|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝑞|
𝑁
𝑖:𝑦𝑖>𝑥𝑖′𝛽
+ ∑ (1 − 𝑞)|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′𝛽𝑞|
𝑁
𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝑥𝑖′𝛽
 
 
It is solved by linear programming problems. Bootstrap procedures are used to estimate standard errors 
(as suggested by Buchinsky 1995).  
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Table 2.A3  : Under identification, over identification and weak instruments test 
 Returns Examined IRS Budget 
Kleibergen Paap rk LM statistics 15.75 
(0.004) 
11.75 
(0.001) 
Kleibergen Paap rk Wald F 
statistics 
5.858 
(0.000) 
4.877 
(0.006) 
Hansen J statistics 7.454 
(0.056) 
6.050 
(0.016) 
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Table 2.A4: Two Stage Quantile Regression (Based on Wage and Salary Income and AGI) 
 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Return Examined -1.444 
(2.333) 
-1.643 
(1.288) 
0.855 
(0.549) 
0.005 
(0.031) 
Enforcement cost -1.723 
(1.880) 
-0.871 
(0.691) 
0.315 
(0.342) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Civil Penalty 
Assessed 
-0.849 
(2.545) 
0.532 
(0.457) 
0.423 
(0.753) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: * Significance at the .10 level; ** significance at the .05 level; *** significance at the .01 level 
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Figure 2.A1: Marginal Effects for estimated Quintile Regression and OLS (Return 
examined) 
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Figure 2.A2: Marginal Effects for estimated Quintile Regression and OLS (Enforcement 
Cost) 
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Figure 2.A3: Marginal Effects for estimated Quintile Regression and OLS (Civil Penalty 
Assessed) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Note 3.A1 Definition of Several Issues in Sales Tax Evasion 
a. Registration Issues: Sometimes, businesses remain unregistered e.g. wholesalers, dealers. 
They end up doing both sales tax and income tax evasion.  
b. Fake and Flying Invoices – Invoices issued by dummy firm which only exist on paper. This 
type of firm shows fake purchases or purchases from other fake firms. On the other hand, 
some times,  invoices are issued to parties other than the original sellers 
c. Fraudulent Refunds – It includes refunds claimed from fake or flying invoice or transactions 
made by dummy firms. 
d. Undervaluation and Fictitious Sales: Sometimes, firms are engaged in sales suppression. 
Audit of the firm cannot reveal the true picture.  
e. Misuse of Concessions: Misuse of zero rating tax scheme as well as low tax scheme is also 
observed.  
f. Weaknesses in Data Processing: The automation systems of Federal Board of Revenue in 
Pakistan delay detection of tax evasion. Automatic cross verification can reduce this 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145  
  
REFERENCES 
Agha, A., & Haughton, J. (1996). Designing VAT systems: Some efficiency considerations. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 303-308.  
Ahmad, E. (2010). Why is it so difficult to implement a GST in Pakistan? The Lahore Journal of 
Economics, 15, 139.  
Ali, M. M., Cecil, H. W., & Knoblett, J. A. (2001). The effects of tax rates and enforcement 
policies on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers. Atlantic Economic 
Journal, 29(2), 186-202.  
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of 
public economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.  
Alm, J. (1999). Tax compliance and administration. Public Administration and Public Policy, 72, 
741-768.  
Alm, J., Bahl, R., & Murray, M. N. (1990). Tax structure and tax compliance. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 603-613.  
Alm, J., & Sennoga, E. B. (2010). Mobility, competition, and the distributional effects of tax 
evasion. National Tax Journal, 63(4), 1055.  
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of economic literature, 
36(2), 818-860.  
Bakija, J., & Slemrod, J. (2004). Do the rich flee from high state taxes? Evidence from federal 
estate tax returns (No. w10645). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Baltagi, B. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data: John Wiley & Sons. 
Bania, N., Gray, J. A., & Stone, J. A. (2007). Growth, taxes, and government expenditures: 
growth hills for US states. National Tax Journal, 193-204.  
Barro, R. J., & Redlick, C. J. (2011). Macroeconomic effects from government purchases and 
taxes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), 51-102.  
Barro, R. J., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Convergence. Journal of political Economy, 100(2), 
223-251.  
Bartik, T. J. (1992). The effects of state and local taxes on economic development: A review of 
recent research. Economic Development Quarterly, 6(1), 102-111.  
Becsi, Z. (1996). Do state and local taxes affect relative state growth? Economic Review-Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 81(2), 18.  
Brown, S. P., Hayes, K. J., & Taylor, L. L. (2003). State and local policy, factor markets, and 
regional growth. The Review of Regional Studies, 33(1), 40.  
Buchinsky, M. (1995). Quantile regression, Box-Cox transformation model, and the US wage 
structure, 1963–1987. Journal of econometrics, 65(1), 109-154.  
Buss, T. F. (2001). The effect of state tax incentives on economic growth and firm location 
decisions: An overview of the literature. Economic Development Quarterly, 15(1), 90-
105.  
Citizenship, M. G. S. o., Program, P. A. M. S., Bahl, R. W., & Alm, J. (1985). Evaluation of the 
Structure of the Jamaican Individual Income Tax: Metropolitan Studies Program, 
Syracuse University [for] Board of Revenue, Government of Jamaica. 
Clotfelter, C. T. (1983). Tax evasion and tax rates: An analysis of individual returns. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 363-373.  
Cobham, A. (2005). Tax evasion, tax avoidance and development finance. Queen Elizabeth 
House, Série documents de travail, 129.  
 
146  
  
Conway, K. S., & Houtenville, A. J. (2001). Elderly migration and state fiscal policy: evidence 
from the 1990 census migration flows. National Tax Journal, 103-123.  
Cowell, F. A. (1990). Cheating the government: The economics of evasion. MIT Press Books, 1.  
Cremer, H., & Gahvari, F. (1993). Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation. Journal of 
Public economics, 50(2), 261-275.  
Dalenberg, D. R., & Partridge, M. D. (1995). The effects of taxes, expenditures, and public 
infrastructure on metropolitan area employment. Journal of Regional Science, 35(4), 617-
640.  
Dorosh, P., & Niazi, M. K. (2006). Social Accounting Matrix for Pakistan, 2001-02: 
Methodology and Results.  
Dubin, J. A. (2007). Criminal investigation enforcement activities and taxpayer noncompliance. 
Public Finance Review, 35(4), 500-529.  
Dubin, J. A., Graetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. L. (1987). Are we a nation of tax cheaters? New 
econometric evidence on tax compliance. The American Economic Review, 77(2), 240-
245.  
Dubin, J. A., Graetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. L. (1990). The effect of audit rates on the federal 
individual income tax, 1977-1986. National Tax Journal, 395-409.  
Dubin, J. A., & Wilde, L. L. (1988). An empirical analysis of federal income tax auditing and 
compliance. National Tax Journal, 61-74.  
Easterly, W., & Rebelo, S. (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 32(3), 417-458.  
Eaton, J., & Rosen, H. S. (1980). Labor supply, uncertainty, and efficient taxation. Journal of 
Public economics, 14(3), 365-374.  
Eaton, J., & Rosen, H. S. (1980). Labor supply, uncertainty, and efficient taxation. Journal of 
Public economics, 14(3), 365-374.  
Epple, D., & Platt, G. J. (1998). Equilibrium and local redistribution in an urban economy when 
households differ in both preferences and incomes. Journal of urban Economics, 43(1), 
23-51.  
Feinstein, J. S. (1991). An econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 14-35.  
Feltenstein, A., & Cyan, M. R. (2013). A computational general equilibrium approach to sectoral 
analysis for tax potential: an application to Pakistan. Journal of Asian Economics, 27, 57-
70.  
Feltenstein, A., Lopes, L., Porras-Mendoza, J., & Wallace, S. (2014). Modeling tax reform in 
developing countries. Taxation and Development: The Weakest Link, 69-102.  
Feltenstein, A., Lopes, L. T., Porras Mendoza, J., & Wallace, S. (2013). “The Impact of Micro-
simulation and CGE modeling on Tax Reform and Tax Advice in Developing Countries”: 
A Survey of Alternative Approaches and an Application to Pakistan.  
Feltenstein, A., & Shamloo, M. (2013). Tax reform, the informal economy, and bank financing 
of capital formation. International Tax and Public Finance, 20(1), 1-28.  
Fuest, C., & Riedel, N. (2009). Tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax expenditures in developing 
countries: a review of the literature. Report for the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID).  
Gale, W. G., Krupkin, A., & Rueben, K. (2015). The relationship between taxes and growth at 
the state level: new evidence. National Tax Journal, 68(4), 919.  
 
147  
  
Gemmell, N., Kneller, R., & Sanz, I. (2006). Fiscal Policy Impacts on Growth in the OECD: Are 
They Long-or Short-Run. University of Nottingham, UK, 1-26.  
Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). The tax compliance game: Toward an 
interactive theory of law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2(1), 
1-32.  
Hassan, B., & Sarker, T. (2012). Reformed general sales tax in Pakistan. International VAT 
Monitor, 23(6), 417-421.  
Helms, L. J. (1985). The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth: A Time Series--
Cross Section Approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 574-582.  
Holcombe, R. G., & Lacombe, D. J. (2004). The effect of state income taxation on per capita 
income growth. Public Finance Review, 32(3), 292-312.  
Jou, J.-B. (1992). Income Tax Evasion: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the US State-level 
Data, Tax Year 1976-1989. University of Chicago, Department of Economics.    
Joulfaian, D., & Rider, M. (1996). Tax evasion in the presence of negative income tax rates. 
National Tax Journal, 553-570.  
Jung, Y. H., Snow, A., & Trandel, G. A. (1994). Tax evasion and the size of the underground 
economy. Journal of Public economics, 54(3), 391-402.  
Kamdar, N. (1995). Information reporting and tax compliance: An investigation using individual 
TCMP data. Atlantic Economic Journal, 23(4), 278-292.  
Kaplan, D. M., & Sun, Y. (2012). Smoothed estimating equations for instrumental variables 
quantile regression.  
Kar, D., & Spanjers, J. (2014). Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2003-2012. 
Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity.  
Kesselman, J. R. (1989). Income tax evasion: an intersectoral analysis. Journal of Public 
Economics, 38(2), 137-182.  
Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2010). Unwilling or 
unable to cheat? Evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in Denmark. (No. 
w15769). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2016). Why can modern governments tax so much? An 
agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries. Economica, 83(330), 219-246.  
Kleven, H. J., Landais, C., Saez, E., & Schultz, E. A. (2013). Migration and wage effects of 
taxing top earners: evidence from the foreigners' tax scheme in Denmark. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, qjt033  
Kneller, R., Bleaney, M. F., & Gemmell, N. (1999). Fiscal policy and growth: evidence from 
OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics, 74(2), 171-190.  
Koenker, R., & Bassett Jr, G. (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 33-50.  
Koenker, R., & Hallock, K. (2001). Quantile regression: An introduction. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15(4), 43-56.  
Kopczuk, W., & Slemrod, J. (2006). Putting firms into optimal tax theory. The American 
Economic Review, 96(2), 130-134.  
Lee, Y., & Gordon, R. H. (2005). Tax structure and economic growth. Journal of public 
economics, 89(5), 1027-1043.  
Lin, W.-Z., & Yang, C.-C. (2001). A dynamic portfolio choice model of tax evasion: 
Comparative statics of tax rates and its implication for economic growth. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(11), 1827-1840.  
148  
  
Lucas, R. E. (1990). Supply-side economics: An analytical review. Oxford Economic Papers, 
42(2), 293-316.  
Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Rider, M. (2005). Multiple modes of tax evasion: theory and evidence. 
National Tax Journal, 51-76.  
Mazerov, M. (2014). State Taxes Have a Negligible Impact on Americans’ Interstate Moves. 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised May, 21, 3.  
McGuire, T. J. (1985). Are local property taxes important in the intrametropolitan location 
decisions of firms? An empirical analysis of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 18(2), 226-234.  
McLure Jr, C. E. (1970). Taxation, substitution, and industrial location. Journal of Political 
Economy, 78(1), 112-132.  
Mertens, K., & Ravn, M. O. (2013). The dynamic effects of personal and corporate income tax 
changes in the United States. The American Economic Review, 103(4), 1212-1247.  
Miller, S. M., & Russek, F. S. (1997). Fiscal structures and economic growth at the state and 
local level. Public Finance Review, 25(2), 213-237.  
Neumann, G. R., & Topel, R. H. (1991). Employment risk, diversification, and unemployment. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1341-1365.  
Newman, R. J. (1983). Industry migration and growth in the South. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 76-86.  
Ojede, A., & Yamarik, S. (2012). Tax policy and state economic growth: The long-run and short-
run of it. Economics Letters, 116(2), 161-165.  
Pencavel, J. H. (1979). A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules. 
Journal of Public Economics, 12(1), 115-124.  
Phillips, J. M., & Goss, E. P. (1995). The effect of state and local taxes on economic 
development: A meta-analysis. Southern Economic Journal, 320-333.  
Plaut, T. R., & Pluta, J. E. (1983). Business climate, taxes and expenditures, and state industrial 
growth in the United States. Southern Economic Journal, 99-119.  
Pomeranz, D. (2015). No taxation without information: Deterrence and self-enforcement in the 
value added tax. The American Economic Review, 105(8), 2539-2569.  
Poterba, J. M. (1987). Tax evasion and capital gains taxation: National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Ramsey, F. P. (1927). A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. The Economic Journal, 
37(145), 47-61.  
Razin, A., & Sadka, E. (2012). Tax competition and migration: the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis 
revisited. CESifo Economic Studies, 58(1), 164-180.  
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1985). Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework. 
Journal of Public Economics, 26(1), 1-18.  
Roback, J. (1982). Wages, rents, and the quality of life. Journal of Political Economy, 90(6), 
1257-1278.  
Romans, T., & Subrahmanyam, G. (1979). State and local taxes, transfers and regional economic 
growth. Southern Economic Journal, 435-444.  
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2010). The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: estimates 
based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. The American Economic Review, 100(3), 763-
801.  
Roubini, N., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995). A growth model of inflation, tax evasion, and financial 
repression. Journal of Monetary Economics, 35(2), 275-301.  
149  
  
SAMWALK. (2010). A Social Accounting Matrix for Pakistan. [World Bank].  
Sandmo, A. (1981). Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity—efficiency tradeoff. 
Journal of public economics, 16(3), 265-288.  
Schneider, F. (2005). Shadow economies of 145 countries all over the world: What do we really 
know? CREMA Working Paper 2006-01, Basel, Center for Research in Economics, 
Management and the Arts. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 
599-617.  
Slemrod, J. (1985). An empirical test for tax evasion. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
232-238.  
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2002). Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration in Handbook of 
Public Economics, vol. 3, edited by Auerbach and Feldstein: Elsevier Science. 
Srinivasan, T. N. (1973). Tax evasion: A model. Journal of public economics, 2(4), 339-346.  
Srithongrung, A., & Kriz, K. A. (2014). The impact of subnational fiscal policies on economic 
growth: A dynamic analysis approach. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 
33(4), 912-928.  
Tanzi, V., & Zee, H. H. (2001). Tax policy for developing countries (Vol. 27): International 
Monetary Fund. 
Tauchen, H. V., Witte, A. D., & Beron, K. J. (1989). Tax compliance: An investigation using 
individual TCMP data (No. w3078). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Thalmann, P. (1992). Factor taxes and evasion in general equilibrium. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 22(2), 259-283.  
Tomljanovich, M. (2004). The role of state fiscal policy in state economic growth. 
Contemporary Economic Policy, 22(3), 318-330.  
Torgler, B. (2007). Tax compliance and tax morale: A theoretical and empirical analysis: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Wasylenko, M. (1999). Taxation and economic development: The state of the economic 
literature. Public Administration and Public Policy, 72, 309-328.  
Wasylenko, M., & McGuire, T. (1985). Jobs and taxes: the effect of business climate on states 
employment and growth rates. National Tax Journal, 497-511.  
Watson, H. (1985). Tax evasion and labor markets. Journal of public economics, 27(2), 231-246.  
Widmalm, F. (2001). Tax structure and growth: Are some taxes better than others? Public 
Choice, 107(3-4), 199-219.  
Witte, A. D., & Woodbury, D. F. (1985). The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax 
compliance: The case of the US individual income tax. National Tax Journal, 1-13.  
Yamarik, S. (2000). Can tax policy help explain state-level macroeconomic growth? Economics 
Letters, 68(2), 211-215.  
Yitzhaki, S. (1974). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of public economics, 
3(2), 201-202.  
Young, C., & Varner, C. (2011). Millionaire migration and state taxation of top incomes: 
Evidence from a natural experiment. National Tax Journal, 64(2), 255.  
Yunus, M. (2006). Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax 
Evasion.  
 
 
 
150  
  
VITA 
 
Sohani Fatehin completed her B.S.S and M.S.S. in Economics from the University of Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. She pursued her MA from Georgia State University in 2011 and started her Doctoral 
Program in Fall of 2011. During her years in the Doctoral Program at Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, she has received “E.D. (Jack) Dunn Fellowship” for her research in Public 
Finance along with Second Century Initiative Fellowship for three consecutive years. She has 
worked at the University of Dhaka as a Lecture for one year.  
Her research interests are Public Finance, and Development Economics. 
Sohani will join Dickinson College as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics in Fall 2017.  
